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Further Reportage on Ignatenko's News Briefing

PM0805162491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[G. Alimov report on 7 May news briefing by Vitaliy Ignatenko, aide to the USSR president: "Will M. Gorbachev Attend the Meeting of the 'Seven'?"]

[Excerpts] The USSR president's aide Vitaliy Ignatenko held a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists 7 May.

What Lies Behind the U.S. Ambassador's Meeting With M. Gorbachev?

Commenting on U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock's meeting with M. Gorbachev, which took place in the morning of 7 May, V. Ignatenko stated that it was not prompted by any exceptional circumstances. He said that it was a normal, business visit by the ambassador to the president. Mikhail Sergeyevich inquired about G. Bush's health and asked that best wishes be conveyed to him in connection with his return to work.

Agreement was reached at the meeting that in the near future concrete steps will be taken on questions that are on the agenda, in particular the problem connected with the CFE Treaty.

Why Did the Vietnamese Prime Minister Come to Moscow?

As already reported, M.S. Gorbachev received in the Kremlin Do Muoi, chairman of the Vietnamese Council of Ministers, who is in Moscow on a working visit. Earlier the Vietnamese guest was received by USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov and Prime Minister V. Pavlov. As V. Ignatenko noted, these intensive Soviet-Vietnamese contacts at a high political level were prompted by the pressing need to "synchronize watches" and exchange opinions on topical problems of bilateral relations and international life. Thanks to the preferential rate of increase in deliveries of Vietnamese goods (food, tropical agricultural products, consumer goods, electronics), trade turnover between our country and Vietnam has achieved balance in 1991—500 million U.S. dollars on each side. The speaker at the briefing announced that the Vietnamese side has even begun to pay off its debt to our country of nearly 10 billion [currency not specified; Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1325 GMT on 7 May carries a report on Ignatenko's remarks which gives the previous figure as "6 billion" rather than 10 billion].

What Moscow Expects From the Top Chinese Leader's Visit

The first Soviet-Chinese summit meeting in Moscow since 1957 will take place 15 through 19 May. The top Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission, will pay an official visit to our country. Since M.S. Gorbachev's visit to China in May 1989 relations between our two countries have come a long way. A firm basis in treaty law has been established for cooperation in various spheres. As V. Ignatenko announced, reciprocal trade turnover has risen to R3 billion. The composition of the Chinese delegation is noteworthy—it will include the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, foreign economic relations and foreign trade....

On the Open Letter to A.N. Yakovlev

The USSR president's aide was asked: Has M. Gorbachev had an opportunity to study the open letter to A.N. Yakovlev in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA?

"Mikhail Sergeyevich has had no opportunity since this morning to study the open letter published in that newspaper, because as I told you, the president was extremely busy," V. Ignatenko said. "But I am sure he will study this item, without fail. I cannot claim to speak for the president on this matter, but nonetheless I wish to say: It is quite obvious that, as USSR president and CPSU Central Committee general secretary, certain points in this letter are bound to cause him regret, other points to cause perplexity, and some to provoke a firm protest."

I also assume, V. Ignatenko went on, that the letter was drawn up in the old journalistic genre whereby the author addresses one individual but has in mind another, and where the allegories are transparent and will be easily penetrated by any well-prepared reader, in which category I include the USSR president. I would like to draw attention to one point in the letter, which creates the image of the country as a ship, a country controlled by no one, speeding toward the reefs at the whim of the waves. All this is in total contradiction to what was said here by the USSR president at the joint news conference (meaning M. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand—G.A.).

This publication can hardly be considered timely. At this moment, when consensus and consolidation are beginning to put forth shoots in society, such an open letter could reverse the process, because the author's wish to reduce matters to the familiar pattern of revenge can be clearly perceived.

Could the USSR President Take Part in the Meeting of the "Seven"?

It is well known that a conference of leaders of the seven leading industrial countries is planned for July. In this connection people asked whether the question of M.S. Gorbachev's participating in this conference was raised during the meeting with the French president. According to V. Ignatenko, we have not had an official invitation to that effect. "But I know that this is being reported in the newspapers," the USSR president's aide noted, "and no doubt this possibility is under discussion in some circles. We would consider the possibility seriously if such a proposal were made in the proper form." [passage omitted]

Does the President Support the Law on Entry and Exit Procedures?

The speaker at the briefing stated that the president fully supports this document. It is necessary, however, to adopt a law that would come into force immediately and would not become just another irritant that exists but for various reasons is not fulfilled. The USSR president's aide confirmed the report that some countries are expressing the wish that the adoption of this law not be hurried, but V. Ignatenko did not say which countries. "These moans reach us," he said, "and we listen carefully to them, but not to do anyone a favor. In adopting this law we will act on the basis of our own interests, the interests of the development of the democratic process." [passage omitted]

Treaty Wanted To Keep NATO From Borders

PM0805154391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 Second Edition p 4

["My Opinion" article by Vladimir Gerasimov: "Mistrust Still Rules the Roost"]

[Text] "Exclusively defensive"... "Creates the necessary strategic balance"... "Democratically organized"... This is all about NATO. Again: "This alliance plays an indispensable role in building Europe's future." Such maxims were heard recently in Prague.

There, at the two-day international conference "The Future of European Security," NATO Secretary General M. Woerner and its other organizer—J. Dienstbier, foreign minister of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic—plus representatives of the United States and the North Atlantic alliance countries and all kinds of experts were the opponents of the Soviet delegation. It firmly insisted on NATO's disbandment: Why preserve it, since the military structures of the Warsaw Pact Organization have ceased to exist?

The Soviet side's logic is perfectly clear. The public in the Western European countries values and understands it. Why mothball the symbol and legacy of the Cold War? When 6,000 NATO military aircraft shake the sky over your head (at the height of the NATO summer games up to 40 percent of regular passenger flights are canceled at Frankfurt am Main, for example, one of Germany's main airports); when newspapers breathlessly discuss the Atlanticists' new strategy whose mainstay will be a rapid response force (between 40,000 and 100,000 men); when, after the Persian Gulf war, the United States and Britain insist on giving the military bloc a more active role and greater "geographic" responsibility—all this cannot fail to irritate Europeans. The NATO-ites plainly feel such a negative attitude to them: This is why the flow of information splashes onto heads, trying to prove that being without NATO would be like "going without water: You could not get anywhere."

There is also this argument: NATO provides an opportunity to link Europe with the United States, and the fact that the Soviet "occupiers" are now pulling out of Central and Eastern Europe is disregarded. Why must the U.S. "occupiers" remain in Western Europe? Why is NATO a "deterrent factor" and why does it "create a strategic balance," while the Warsaw Pact never created one? Is it really impossible, instead of a military bloc, to build a treaty structure? A consultative one?

Unfortunately, military problems are still taxing the politicians, diplomats, and journalists. One of the stumbling blocks at the conference was Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarian weekly REFORM earlier published a conversation with Hungarian Defense Minister L. Fur. "Is it possible to create a guarantee that Soviet soldiers will not return? It would be a big comfort to the Hungarian population," the correspondent's view sounded almost provocative, "if a U.S. military base were created at our 'eastern gateway,' in Zahony. Such bases would also be needed on the Yugoslav and Romanian borders." "No way is this feasible," the minister replied. "For 45 years we wanted to free ourselves from foreign invaders, from an external military force. The building of any U.S. military base is totally ruled out." "I do not want to conjecture, but this could still happen," the correspondent concluded.

Some six months ago certain Eastern European politicians could only be heard saying that the former Warsaw Pact states must join NATO as quickly as possible. Rejecting the idea of neutrality, our former allies see integration in the West's defensive and political structures simply as deliverance from the vacuum that is arising with the "invaders'" departure. The NATO-ites have been severe about "showing them the door." The military bloc's preservation does not mean its expansion. That is happening, however—by virtue of the united Germany.

Under conditions when Central and Eastern European countries have no thought of neutrality or a neutral zone, when bloc thinking continues to prevail and the North Atlantic alliance itself is being strengthened by East Germany, and when the U.S. military presence is being maintained in Europe, the Soviet Union naturally wishes to enshrine in new treaties with its neighbors the point that no side will enter into an alliance directed against another side. We do not want the rapid response detachments which the Atlanticists are setting up to appear on our borders.

M. Woerner said in Prague that the Soviet Union must understand that all the peoples of the NATO countries and of Central and Eastern Europe have a desire to build a new Europe with the USSR. The system of all-European security cannot exist without the Soviet Union. It is possible to agree with this. But the same M. Woerner also wagged his finger: The USSR must know that NATO is not indifferent to the countries of central and Eastern Europe. In other words, if anything should happen—NATO will be right there.

This is how we live: Mistrust still rules the roost.

United States & Canada

U.S. President Meets Baltic Leaders in Washington

LD0805221891 Moscow TASS in English 2151 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Text] Washington May 9 TASS—President Bush met Lithuanian parliament President Vytautas Landsbergis, Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, and Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis in the White House on Wednesday. They are currently in the United States on a private visit.

The meeting with the Baltic leaders continued for about an hour.

In response to reporters' questions at the close of the meeting, the Baltic leaders described it as very substantive.

The U.S. President told a news conference on the eve of the meeting that he would tell the Baltic leaders that President Gorbachev and he developed a lasting relationship, that it would be interesting for him to hear about their problems and that the U.S. had never recognised and did not recognise the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union.

However, Bush said he would encourage a peaceful settlement of these complex issues.

Judging by the Baltic leaders' remarks after meeting the U.S. President, Bush firmly adhered to his position, making no specific assurances at the meeting which virtually came to the U.S. President's familiarisation with the opinions of Landsbergis, Savisaar and Godmanis.

Praises Gorbachev at News Conference

LD0805233791 Moscow World Service in English 2000 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] American President George Bush has praised the activities of Mikhail Gorbachev as the president of the Soviet Union. At a White House News Conference before his meeting with the leaders of the Baltic republics, he said that Gorbachev's achievements are great. His attitude to Eastern Europe and the policy of perestroyka and glasnost enjoy the respect of the U.S. President.

Recalling that the United States has never recognised the inclusion of the Batlic republics in the Soviet Union, George Bush said that he will encourage a peaceful solution of these complicated issues. He said that the Soviet Union is going through hard times in economy but admitted that he has not decided the question of credits for this country for purchasing American grain yet.

TASS Observer on 'U.S. Inteference' in Baltics

LD0805144791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1400 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS international observer Albert Balebanov]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 8 May (TASS)—Steny Hoyer, member of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, has stated that the commission he heads on security and cooperation in Europe will seek to ensure that "the sovereignty of the three Baltic states is recognized by the international community and the Soviet Union." With this goal, the "Hoyer Commission" has acted as the initiator of hearings "on the situation in the Baltics" in which the leaders of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR have been invited to participate.

Such actions by U.S. congressmen constitute undisguised interference in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union and an attempt to exert pressure on Moscow in regulating its relations with the Union republics. [passage omitted]

But perhaps a new approach toward the USSR by official Washington, about which the NEWSWEEK wrote recently, have begun to manifest themselves? In the magazine's words, "Although the Bush Administration supports Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev as before, officials in Washington are switching imperceptibly to a dual policy with regard to the Soviet Union." If the magazine is right, then it is possible to envisage a situation which, in my view, is fraught with negative consequences for bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations.

I would like to hope, however, that the U.S. side will not embark upon this path and will show restraint and a responsible approach to the complex processes under way in the USSR and refrain from interference in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union.

Commentator on Need for U.S. Aid to Soviet Union

LD0805144891 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 7 May 91

[Nurlan Urazbayev commentary]

[Text] At a time when ethnic conflicts and the economic crisis in this country are changing for the worse some Western leaders are trying to figure out different approaches to relations with the Soviet Union. What can these approaches be like? We have taken the question to Nurlan Urazbayev of our staff:

On Wednesday President Bush is to meet with the leaders of the three Baltic republics and former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The Russian Federation Premier Ivan Silayev has visited the United States. American officials have stepped up their efforts in many other Soviet regions. This is proof the administration in Washington attaches increasing significance to Soviet republics that are pressing for greater independence. Many fear the United States may stop supporting

Gorbachev to stake on local leaders and prominent opposition reformers instead.

But it seems too early to say that the United States has adopted a new strategy toward this country. The American attitude toward events in the Soviet Union has been going through two principle stages. One was a gusher of euphoria about perestroyka. The other a guarded response to the political and economic instability in this country. If the unstable Soviet Union is to cope with the crisis, it needs help from other nations and if it, God forbid, falls to pieces it can prove a threat that may dwarf the Gulf crisis.

American politicians and many others feel that after the war community showed its unity in the Gulf it must do the same toward the Soviet Union. Well, that is a good idea, especially with the changes that have taken place on the Soviet political scene. As many admit, Mikhail Gorbachev has survived a personal crisis. He has not resigned and does not look like it. On the contrary, he and the leaders of nine republics have shaken hands on anticrisis moves. Mikhail Gorbachev energetically confirms his loyalty to reforms and his readiness to cooperate with the West. This helps the moderates consolidate with the Kremlin and block both the right- and left-wing extremists, at least for some time.

The Western wait-and-see tactics must come to an end shortly. At any rate, there have been signs that the new Western strategy will not be directed at destroying the Soviet Union .

American Senator Richard Lugar recently told a Finnish magazine that if the United States wants to avert a threat, which the unstable Soviet Union may present, it must act constructively. America must help the Soviet Union improve economically and build a more democratic society.

Eduard Shevardnadze supported the idea in an interview with TIME magazine. He said this country badly needs not so much charity aid as easy term intellectual and technical assitance and credits.

So the United States is to specify priorities shortly. Let's hope it won't miss the time for constructive solutions.

China

Defense Ministry Spokesman Reviews Yazov Visit

LD0805105991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1000 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 8 May (TASS)—"Relations between the USSR and the PRC are traditionally an influential factor in world politics. The visit to China by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989, last year's visit to the USSR by PRC State Council Prime Minister Li Peng, and other Soviet-Chinese contacts are convincing evidence of the stabilizing influence of relations between our states on the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as a whole", Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, head of the information directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, has stated. He granted an interview to a TASS correspondent in connection with the completion of the visit to China by Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense. Gen Manilov was a member of the Soviet military delegation that accompanied the defense minister.

In Valery Manilov's opinion, ties along military lines are an essential component of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the PRC. A beneficial role is being played here by the implementation of the agreement signed in 1990 on the guiding principles of mutual reductions in armed forces and of confidence-building in the military sphere in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border. "Talks on the border settlement are advancing successfully. Cooperation between the Ministries of Defense of the USSR and the PRC on a broad range of issues is intensifying. Reciprocal visits and contacts at various levels have been put on a regular footing", the head of the information directorate noted.

According to the general, this is the context in which the current visit by the Soviet military delegation should be viewed. The content and character of the meetings and talks held within the context of it, he considers, mean that the conclusion can be drawn that the visit to China by Dmitriy Yazov will promote "further deepening of mutual understanding in various spheres, including the strengthening of security in the Asia-Pacific region".

The Soviet Union is taking an active part in the building of a secure, humane, and civilized world order, Valeriy Manilov observed. This is a task which can only be accomplished together, on a basis of reciprocity, of sensible compromise, and of constructive cooperation. "It is precisely on such a basis that Soviet-Chinese relations are developing in the interests of the peoples of our two countries and of the strengthening of Asian and universal security", Gen. Manilov emphasized.

Ties With PRC Assessed in Light of Jiang Trip

PM0805123591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, deputy chairman of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society: "Two Years On"]

[Text] Beijing—Beijing is bathed in May sunshine. To a Muscovite it seems like the height of summer. Only the rosy crowns of the flowering peach trees are a bright indication that it is spring in Beijing. It is two years since the top leaders of the USSR and PRC met here in order to "close the past and open up the future." And exactly two years later, on literally the same dates—15 through 19 May—the first Soviet-Chinese summit in Moscow since 1957 will be held. Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the PRC Central Military Council, is to pay an official visit to our country.

Immediately after the normalization of Chinese-Soviet relations they had to endure a serious test of strength. The dramatic events in China and the difficulties of perestroyka in the USSR have sometimes evoked ambivalent feelings in our states. But this has not nullified the consensus reached in Beijing. For both sides have remained committed to the principles enshrined in the Soviet-Chinese joint communique. These are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence. A qualitatively new model of relations that can be described as good-neighborly cooperation and equal partnership has taken shape on the basis of these principles over the last two years.

Interparty relations can serve as an example. Two years ago the Beijing communique stated that the CPSU and the CPC would implement contacts and exchanges in accordance with the principles of independence and autonomy, complete equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. A useful exchange of experience of party work in conditions of perestroyka and reforms has developed within this framework.

After the normalization of relations the priority task was to expand trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, which would promote perestroyka in the USSR and the reforms in China. Bilateral relations in this sphere have again become dynamic. Trade turnover (in money terms) has topped the record indicators of the fifties and has reached almost $4 billion. Overall, the volume of Soviet-Chinese trade in the eighties increased by a factor of 14. But no matter how impressive these figures may look, there is no reason to exult at them. First, trade turnover between our countries may decrease this year. Second, the Soviet Union is in fifth place among China's commercial partners.

In view of our present difficulties, China recently granted the Soviet Union a commodity credit of $730 million. This sum will be used to supply us with grain, meat, tea, silk, textiles, and other consumer goods. This is the biggest action of this kind that China has ever taken on such preferential terms.

On the other hand, a state credit granted by the Soviet Union enabled China to start construction of the Usu-Ala Shan Pass railroad. This line will link the two states' railroad networks via Xinjiang and Kazakhstan and will be the shortest route from West Europe to East Asia.

The results of collaboration are particularly noticeable in the power industry sphere. The total capacity of the thermal electric power stations under construction in the PRC with technical assistance from the USSR is nearly 7 million kilowatts.

Decentralization is also characteristic of a sphere of bilateral relations like humanitarian exchanges. The Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship With Foreign Countries now perform mainly a coordinating role, encouraging local organizations and collectives to establish direct contacts with the partners that interest them.

"Like our colleagues in Moscow, we are proud that six years before the official normalization of interstate relations 'people's diplomacy' began to prepare the ground for this," Chen Haosu, vice chairman of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries, says. "Back in 1983 the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship With Foreign Countries resumed active collaboration. And in the two years since the Beijing meeting we have extended the framework of our activity in terms of both breadth and depth."

According to Chen Haosu, these friendly contacts highlight the roots of the traditional friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples, and also their common forward-looking approach. It was no accident that the county city of Wanxian decided to establish sister city ties with Cherkassy in the Ukraine. That was the birthplace of future pilot Grigoriy Kulishenko, who in 1939 defended the Chinese capital from Japanese bombers. The pilot sacrificed his own life to ensure that his downed aircraft did not come down on the houses densely scattered along the bank of the Yangtze. The daughter of the internationalist hero recently visited Wanxian, and the city's ties with Cherkassy will now be permanent.

The normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC has only begun to yield fruit over the last two years. But one consequence of it became clear immediately: Each of the two peoples felt that they had a reliable, secure rear. The possibility emerged of putting an end to the expensive military confrontation along the 7,500-km border and in the long term working to demilitarize the border. It was stated at the meeting in Beijing: "Both sides agreed to take measures to reduce armed forces in the Soviet-Chinese border region to a minimum level consonant with normal good-neighborly relations between the two states."

The USSR and the PRC, the joint communique said, advocate that the border questions inherited from the past be resolved fairly and rationally on the basis of the treaties on the present Soviet border, in a spirit of equal consultations, mutual understanding, and mutual tractability.

An intergovernmental agreement on the guiding principles for the mutual reduction of armed forces and the strengthening of trust in the military sphere along the Soviet-Chinese border was signed a year ago in Moscow. A good legal basis was thereby laid for further talks. At the same time it was placed on record that the leaders of the USSR and PRC military departments would implement friendly exchanges with a view to strengthening mutual understanding. USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov has just paid an official visit to China in accordance with this understanding.

The transformation of the Soviet-Chinese border into a zone of peace and good-neighborliness is not only releasing considerable resources for creative purposes but is also eliminating a serious seat of tension in the Far East.

"Although there are grounds for saying that the 'cold war' is over, the recent events in the Persian Gulf were a reminder that the threat of regional conflicts remains and that hegemonism and the policy of force still exist," I was told by Professor Xu Kui, an eminent political scientist and director of the Soviet and East European Studies Institute. "In these conditions the normalization of Chinese-Soviet relations is having a stabilizing influence both on the Asian and Pacific region and on the world situation as a whole. Neighboring Asian states are especially aware of this.

"I have just got back from Moscow," Xu Kui continued, "and I saw for myself that over the last two years our two peoples have become still more deeply aware that the normalization of Chinese-Soviet relations accords with their vital interests and that the importance of our cooperation is increasing both for its participants and for the whole of mankind."

"The two years since the Beijing meeting have graphically demonstrated that the new model of Chinese-Soviet relations is advantageous not only to us but also to the Asian and Pacific region and the whole world," Li Jing Jie, deputy director of the institute, chipped in. "They have revealed the complete untenability of fears that the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow may be detrimental to anyone. On the contrary, it is a weighty positive factor in international life. The cornerstone in the foundation of Chinese-Soviet relations is mutual trust. This emerges from mutual understanding, and meetings between top leaders are the shortest route to that. They are especially valuable when both our states are experiencing a complex transitional period when it is extremely necessary to exchange experience of successes and failures and to compare views on how the new world order is shaping up after the end of the 'cold war.' That is why people in Beijing are convinced that the visit to Moscow by the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee will give a new fillip to Chinese-Soviet cooperation and collaboration."

Northeast Asia

Magazine Article on ROK-Soviet Relations Cited

SK0905093491 Moscow International Service in Korean 1200 GMT 5 May 91

["Gist" of special article carried in TODAY'S ASIA AND AFRICA under the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Rogachev, Soviet [word indistinct], noted that despite the repeated (?opinion) of the DPRK, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Seoul.

North Korean publications strongly denounced such a stance on Moscow's part. It is, however, natural that each country should have its own opinion. The Soviet Union and the DPRK have had concerns about each other. Both countries want the prosperity of their people. In addition, considering their geographic and strategic positions, both countries have had relations in economic, political, and security fields. That is to say, it would be unreasonable for both countries to be alienated from each other because of some ideological differences and or other issues.

Judging from the geographic proximity between the Soviet Union and the DPRK, it is requisite that constructive relations be maintained between the two countries.

Specific relations came to a rupture [patan]. The reality created by [words indistinct] requires perestroyka. However, it does not mean that such perestroyka should accompany a rupture. The Soviet Union has recognized that Soviet-DPRK relations should be established on the basis of mutual understandings. This is related to the development of relations with the ROK.

Today, Soviet society is very interested in the ROK. This is, above all, because the ROK has achieved the economic success that we want. We are confident that mutual cooperation in economic fields will contribute to our perestroyka cause.

Also, Seoul established official relations with Moscow on the basis of its economic interest in the Soviet Union. The ROK side knows well that we are ready to establish joint ventures with foreign companies. We are considering establishing joint ventures in technological processing fields and in other highly profitable fields. Therefore, the ROK side does not want to make a (?blind) contact with us. It is, however, true that, because the ROK has firmly secured its international position, the Soviet Union officially recognized it.

In addition, the ROK is beginning to show a confident attitude in dialogue with the North. The political task of the Soviet Union lies not in supporting either the North or the South, but in helping ease tension on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, all countries concerned should know this.

The economic relations with Seoul should be developed multilaterally. However, in the process of developing mutual relations between the two countries, any measures to separate the DPRK should not be taken.

The recognition of Seoul is not a political goal itself. This is nothing but a policy for both the North and the South to lead into an international structure, because an international structure may help guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Near East & South Asia

Bessmertnykh Middle East Visit Previewed

Bessmertnykh Previews Tour

LD0805130191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1100 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 8 May (TASS)—Measuring the concept of a Near East settlement against the realities of the region is the basic task of the trip by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR foreign minister, around the countries of the Near East which began today. The trip is to include Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and, possibly, Lebanon. This was stated by the Soviet minister in a conversation with journalists at Moscow airport immediately before he flew out to Damascus.

In Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's opinion, now is the very time when there is an opportunity to realize "a historic chance to shift the Near East settlement process out of deadlock". For the last few months, he said, the Soviet Union has been working energetically on the issue of seeking the most suitable formula for developing the process of a peaceful settlement in the Near East. For example, a joint Soviet-U.S. statement was adopted in January. It envisaged, in particular, efforts to seek a start to this process. In the months that followed, the Soviet side has been in contact with leading states in this region and also with the United States, European countries, and the Palestinians in order to formulate "a proper concept for starting to resolve" the conflict. "I was in no hurry to travel to the region, although I did receive suggestions from my experts that I should do so, noted the minister. I took the view that there had to be a final and fairly definite understanding of the actual tasks and possibilities, routes, and room for maneuver". Now, in his opinion, the time has come to test the "closeness to real life" of the concept that has been developed "in direct conversations and talks with the leaders of states in the region".

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh described his forthcoming contacts with the leadership of Egypt as "the key" during his visit. "We attach great significance to the role of Egypt, as a country which occupies a special position within this region and which has already done quite a lot when it comes to resolving the region's problems, he stressed. We are counting on Egypt's efforts being positive when it comes to resolving the urgent task of today—to be precise, in developing the process of talks and settling the Near East conflict".

Talking about his visit to Israel, the Soviet minister stressed that it is connected "primarily with the problem of a Near East settlement". Furthermore, he described Israel "as one of the most active partners in this process", adding that the Soviet Union "absolutely has to maintain a businesslike link with it". He noted especially that this link was maintained previously as well. However, "there will now be an opportunity to discuss all issues connected with a settlement directly with the Israeli leadership".

Answering a question about the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations with this country, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said "within the context of the settlement process which is now coming into being, the question of restoring diplomatic relations will be resolved naturally".

The head of the Soviet foreign policy department said that during his trip there are plans to hold meetings with the leadership of the PLO and with Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. However, the place and time for these meetings have not yet been decided. "We consider that the PLO as an organization representing the interests of the Palestinian people absolutely must play its part in the process of seeking solutions to the Near East conflict at the center of which lies the Palestinian problem", stressed Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.

Bessmertnykh on Regional Conference

AU0805130391 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 2 May 91 p 4

[Interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "A Chance for the Middle East (Written for VEREJNOST)"]

[Text] [VEREJNOST] What is your opinion about the results of your meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State in Kislovodsk?

[Bessmertnykh] The meeting was very beneficial and necessary. Both parties had their own concepts that contained many elements in common. Of course, many problems will have to be worked out—both jointly and individually.

The times when the Soviet Union and the United States each had their own group of partners are over. Now, we are going to work together with everyone. Our task—as joint chairmen of the future conference—is not to force our point of view on the potential participants but to help find a common language when searching for an agreement.

[VEREJNOST] What is you opinion about the peace conference after the meeting with J. Baker in Kislovodsk?

[Bessmertnykh] From the large number of problems that will have to be discussed, we have singled out the most important ones awaiting the conference, its participants, and its joint chairmen. It will be a peace conference about the Middle East that can really play a historic role.

[VEREJNOST] Who may participate in the conference?

[Bessmertnykh] The list of the participants in the conference is basically clear: mainly the Arab states that border Israel, the Palestinians, Israel itself, and the joint chairman's countries. The question of the presence of Europeans and of the United Nations is still unresolved.

[VEREJNOST] What kind of discussions at the conference are anticipated?

[Bessmertnykh] All who want to participate in the conference must meet with the co-chairmen of the conference. They will present their general standpoint toward the tasks awaiting the conference and its participants. If necessary, more plenary meetings may be convened—this will have to be agreed upon with all the participants.

[VEREJNOST] To what degree will the Palestinians participate in the conference and to what degree they will participate in the solution to the Palestinian problem as such?

[Bessmertnykh] This is one of the main questions. The Palestinians are proposing a few solutions in this connection and we are examining them. Most likely a preliminary variant of the Palestinian problem will have to be worked out and, gradually, a final solution will be found, leading to a general settlement in the region. This means that the solution will be found step by step.

[VEREJNOST] Contact with our American colleagues who accompanied the U.S. Secretary of State on his trip to the Middle East has evoked—at least among journalists—considerable skepticism. What is your opinion?

[Bessmertnykh] I will say it openly. We have finally decided to solve one of the oldest conflicts in which standpoints have changed into axioms. As is well known, to change any axiom is very difficult. From this also ensues the enormous complexity of the entire task. I do not want to assert that the conference will take place unconditionally. There is a lot of work awaiting us. Yet, some kind of a unifying platform is beginning to appear. If we succeed in convening the conference, everything will be OK. If not, then it will be very bad, because I do not know when another chance like this will arise.

Churkin Cited on Mideast Trip

PM0905095991 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 8 May 91 p 4

[Sami 'Imarah report: "Soviet Spokesman Tells AL-SHARQ AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Bessmertnykh's Visit to Israel Aims At Organizing Settlement, Not Settling Shape of Relations"]

[Excerpts] Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's visit to the Middle East region, which begins today, arouses many expectations and much speculation not only because it is the first visit by a Soviet minister after similar tours by his U.S. counterpart James Baker, but also because the uproar that has accompanied this visit since it was announced is largely attributable to the fact that it includes, for the first time, Israel, with which Moscow severed its diplomatic relations in June 1967.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT interviewed Vitaliy Churkin, official spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, to ask him about this subject prior to his departure with Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh for the Middle East region. [passage omitted]

Churkin, a distinguished diplomat, began his interview with us by saying: There are no special motives behind the announcement of the visit to Israel. There is an attempt to organize the settlement process in the Middle East—the settlement which cannot be realized without Israel, because of its presence at the heart of the conflict. And as Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Secretary Baker together reached the conviction that their countries would sponsor the expected conference on peace in the Middle East and would work directly with all the parties concerned, we believe in the need to use our influence, including our dialogue with Israel. And it is no secret that a dialogue took place in the past between the Soviet and Israeli foreign ministers in several places. And the Soviet foreign minister also met with Yitzhaq Shamir twice recently.

He went on to say: As for the Soviet foreign minister's first visit to Israel, I see nothing in it that can be regarded as a surprise: The minister will be in the region and his visit to Israel will be confirmation of the importance we attach to attempts to activate the mechanism of the settlement process in the Middle East. And despite the complexity of the problem, we believe that the opportunity is favorable and better than ever before—which explains the reason for our foreign minister's unconventional visit to Israel.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT asked whether the visit would result in the announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel, since the diplomatic tradition indicates that a visit on such a level and in such circumstances must witness the establishment or the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Churkin, who is known for his quick-wittedness, said that there are few formalities in diplomatic life now, and that political and diplomatic necessities dictate today's actions. He cited as an example President Nixon's 1972 visit to China despite the absence of even consular ties with China, referring to the existence of Soviet-Israeli consular ties.

Churkin went on to say: The Soviet foreign minister is traveling to Israel within the framework of the efforts to activate the mechanism of the settlement in the Middle East. As for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel, we see that it is one element of that process.

I am content with what have said. So the major objective of the visit is not to settle the issues concerning Soviet-Israeli relations, but to work within the framework of that multifaceted process.

As the official spokesman was content with what he had said about that issue, we asked him about his views with regard to PLO participation in the settlement process.

Like other issues, Churkin said, that question will be subject to discussion among all the parties concerned in a bid to find a suitable formula guaranteeing the reactivation of the peace process away from the deadlock. As for the PLO, it will remain the Palestinian people's legitimate representative. We are continuing contacts with the Palestinians, with the PLO leadership. And attempts are being made to arrange a meeting with PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat during Minister Bessmertnykh's tour of the region. We believe that the major task is to secure a solution that would guarantee the attainment of a settlement of the Palestinian issue, which is the crux of the problem. And everyone must think about ways of handling that issue, taking account of the all the circumstances to which I referred.

The official spokesman added that his country is continuing its contacts with all parties, including the PLO. "Together with the U.S. side, we believe that there are some delicate problems which should be resolved for the sake of convening the peace conference."

Churkin emphasized that the Palestinians' interests are dear to the Soviets, who are bound to them by old and staunch relations, and that his country realizes the depth of that people's tragedy and is trying to do all it can to resolve the Palestinian issue.

On his country's efforts the official spokesman said that Moscow doing its utmost to reactivate the peace process, a matter which was discussed with Secretary Baker, emphasizing that the two sides will arrive at a solution which must satisfy the Palestinians. [passage omitted]

Tour Agenda Previewed

PM0805200091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin: "A. Bessmertnykh Flies to Near East"]

[Text] On the morning of 8 May USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh flew out of Moscow on a five-day tour of the Near East. The minister will visit Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. This is his first tour of the region's countries.

The first stage of the trip is Damascus, where Bessmertnykh arrives around midday Wednesday. He will have talks in the Syrian capital with the country's President Hafiz al-Asad and Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar'. In interviews with foreign news agencies ahead of the visit, Syrian officials are stressing the closeness of Moscow's and Damascus's positions on key problems of the Near East, primarily with respect to the holding of an international peace conference.

Bessmertnykh's second stop is the Jordanian capital, Amman, where he arrives in the morning of 9 May. Talks with the country's leaders, primarily King Husayn, are of interest in the sense that they will make it possible to determime how Jordan's pro-Iraqi orientation during the Persian Gulf conflict has affected its relations with the Soviet Union.

In the morning of 10 May Bessmertnykh arrives in Tel Aviv. This leg of his trip is attracting maybe the greatest attention since no Soviet foreign minister has paid an official visit to this country since the day Israel was founded.

Few people doubt that the normalization process between Moscow and Tel Aviv that began a few years ago will lead eventually to the restoration of diplomatic relations, broken off in 1967. The question is when. On the eve of Bessmertnykh's visit it appeared quite logical to assume that the Soviet minister would take advantage of his presence in Tel Aviv to announce the USSR's consent to the restoration of diplomatic relations. This prediction was reinforced by certain recent statements by Soviet officials (in particular A. Grachev, senior official at the CPSU Central Committee International Department).

Vitaliy Churkin, however, chief of the Foreign Ministry Information Administration, touching on this subject at a briefing, was far more cautious. "We view the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations with Israel in the context of the overall process of a Near East settlement. Therefore I would not venture to assert that the restoration of diplomatic relations will necessarily take place during the coming visit," he said. Well-informed Soviet diplomats, who talked with me a few days before the trip, spoke in the same spirit. They led me to understand that the restoration of diplomatic relations is hardly likely to be announced during this visit.

Bessmertnykh will spend only six hours in Tel Aviv, after which he will fly to the Egyptian capital. In Cairo, apart from talks with Egypt's leaders, there are plans for a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who sets off 10 May on his fourth Near East tour in recent months.

The secretary of state plans to visit the same capitals as our minister, but in a different order: Damascus, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman. Riyadh may be added to the list later. Baker's meeting with Bessmertnykh is to take place either 12 or 13 May. The main topic on the agenda for these talks (and probably for all the other talks during the trip) can be predicted right now: preparation of a peace conference on the Near East, for which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to act as cochairmen during the previous consultations between Baker and Bessmertnykh in Kislovodsk.

As for the mooted meeting between the Soviet minister and PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat, it is hardly likely to take place during this tour. The problem is that none of the countries on Bessmertnykh's route has expressed readiness to play host to the Palestinian leader. True, there remains the probability that a solution could be found at the last moment.

Bessmertnykh Arrives in Damascus for Talks

Sees 'Historic Opportunity'

LD0805141791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1318 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Vadim Shchennikov and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Damascus, 8 May (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh arrived here today on a short working visit. Syria is the first stage in a journey by the leader of the Soviet foreign policy department around countries of the Near East for the purpose of promoting the process of a peace settlement. The minister will also visit Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

At Damascus airport A.A. Bessmertnykh was met by Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' and other officials. Speaking to journalists on his arrival, the Soviet minister noted that the aim of his visit to Damascus is to discuss a broad range of problems relating to the region of the Near East, and also bilateral relations.

For quite a considerable period of time, A.A. Bessmertnykh said, we have been maintaining contacts with the Arab states and with all sides having an interest in a settlement to the conflict, and we have been elaborating our own concept of the beginning of a solution to one of the most chronic conflicts. I haven't rushed with a trip, the minister noted, as I considered that it was essential to determine the tasks and possibilities, to elaborate a concept, and now I think that the aim of my trip lies in comparing this concept with the realities of the region, to verify it against life, in direct conversations and talks with the leaders of the states of the region. It is essential to determine, the minister stressed, to what extent it is possible to exploit the historic opportunity which, in my view, exists in current conditions for breaking the impasse on the process of settling the crisis in the Near East.

Under the program for the Soviet minister's stay here, today he is to have talks with Syrian President Hafiz al-'Asad, and talks with Syrian Foreign Minister F. al-Shar'.

Meets Al-Asad, Al-Shar'

LD0905032991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2315 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Vadim Shchennikov and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Damascus, 9 May (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh has started his regional trip in Damascus with an acknowledgement of the prominent place Syria occupies in the Near East, and with a confirmation of the close character of Soviet- Syrian relations.

From midday until late at night on Wednesday, intensive talks went on here which have been frank and amicable in character.

A.A. Bessmertnykh had a thorough meeting with H. al-Asad, the president of Syria, which lasted for many hours, and held talks with Syrian Foreign Minister F. al-Shar'.

The Syrian side welcomed the visit of the Soviet minister to Syria and his trip to the Near East, and they evaluated highly the constructive role played by the Soviet Union in regional and world politics. As was expected, the theme of a Near East settlement occupied a central place in the discussions. They succeeded not only in arriving at a more concrete impression of the positions of both sides, but they also exchanged views on possible solutions to those aspects of a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict which present most difficulties from the point of view of finding a rapprochement for seemingly difficult-to-reconcile approaches.

In particular, details of organizing and holding a peace conference on the Near East, which would be able to set the process of the Near East settlement in motion, were analyzed in detail. The sides exchanged impressions and information regarding numerous contacts on this problem, which each of them had in recent months. A joint analysis of the situation has exposed certain possibilities that are worth trying to use, as well as many difficulties, the overcoming of which will require additional efforts. The sides agreed to continue maintaining constant contact with each other in light of the current increased multilateral diplomatic activity in the Near East.

Appropriate attention has also been given to the discussion of the state and prospects of bilateral relations between the USSR and Syria. Both sides expressed an interest in maintaining and further developing many-sided and mutually beneficial Soviet-Syrian cooperation and in giving it even more impetus.

Further Reportage on Tour

WA0905110691

For further reportage on the visit of Soviet Foreign Aleksandr Bessmertnykh to the Middle East, including his meetings in Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt please see the pertinent sections of the 9 May Near East & South Asia DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Soviet Legislative Delegation Arrives in Libya

LD0805204491 Moscow TASS in English 2010 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Anchikov]

[Text] Tripoli May 8 TASS—A Soviet parliamentary delegation, led by Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the parliament's Council of Nationalities, arrived in the capital of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah (SPLAJ) for a visit today.

"We regard the visit to Libya first of all within the context of our two countries' and peoples' mutual aspiration for the development of versatile relations," Nishanov told TASS.

"These relations are now characterised by an intensive political dialogue on a wide range of matters concerning life in the USSR and the SPLAJ [Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah], world politics, as well as mutually beneficial cooperation in the economy, trade and culture.

"The Soviet Union's friendship with countries of the Arab east has very deep roots," Nishanov said. "Although certain difficulties did arise sometimes in its path, we would not like to associate friendship with Arab countries with some situation- determined aspects or considerations.

"The policy being pursued by the Soviet Union over the period of perestroyka makes it possible to raise them to a higher stage and add substance to it.

"During the Gulf war, the efforts of everyone: both the Arab World, the Soviet Union, and Europe were aimed at eliminating the seat of tension. At that time, there was no possibility to discuss in detail further ways to broaden our economic, trade, and cultural relations and political contacts.

"Now that the war has been terminated through joint efforts, new conditions have been created for the establishment of peace in the region and for the solution of the entire spectrum of issues concerning a Mideast settlement, and an opportunity to intensify our contacts has presented itself," Nishanov said.

In conclusion Nishanov said that the delegation brought heartfelt greetings and wishes to Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the Libyan revolution, from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

"We view the existing good relations between the leaders of our two countries as one of main aspects of future development of Soviet-Libyan relations," Nishanov said.

New Party for Soviet Jews in Israel Formed

PM0905091991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 91 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Political Party of Emigrants From the USSR"]

[Text] Cairo, 8 May—AL-AHRAM reports that Soviet immigrants have formed a new political party in Israel. Iosif Gurul, the leader of the party that has been called the "Zionist Party for Immigration and Democracy," said on Tuesday that its main political task will be to "resolve the problems facing immigrants coming to Israel for permanent residence." According to Gurul, the party intends to take part in the elections scheduled for February 1992.

Soviet Jews are fully entitled to settle throughout Israel, including the West Bank and the Gaza sector, the leader of the "Zionist Party for Immigration and Democracy" said. And no one can prevent this process, he added.

In this connection AL-AHRAM commented that in the last 18 months roughly 250,0000 people have immigrated to Israel, more than 90 percent of them emigres from the Soviet Union.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Churkin Cited on Possible New Ties With RSA

PM0805154191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent G. Charodeyev: "Will Relations Be Restored with the Republic of South Africa?"]

[Text] Your IZVESTIYA correspondent asked Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, to confirm or deny rumors that diplomatic relations with the RSA [Republic of South Africa] may soon be restored.

"On the practical plane today it is premature to speak of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries," he said. "I can nonetheless remind you that an advance group of the section for RSA interests in the USSR, set up at the Austrian Embassy, arrived in Moscow 22 April. Its functions are similar to those which our advance group operating in Pretoria has already begun to implement. Incidentally, the Soviet group is small and consists of two diplomats. They have succeeded in establishing businesslike relations with the RSA Foreign Ministry and setting up contacts with the African National Congress and other public organizations in the country. As for the South African diplomats, so far four of them have come to Moscow."

Statements Issued on South Africa Unrest

LD0905060191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 8 May (TASS)—In the USSR growing alarm is being expressed over the exacerbation that has occurred of late in the situation in South Africa. This is mentioned in statements that have been circulated here today by a representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry and by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Afro-Asian Countries.

In the statement of the Foreign Ministry spokesman it is pointed out that, in spite of preliminary talks between the government of Frederik de Klerk and the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) which started a year ago and which opened up the path for an internal political settlement in the RSA [Republic of South Africa], "the sharp escalation of violence is creating an extremely dangerous situation fraught with the risk of serious destabilization and ultimately the possibility of the breakdown of the political settlement."

The Foreign Ministry representative confirmed the adherence of the Soviet Union to the elimination of apartheid in South Africa by political means. "The USSR," it says in the statement, "expresses the hope that the government and all the influential forces in the country will display an extremely great sense of responsibility and restraint at this critical moment, and will do everything incumbent on them to stop the violence and seek mutually acceptable solutions and the swiftest possible start to a nationwide dialogue." In this context the last initiative of the ANC on a meeting of Nelson Mandela and Frederik de Klerk is welcomed as a step that "will facilitate the removal of the impediments to the talks." In the statement of the Foreign Ministry representative it stresses the willingness of the USSR, together with other members of the international community, to go on rendering the necessary assistance to the development of the process of a political settlement in the RSA.

Concern about the complication of the process of settlement in the RSA is also expressed in the statement of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Afro-Asian Countries. "The deception by the government of Frederik de Klerk of the partners in the political dialogue and the international community," it says, "is again bringing the country to the brink of danger, beyond which an explosion is possible. The committee believes that in this situation the decision of the European community on the lifting of economic sanctions against the RSA may only evoke "the bewilderment of the international public." [quotation marks as received]

East Europe

Walesa Interviewed on Relations With USSR

91UF0704A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17 1 May 91 p 4

[Report on interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent Leonid Pochivalov in Warsaw: "Warsaw. Belweder. An Hour With President Walesa"; date not given]

[Text] On the streets of Warsaw one can still see the remainders of the recent elections—glued to the fences are portraits of a man with a wide forehead and a thick horseshoe-shaped mustache. Under the photo, there is only one firm word: "Teraz!"— "Now!" Right now, elect him, Lech Walesa, president! Only he, and nobody else, is capable of pulling the great power on the Vistula out of trouble. Or so his supporters said.

Lech Walesa did win the election and immediately started on the task of pulling the country out of trouble. The country is now on the eve of an important national holiday: the 200th anniversary of the 3 May 1791 Constitution, a great symbol of Polish independence. What does the country bring to this celebration?

I approached a wide main gate in the massive fence on the outskirts of old Lazienki Park. Set back behind the gate are the clean classic lines of a white-walled building—Belweder, the traditional residence of the number one person in the Polish state. Inside the wide open gates, standing stiff, are two tall handsome lads in square-top caps. Every time I have visited Warsaw I have unfailingly passed Belweder, slowing down to enjoy the view of the sentinels. These lads have always seemed the same, whether a year, 10 years, or 40 years ago: impressively immobile, unshakable, with proudly straight shoulders, the personification of the fact that "jeszce Polska nie zginela" ["Poland has not died yet"—published in Polish transliterated into Russian].

I stepped inside these gates for the first time 40 years ago. Boleslav Bierut was then the master of Belweder. Spacious, filled with echoes and air, halls, the generous radiance of chandeliers, the shine of bronze, and huge canvases of old paintings on the walls... And, of course, the master himself—the main ingredient of the academically stern entourage. His solidly built, assured body; every step he made on the parquet floor; his every word, chosen and uttered with deliberation—all of these indicated the significance of a mission providence chose to burden him with. He even raised a champagne glass in a toast at a state reception as if it were a state mace. And it was clear to everyone that this was the chief helmsman, who guided the ship of the state toward, naturally, happy shores.

Alas, history has its own laws. Over the decades, this ship, traveling side-by-side with our heavy dreadnought, never made it to the dreamed-about latitudes of a common "bright future."

...The sentinels at the gate saluted me, and I now had access to the new captain of the Polish ship.

I was mentally prepared to give the grandeur of the atmosphere inside its due, just as I did forty years ago. Nothing of the kind! I did not see menacing protective guards, or majestic major domos, or servants noiselessly gliding along the parquet floors with trays. I entered an organization at the peak of the workday as I would enter a shop at the Gdansk shipworks, where the current master of this house came from. I pushed a massive door and found myself in a hall. I felt I had already stood under these Empire ceilings forty years ago. Only this time the hall was not reverentially quiet. People were scurrying about, moving chairs, clicking locks on briefcases, setting up klieg lights on high tripods...

I was forewarned that I would not be alone: The president would talk at the same time to British television and to reporters from THE INDEPENDENT newspaper. And that he could only set aside one hour for all of us together.

...He entered the hall, as fast-moving, businesslike, and preoccupied as everybody else here. "Hello, gentlemen! I am the president of the Republic of Poland. And I am at your service."

The television people needed him first. They immediately sat the president down and focused the klieg lights on him; his face, round and mustached, relaxed; he squinted under the light and all of a sudden began to resemble a cat warmed by the sun. Do not bother him; let him rest! But the president can never truly rest. That is what the president's job is about!

For the entire hour he did not have one second's break. First, the television people—in a few days the president is going to England where he will be received with royal honors and will conduct important talks. Some of the questions the British asked coincided with the ones I had prepared in advance. For instance—what is the presidential power.

"It is not easy being a president," Walesa shared his thoughts. "There is no single type of head of state. It all depends on personal traits..." He laughed loudly: "A computer would probably make the best president."

He talked fast, and it was not easy to follow his thoughts.

"...We will go through what we have to go through. We cannot disregard the opinion of the people. I am the president for all Poles; therefore, I cannot lean toward any particular political groups, even those who actively support me. A president must be surrounded by people with different points of view..."

I feel that it is important for him to be convincing, to prove that he is right. Of course, he felt that the visit to England was very important. He has quite a few complaints about Europe. This was what he talked about first. Poland was reaching out to Europe with an open heart, and what did Europe do? Poland needed credits, investment, joint enterprises... Why did Europe show such restraint?

The television people finished their job. The president walked quickly to our table, extended his hand in greeting. His handshake was strong and hasty—there was not much time. "Please do not ask me questions that I have already answered."

The Englishmen had preferential treatment at our journalistic table as well. The president himself made it clear. He had an interest in promoting his views in England. His course was maximum rapprochement with the West. He was not just answering my English colleagues' questions; he was passionately trying to win them over, as if it depended on them, the reporters from THE INDEPENDENT, whether Poland would get new credits.

"I do not get upset when some of my plans get rejected. I agree with those who are looking for a variety of ways to pull Poland out of its difficult situation... You ask me what I think of myself? Sometimes I do not like myself. I would not have voted for myself. There are many things I cannot foresee in advance. After all, I have only barely started to build a system. All my life I have dreamed about building something that would not fall apart..."

Question followed question, and answers came just as fast. Yes, he did promise a lot at the rallies; yes, not everything had been implemented. But a lot of things should not be done in a rush.

"I promised democracy—and we have it. It this so little? I am against a dictatorship. I defend myself against my own dictatorship..."

His concise answers, colored by his fighting moods, were a reflection of the situation in today's Poland. Of course, it is not easy for Walesa to be in the role of president. He was elevated to it by the working masses, but so far what had been expected of him was not very noticeable. Well, that is not entirely correct. It is noticeable. Especially when one comes here from Moscow. The shops are full of goods—whatever one may wish. No shortages! There is a shortage of buyers. Prices are mind-boggling, even worse than ours. Whenever there is a shortage of buyers, there is a shortage of trust in the leadership. Therefore—new strikes. Lech Walesa is no longer the spirit behind them. He now represents the interests of the entire state. Yes, it is hard to be president when one has to built something solid, something that will not fall apart, on top of the still smoking ruins of the world that used to call itself socialist.

I looked at the "president of all Poles." During the conversation, his face changed all the time. Sometimes it looked poised, composed, well-groomed—and then Lech Walesa looked more like a successful businessman than a president. Or sometimes the mask appropriate for his rank got shattered under the pressure of a fleeting mood—and then he was a tribune, a leader, speaking to thousands of people, who are listening to him and whom he has to persuade. Opinions about him differ these days. His popularity is uneven among different strata of Polish society. His authority among the workers is falling, too. This is understandable—everybody expects an instant El Dorado on Polish soil. But miracles only happen in fairy tales. People criticize Walesa, make jokes about him, laugh at him. Especially at his uneducated language. But Lech Walesa was not groomed from childhood to become royalty; his way to the top was not made easier by the solicitous hands of well-wishers. He did it all by himself. The best he could. Of course, it is his proletarian roots in combination with his mind and temperament that made Walesa what he is. In the political environment in which his ascent took place these ingredients were a must. Even his not very literate language. It was their own, simple, folk language they understood.

I had a conversation with our ambassador to Poland Yu.B. Kashlev on the eve of this meeting. He is a career diplomat; he knows what diplomacy is, with all its nuances. Kashlev especially emphasized: It will be interesting and easy to talk to Walesa. The president is straightforward, frank, and he appreciates humor. The ambassador laughed: "He is considered the chief expert on strikes. Used to be the ringleader. Ask him about the strikes. What he thinks about them now that he is president."

Our embassy is happy that the president agreed to be interviewed by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. It is not easy for Soviet journalists to get to him. A lot has changed in Poland lately. Especially in relation to us, the Soviets. Forty years ago our ambassador here was promoted to this post from a high-ranking party position. He behaved himself in Poland in a decisive, Bolshevik manner. Even President Bierut, who was quite obedient to us, once lost his patience and called Moscow: "Your ambassador orders me around as if I were a rural rayon party secretary." The ambassador was replaced, but the command style remained.

Now times are different. So, different relations are needed. But what kind? The system of relationship between the two countries, built over decades, has collapsed in a short period of time. There is incomprehension, mistrust, and suspicion on both sides of the border. Economic ties are in a state of complete crisis, as if Poland were not our neighbor but some country at the other end of the world. How are we to coexist in the future when between us is not just the narrow Bug River, but a whole ocean of alienation?

"How do you see our current relations?" I asked.

His tired face lit up again with the excitement of a debater ready to tell the whole truth, straight.

"A mess! Both here and there—a mess! We have to think about all of it together. We are doomed to each other..."

Yes, this is what he said: "doomed"! It is not a very pleasant word, but my translator Jerzy Brzesninski, a high class professional, confirms: The translation is correct! Well, if we are doomed, we are doomed, although I personally do not see my sympathy toward Poland and Poles as a sign of doom.

"There is no place for love here. Only realities. You have a tremendous number of problems. We also have quite a few. Therefore we must strive to understand each other. The old economic system has not worked in either country—yours or ours. We need to search for our own ways, most suitable for each country. Right now we have a better chance to succeed. You have more problems..."

He got more and more involved in his monologue, and I felt that he was not simply answering my question, but was talking about something of his own, mulled over in his head many times.

"Before, under the communist regime, we were moving slowly—let us say, 25 kilometers an hour. We should, however, have kept the speed at 100. But in order to move the car in the right direction, it has to be stopped, and then moved forward. People do not understand that. They boo, they complain that under the communism we were moving somewhere, albeit slowly, while now we are staying in place..."

Suddenly, the president repeated:

"Yes, we are doomed to each other! Therefore we have to, and we will, cooperate. You remain a major nuclear power, but in an economic sense, you need a major overhaul."

Many people in Warsaw told me that Walesa was preparing to visit Moscow. Our side sent him an advance draft of a new treaty between the two countries. Will he go? And when? Many are anxious about this—after all, we are "doomed" to be neighbors!

The president nodded, confirming that the issue of his trip to Moscow is on the agenda, and that he knew about the draft treaty.

"We have to sign a new treaty! But only after a major overhaul. Many problems need to be solved now, however. In this respect, there arises the issue of the speediest possible withdrawal of your troops from Poland. Of course, we have no plans to push your army out immediately, but we will continue to make the point that it is simply politically disadvantageous for the Soviet Union to keep its troops in Poland any longer. We want an open and simple relationship. So I could, say, get on my bicycle and take a trip to Lvov. Without any obstacles on the way. We have to build new roads instead of closing existing ones. Such issues are best resolved in a good-neighborly way."

"And what do you think about our current economic relations?"

"The question is with whom these relations are to be built. The USSR has only one choice. It has to consolidate itself on a new basis; its parts cannot exist separately. New solutions for this problem need to be found—on a pluralistic basis. Several years ago I said that the Soviet Union ought to build its internal relations differently. If you had started to tackle this problem then, the USSR today would be in a better position... We want to see the Soviet Union a prosperous power, and for you the main unifying force should be the economy..."

The president caught his breath after a long and heated monologue and concluded, more quietly now and with a smile:

"And let the people go wherever they want—all over the world. Come to Poland, too. Only not all and not at the same time. Poland is not a large country..."

I remembered our ambassador's comment on strikes and asked Walesa what he thought about strike movements in general, and, in particular, about what was going on in our country.

"Strikes are needed for reforms, to demonstrate the desire of the masses for a change for the better. But if we have already achieved something real with our strikes, we need to remember that continuing refusal to work will not fill the plates. I am against strikes here. Today they are harmful to Poland. As to your country, it is hard for me to say: I am not informed well enough."

Suddenly, he pointed at my notebook.

"Write this down, however! Specially for your miners. Tell them to think of themselves as bacteria. Yes, beneficial bacteria in an organism! Bacteria should transform the organism in which they live, but not destroy it—it is their abode..."

He took a sip from a cup of coffee brought to him, paused briefly, and I feel his thoughtful gaze dwell on me.

"You said that you came to Poland for the first time forty years ago, and that you met many of its leaders. Who impressed you most?"

What was I to say? If I answered honestly, it was Marshal of Poland Rokossovskiy. I remembered my long conversation with him: How beautifully the marshal talked about Polish soldiers; how much he admired their courage and self-sacrifice during the war, their patriotism, and their readiness to die for their country. The mention of Rokossovskiy did not seem to strike the right chord with the president. I understood: There is quite a bit of writing here now that in the past we imposed everything that was ours, Soviet, on Poland; that we even imposed the minister of defense on them. My mention of meeting with Poland's primate Cardinal Glemp elicited more benevolent reaction.

"What a spread—from Rokossovskiy to Glemp!" the president chuckled. "What do you think: Did Rokossovskiy know about the crime in Katyn? Probably..."

I did not agree. Not many people knew about things like that. As for Rokossovskiy, he himself spent some time in Stalin's prison before the war.

Well, all of that is history; you cannot strike things out of history, and each personality in it is a link. Now such a link was in front of me—an unusual man whose name, of course, would become part of this country's history. No matter what the attitude toward him, he tries, to the best of his abilities, to do everything to make Poland a happy place.

While we were saying good-bye, he addressed my English colleagues again:

"Do not forget to write: We need credits and cooperation. We have to get on our feet. We must!"

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet 'Delays' on Entry-Exit Law

LD0905064791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network 2045 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] High-ranking officials from the Foreign Ministries of the USSR and Russian Federation have made an unprecedented statement exclusively to the RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY. They have expressed serious concern about delays by the country's Supreme Soviet with the adoption of the law on exit and entry.

We do not see any serious arguments against the adoption of the law, said Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy. The representatives of the two ministries have recalled the words of the late Academician Sakharov, that while there is no freedom of entry and exit the USSR will continue to be a prison camp zone. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has stressed from his side that the Russian leadership is calling for the adoption of this law as soon as possible. The Union legislature, he reminded, has a duty to give consideration to the republics' wishes.

Meanwhile, according to a high-ranking representative of the USSR Ministry, who asked not to be named, the maneuvers aimed at sabotaging the adoption of the law are being made by the "Soyuz" group with the massed support of the party and legislature apparatus.

General Discusses Changes in Navy Service

LD0805104591 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1630 GMT 7 May 91

[Address by Colonel General Kirvosheyev, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, to the Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow on 7 May; from the "Legislative Diary" program—recorded]

[Text] The question of transferring the Navy petty officers and seamen as well as the Navy units of the USSR KGB border troops from the three-year to two-year period of service is topical and demands immediate solution at the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The solution to this question is also important because this is actually one of the components of the military reform and one of the first major practical steps toward perfecting the system of military service. The same provision regarding the period of service in the Navy has been included in the USSR draft law on the general military duty and military service, which has already been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. It should also be noted that the decision on the question brought for discussion is of the utmost interest to the population of the country.

The transfer of Navy petty officers and seamen to the two-year period of service demands the additional allocation of funds up to 535 million rubles [R] for the expansion of Navy training establishments. Moreover, it will be necessary to increase the strength of the Navy by 40,000 men because of the need for larger numbers of the specialists to be trained in the educational establishments of the Navy because of increased turnover of the ships' crews. At the moment Navy service lasts five periods, but will be last only three in the future. It is also necessary to note that the transfer of the Navy to a shortened period of service is not a one-off action, and the process of the transfer itself is impossible without a transitional period that will continue throughout 1991-92. During this period all young men called up in the spring will already serve two years while the petty officers and seamen called up before the adoption of this decision by the USSR Supreme Soviet will serve three or four years.

Under these conditions, to somehow compensate for the decline in the professionalism of the ships' crew, the Ministry of Defense asks the USSR Supreme Soviet to allow the Navy to carry out an experiment in employing on its ships the petty officers and seamen who will enter the military service voluntarily on a contract basis with the appropriate payment for their work in the ranks in accordance with the rates established for reenlisted servicemen. This currently ranges from R308 and up. It is expected in the planned experiment that young men who are called up for active service lasting a total of three years will be eligible to be employed in the contract service. This will include six months training in educational units and two and a half years of contract service itself.

In our opinion, apart from anything else, the results of this experiment should provide us with rich factual material on the viability of creating, under our conditions, a professional army the need for which is being discussed so much in the media as well as in the speeches of a number of the people's deputies. This experiment will also become a first step in bringing to life one of the provisions of the proposed concept of the military reform that foresees an increase in the voluntary contract employment of the young people in the military service alongside the call-up of the citizens, in other words, the systematic professionalization of the Armed Forces.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Signs Law Enforcement Committee Statute

LD0805191191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1800 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] By a decree of the USSR President on 7 May, a statute on the committee to coordinate the activity of law enforcement bodies has been ratified. It is being set up attached to the president and is called upon to ensure coordination in the work of these bodies, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of efforts to defend the rights and freedoms of citizens in the battle against crime and the strengthening of law and order in the country.

In this respect, any kind of interference by the committee in the procedural activity of law enforcement bodies will not be permitted. The statute also foresees that in its activities, the committee proceeds from the interests of the USSR and the republics. One of its main tasks is the analysis of the practice of the application of the law and the activity of law enforcement bodies, as well as the organization of cooperation with other states and public associations.

The committee is charged with the organizing and studying the state of law and order in the country and in separate regions, elaborating special programs to strengthen law and order, and helping law enforcement bodies in their participation in international cooperation.

To implement these and other tasks, the committee has been vested with appropriate powers. It will be composed of plenipotentiary representatives of republican members of the Union treaty. The staffing of the committee is confirmed by the USSR president, and activity is effected openly on a collective basis. Decisions by the committee have the force of recommendations.

Gorbachev Lays Wreath at Tomb of Unknown Soldier

LD0905094991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0930 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 9 May (TASS)—Today, the 46th anniversary of victory over Hitlerite fascism, the flow of people to the tomb of the unknown soldier at the Kremlin wall is endless. Young and old are coming here to bow before the memory of those who, at the price of their lives, saved the planet from the plague of fascism.

USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, and other state leaders came to the tomb of the unknown soldier and laid wreaths to honor the bright memory of war heroes.

Taking part in the ceremony of laying wreaths from servicemen of the USSR Armed forces was Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense.

Gorbachev Meets Children's Military Activists

LD0905104591 Moscow TASS in English 1032 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev met activists of the Soviet Children's Military Movement in the Kremlin's St. George Hall today.

The Movement aims to promote patriotism among children.

Activists pledged to honour "glorious traditions" of their fathers and promote perestroyka.

Gorbachev praised the Movement's role in patriotic upbringing of the young generation.

Gorbachev Decree Appoints Minister of Railways

LD0805213991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1530 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] By decree of the USSR president today, the country's new minister of railways has been appointed. He is Leonid Ivanovich Matyukhin.

TASS Reviews Soviet Central Press for 9 May

LD0905070391 Moscow TASS in English 0645 GMT 9 May 91

["Soviet Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS - "The Soviet people are rightly proud of the Soviet Union's decisive role in defeating Fascism and they remember and honour all participants who fought a common enemy during the Second World War," Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov said in a statement, marking V-Day, published in today's newspapers.

All today's newspapers carry stories marking Victory Day.

Yazov speaks in PRAVDA about the importance of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War. "We have approached this anniversary with a knowledge of the bitter truth about the price of victory. We can't go on living without this truth," Yazov writes.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA publish soldiers' letters from the front.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA carries new facts about the trial of Soviet spymaster Richard Zorge and his colleagues in Japan.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes an article by German military historian Georg Soldmann, who predicted the outcome of the Second World War.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA carries an interview with thrice Hero of the Soviet Union former pilot Ivan Kozhedub, who speaks about the current state of the Soviet Armed Forces.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA carries an interview with Army General V. Govorov.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes an interview with war veteran Air Force Marshal Aleksandr Yefimov, who reminisces about the war.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries new facts about the development of Soviet nuclear weapons.

TRUD runs a feature about troop commander Georgiy Zhukov, who led the Soviet forces during the Second World War.

Several newspapers carry war-time photos.

President Mikhail Gorbachev met representatives of ethnic Germans living in the Soviet Union, PRAVDA reports.

Newspapers comment on the presidential election campaign in Russia. Workers at a tractor works in Lipetsk nominated Nikolay Ryzhkov to run for the presidency, PRAVDA reports. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an interview with Vadim Bakatin, who is also running for the post.

Newspapers cover ethnic fighting in Yugoslavia. PRAVDA carries a report from the country.

PRAVDA publishes extracts from an interview world chess champion Garry Kasparov gave to the NRC HANDELSBLAD Dutch newspaper.

Victory Day Celebrated; Details Reported

Festive Meeting Held

LD0605191191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1605 GMT 6 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 6 May (TASS)—A festive meeting took place today in the Central Academic Theater of the Soviet Army of representatives of the working people of Moscow and troops of the capital's garrison, devoted to the 46th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

On the Presidium were USSR Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev, USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, and state and party leaders and military chiefs.

Heroes of the Soviet Union, holders of the Order of Glory and representatives of public organisations took part in the festive meeting.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov delivered a report.

Yanayev, Pavlov Attend Meeting

PM0805105991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by F. Semyanovskiy: "In Honor of Holiday"]

[Text] A festive meeting was held 6 May in the Soviet Army Central Academy Theater to mark the 46th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War. War veterans, servicemen from the Moscow garrison, and representatives of the working people gathered in the theater auditorium.

In the meeting presidium were G. Yanayev, vice president of the USSR; USSR Prime Minister V. Pavlov; O. Baklanov, chairman of the USSR president's Defense Council; Deputy Prime Minister Yu. Maslyukov; Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister; Army General K. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense minister; USSR deputy defense ministers, other eminent military leaders, and front line veterans. Also in the presidium were Ye. Stroyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Lieutenant General M. Surkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the all-army party committee; CPSU Central Committee Secretary Yu. Manayenkov; and Ye. Makhov, acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission.

The ceremonial meeting was opened by Colonel General N. Shlyaga, chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate and USSR first deputy defense minister.

Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Kulikov delivered a report on the 46th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

After the meeting's participants had spoken a festive concert was held.

Cabinet of Ministers Discusses Monument

LD0705205291 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1200 GMT 7 May 91

[Text] On the eve of the Victory Day festival, the question of completing construction of the Victory Monument memorial complex on Poklonnaya Gora [hill overlooking Moscow] has been under consideration by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. Those taking part include USSR First Deputy Prime Minister Doguzhiyev and leaders of the Moscow City Executive Committee and the Soviet War Veterans' Committee. Suggestions have been voiced concerning the need to restore the tradition of the people's construction project for the concluding stage of construction of this unique complex, which reflects the magnanimity and self-sacrifice of all the peoples of our country, for there is no greater duty incumbent on the generations now living than that of remembering those who fell for the freedom of the homeland.

Yanayev Hands Out Awards

LD0805171691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1530 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] On the eve of Victory Day, in the Georgiyevskiy Hall of the Kremlin, USSR Vice President Yanayev conferred high awards of the motherland for courage shown in the struggle against the German fascist aggressors. Heroes have been rendered their due 46 years after the end of the war. The names of those who have fallen are on a par with the living. Their awards were received by relatives and close friends.

Veterans Council Chairman on Great Patriotic War

LD0805150591 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 8 TASS—"The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, won at a huge sacrifice, is part of our heroic history and was a very important turning point in world development," said Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, chairman of the All-Union Council of War Veterans and Veterans Workers. He gave an interview to TASS on the eve of the V-Day, observed in the USSR on May 9.

Ogarkov believes there are events in world history which do not fade with the passage of time. The Great Patriotic war of the Soviet people against fascism was such an event.

"Everything about it is important to our people: the 1,418 days and nights of fighting, many millions of soldiers and civilians dead, devastated cities and villages, unprecedented heroism of soldiers and workers on the home front, and great humanism of soldiers who liberated European and Asian countries," Ogarkov said. He said that the Soviet Union paid a dear price for the victory: according to data, the USSR lost over 27 million people during the war.

The Soviet people are observing the 46th anniversary of the great victory at a difficult time. A complex economic situation and confrontation between different forces attest to the crisis in our society. Some even deny the positive development of history in the post-October period.

"Grim lessons of history should not be repeated," Ogarkov said. "When reforming the military, it is necessary to remember the future state of the Soviet Armed Forces and the very stages of the reform. At each stage the Army and Navy should meet the country's needs for defence in accordance with the military-political situation," Ogarkov said in conclusion.

CPSU's Luchinskiy Interviewed on Press Day

PM0705102991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 May 91 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by correspondent V. Georgiyev; place and date not given: "Do Not Lose Readers: Thoughts on the Duty and Vocation of the Party Press"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Today is Press Day—the holiday of all press workers in the country. The mass media play a significant role in the life of society. Our correspondent V. Georgiyev talked with P.K. Luchinskiy, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, about the problem of the mass media's development and the role and activity of CPSU publications in the new conditions.

[Georgiyev] Petr Kirillovich, one area of your work as CPSU Central Committee secretary and Politburo member is the activity of the mass media. The attitude toward the press in society is varied. The range of opinions is very broad, ranging from "The press is the main lever of perestroyka" and "Way to go!" to an angry cry of "The journalists have ruined the country." What is your view of the situation?

[Luchinskiy] For many years we regarded the press as an extension of the structures of power, the mouthpiece of a particularly official—party, state, and government—viewpoint. When the pages of various publications were turned overnight into an "in-house talking shop," discussing matters that never used to be raised publicly, and the press bombarded the reader with a welter of uncontrolled information of various kinds—honest and objective, as well as false and tendentious—then it was hard not to lose one's way.

Our readers traditionally believe what they read in print. They usually believe the claim, a moot one in my view, that the press does not make life but reflects it. This reflection has now begun to depend very much on who is holding the mirror. Unfortunately, and despite the laws that have been adopted, responsibility for the truthfulness and objectivity of information is declining. Some press organs are becoming an instrument of political intrigues, are resorting to outright disinformation, and are being transformed into a means of provocation. In the campaign to win readers, they are losing their sense of moderation and taste, and the struggle in the newspaper market place is intensifying. Journalism in this country, it seems to me, should treat the reader's sacred faith more solicitously and not violate it.

Playing the role of an opposition to the central authorities in the initial stage of perestroyka under what was effectively a one-party system, the press combatted dogma and helped to change the public awareness, which was a historically necessary mission and was, incidentally, supported and initiated by the party. Now everything has changed radically in society. Say what you like, we have no lack of opposition forces here now, but the majority of the press, including the party press, in my opinion, still lives according to the old ideas. While loudly condemning the so-called stagnation era, the press itself is in fact successfully exploiting the conventions of "stagnation" only in reverse: Then it was dedication to the central state power, now it is separation from it. Then the facts were zealously adapted to a single idea—the eulogy, whereas now they are adapted to the opposite—denigration. Nowadays criticizing the authorities is as safe and generally as lucrative as praising them used to be. In this zeal and fervor—again—people often lose their sense of moderation and indeed objectivity, but real life is, after all, more complex, deeper, and multifaceted. Furthermore, the chill of stagnation in the press—whether positive or negative—contains a considerable danger for society.

[Georgiyev] Previously all the press expressed, either directly or indirectly, the position of the Communist Party and was managed by it. Under current conditions party publications are the subject of the CPSU Central Committee's attention. How are relations with the rest formed?

[Luchinskiy] Indeed, in the past not a single publication could appear without a party committee adopting the relevant decision, but now there are over 2,500 different press organs registered in Moscow alone. The Communist Party has its own publications and indeed they are the subject of our main concern and attention. Whether we are trying to influence them indirectly is a different question. Yes, we are. Here, too, the main points are Communists' ideas, policy, and actions. The 28th CPSU Congress Program Statement stresses that the CPSU is a political organization that will use its practical activity and constructive approach toward the solution of the problems of society's development to defend political leadership in free competition with other sociopolitical forces.

[Georgiyev] In that case, what meaning do you attach to the concept of the "leadership of the press"? Does such a thing exist now at all?

[Luchinskiy] Mutual relations between the founder and the publication are regulated by the Law on the Press. Here, too, we adhere strictly to the law. The provisions of the law lay down that the founder must not evade questions relating to the creation of conditions for the normal working of editorial offices, staff recruitment, and the improvement of journalists' skills. We use the most varied forms of information and contact with editorial collectives. All this should promote full and objective coverage of CPSU policy in the press. On the eve of the 28th congress the greatest debate centered on the question of democratic centralism and democratic unity. The party has revised a lot here. Our complex and contradictory time itself dictates that editorial office staff should be people of conviction who are highly professional and who care for their country's future. Leadership, however, means comradeship and joint creative work.

[Georgiyev] Nevertheless, it seems that publications independent of the CPSU are in a more advantageous position and feel freer to realize their creative aspirations and standpoints.

[Luchinskiy] I doubt the journalistic freedom of publications like KOMMERSANT, KURANTY, or ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA or the independence of Radio Rossii. These press organs are predictable, everyone knows in advance what they are going to tell their readers or listeners. They express the opinion of certain groups of people and defend certain interests. Recently they have taken a particular dislike to the CPSU. They have been attacking it as though by command. They are showing an astonishing unanimity. This no longer looks like pluralism and "creative" aspirations, it is more like a coordinated attack.

The reader likes incisive and uncompromising critical materials, as long as they do not affect him, of course. As we absorb what is written, however, how often does it occur to us that criticism in the press can be not only useful but also a factor which slows social development down? That is what happens if it defends false, erroneous, or antisocial aims and interests. Such a situation is particularly dangerous for society when the right to express one-sided "truths" is monopolized, when those "truths" are foisted on the reader, and when alternative ideas are not reflected in that publication or in parallel ones.

Under the new conditions, a number of party publications have proved more inert and missed the opportunity when society became polarized. Those publications, seemingly afraid to offend anyone, went with the flow, tried to please everyone, but on no account betray their party allegiance. Consequently our press seemed more insipid, so to speak. We began losing readers. The illusion of a lack of creative freedom, it seems to me, is a self-deception designed to reassure people's professional esteem. Earlier, clearly, in conditions that were ideologically more comfortable, we lost the knack of conducting a debate at the pitch which the alternative press offered. Many of our publications avoided direct and principled discussion for a long time. Someone has to tell people the truth. Many letters and appeals to the CPSU Central Committee contain quite harsh reproaches on that score.

[Georgiyev] Recently, however, on the radio, in the newspapers, and in the Russian legislature there have been increasingly frequent accusations of Communists' aggressiveness and of attacks by the party press on democracy and glasnost.

[Luchinskiy] This is still further evidence that our opponents have understood and continue to understand glasnost and pluralism as one-way traffic. Gagging those who do not think the way the anticommunists do—that is the main aim of these accusations. The methods, furthermore, are borrowed from the old arsenal—labeling, extracting quotes and attaching tendentious commentaries, and looking for compromising material. This is all against a background of calls to ban the Communist Party and hang the Communists.

Recently we calculated that a simultaneous salvo by the anti-CPSU press would be many times greater than the potential at our disposal. The development of "glasnost" in Lithuania is very indicative in this respect. In the first stage of perestroyka, the communist parties' desire for a joint quest for the truth and a way out of the social crisis spawned a whole series of so-called "independent" publications. Soon a strange metamorphosis occurred: The fiercest supporters of glasnost and pluralism and the local mass media suddenly began speaking with one voice, as in the bad old days that they themselves condemned. While speaking out against dogma, the "independent" Sajudis press created a new dogma and began zealously protecting it. But what about pluralism? All dissenters were initially deprived of the right to vote, and the section of the press that espoused a different view was thrown out of the republic and then recently outlawed entirely. It is possible to be autocratic. Is that not the dream of those who are sometimes very hostile to the truth found in party publications?

The CPSU has on several occasions confirmed by deed its position regarding the further broadening of glasnost. The party's course—toward democracy and stability, economic recovery, the ending of the fratricidal interethnic strife, the quest for civic accord and peace, the overcoming of the crisis, and ultimately the proclaimed priority of universal human values—enables us to cooperate and find points of contact with all forces struggling for the fatherland. The fact that those forces constitute the majority of our people and are capable of showing wisdom and common sense at complex and crucial moments for the country and not being led on by the lovers of chaos and destabilization was very clearly shown by the referendum on preserving the USSR, the first referendum in our history.

[Georgiyev] Publications presenting an alternative view to the CPSU continue to blame Communists and the party apparatus for many of the present economic and political disorders. What is your view on that?

[Luchinskiy] This is another very old method of protecting oneself against criticism. The accusations, you will notice, are not confined to the present day. The present generation of Communists are being blamed for mistakes made in the distant past. Where are the roots of this blatant juggling of the facts, this injustice? The point clearly is that, in many soviets, people have come to power who made political capital and won the voters' sympathy by criticizing the CPSU, the party apparatus, and our country's past. The public platforms and the agents of destruction operated on the wave of emotions and in conditions of social crisis. Destruction is one thing, whereas building and bearing responsibility for one's own actions and mistakes is quite another. In the present conditions of aggravated crisis a leader's inability to work thoroughly and seek out allies and consensus is very dangerous. Calling the people to rallies, urging strikes, and making accusatory speeches—these electioneering tricks continue to be used. Is that what society needs now? Some new extremely radical leaders want a "great leap forward." That is not happening; on the contrary, in a number of places their attempts are collapsing. For some reason, the anticommunist press does not want to help the new authorities with severe words, they are fully occupied fighting the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the president, and are denigrating everything.

A journalist, like any individual, is part of the system of social relations and is linked to particular political associations, social and ethnic strata and groups, and their interests and positions. Here, too, in my view, the modern reader should take a more critical attitude toward particular press articles and see what is behind the denunciatory fervor: Pain, a desire to change life for the better, or the cynical indifference of the casual observer and a desire to make everyone live according to one's own scenario and ultimately create one's own dogmas, idols, and cause pain while protecting them?

[Georgiyev] Do you not think that the fact that an anti-CPSU press was set up in a number of places in record time is evidence of the "input" of party workers. Until recently PRAVDA received quite a few reports on conflicts between party committees and their press organs. The truth was not always on the side of the party apparatus, but as a rule it was journalists who were dismissed.

[Luchinskiy] If there are hard facts here, they must be examined without delay. Normal mutual relations between party workers and journalists can be formed only on a basis of comradeliness. Unfortunately, sometimes in the past this was lacking. It is well known that V.I. Lenin did not separate journalism from party work. Journalists are, as a rule, highly qualified, thoughtful, intellectual, and literate people. By their pen they can influence an audience of many thousands. The time has gone when contact between a party committee and its newspaper was confined to the level of chief editor or, in emergencies, his deputy. Nowadays any newspaper worker must feel at home inside the party committee, get on well with leaders of any rank, and feel that he is needed and important. No single journalist should be overlooked, and it is our duty to watch over their professional and official development. Nothing antagonizes people more than indifference and a lack of attention to their experience, intelligence, and talent.

[Georgiyev] One last question, Petr Kirillovich, one of no little importance for a journalist's normal self-esteem. The mass media with free financial status enjoy considerable advantages over party publications. Workers' wages are two-three times higher there. Will the party press survive in market conditions? What is your wish to journalists on their professional holiday?

[Luchinskiy] The party press is learning how to work under the new conditions. In a number of publications the departmental structure has been revised, staff size reduced, and salaries considerably increased. Advertising and publicity in various forms are a considerable financial reserve. It seems to me that we ought to look for sponsors to support editorial offices. I know, for example, that during the preparation of the first PRAVDA festival many labor collectives freely offered material aid to the editorial office. When resolving a major problem of general significance, why not pool the efforts of several organizations on economically accountable principles, for example, along the lines of production collective—newspaper—small enterprise? The most diverse combinations are possible. This year the CPSU Central Committee has given the party press considerable material support. Nevertheless, reader interest is the main guarantee of any publication's moral and material well-being. This should be the main line of approach.

I should like to take advantage of the occasion to congratulate press workers on Press Day. My first wish is for good health—without it journalism is very difficult in our stormy times. My second wish—do not allow any false notes in your work, because the self-esteem of all society depends on that.

CPSU Secretariat Calls For More Discipline

PM0705145191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "For the Cohesion of Party Ranks; From the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Session"]

[Text] A routine session of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat has been held with V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the chair. This was reported by the CPSU Central Committee Press Center.

This was the first session since the recent CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission Joint Plenum. Opening the session, V.A. Ivashko called for the trends in the party's life that were seen at the plenum to be profoundly analyzed. Terming the plenum sharply different in form and content from all previous representative party forums over the past few decades, the deputy general secretary stressed the need for concrete action to implement the resolutions it had adopted.

Communists are particularly concerned about increased ideological confrontation, the emergence of factionalism, and the creation of a tangible threat to party unity. There was worried talk at the plenum about the growth of confusion among communists, their loss of guidelines in their practical work, the penetration of opposition ideas and slogans, populism, "rally democracy," and nationalistic sentiments into the party environment. Discipline in party ranks has been seriously weakened, the required persistence in implementing party decisions is lacking, and there has even been slackness about payment of membership dues.

In connection with the plenum results, the Secretariat session participants showed particular interest in the initiative presented by the CPSU Central Committee Commission for Renewing the Activity of Primary Party Organizations, which has drawn up recommendations to strengthen CPSU ranks. Talking about the work done by the commission, Yu.I. Ryzhov, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Department, noted that the commission has not dramatized the situation in the party, but nor has it closed its eyes to crisis phenomena. He quoted the following figures: Whereas 1.8 million people left the party in 1990, 587,000 had left in the first quarter of this year. At the same time, the number of new CPSU members has increased: Whereas they came to just 108,000 in all of last year, some 46,000 people have joined the CPSU in the first quarter of this year alone.

The CPSU Central Committee Commission for Renewing the Activity of Primary Party Organizations sees the main threat coming from the increasing pressure aimed at squeezing out party organizations from enterprises. Admittedly, this is mainly happening at small collectives—schools, colleges, and small organizations. These processes are starting to affect even major industrial, transportation, and construction enterprises.

Under these circumstances, the commission stresses, most communists have a growing resolve to rally and consolidate party ranks. Communists' strength has always lain in their organization, their conviction in the correctness of their work, and their service to the people. We need to urgently get out of our crisis of morale and out of our mood of confusion and inaction. We cannot resolve the task of strengthening the party if we remain on the margins of people's main interests.

The party ranks can only be rallied around specific work, V.S. Babichev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Legislative Initiative and Legal Issues, said in support of this provision.

Specific work is being done by labor collectives and soviets. This means that communists' voices should be heard above all in those places where the most acute questions of everyday life are being decided today. Each party organization should be aware of what it needs to do to overcome the economic slump, develop new forms of economic management, and protect working people's political and social rights.

The timeliness of the recommendations made by the commission was noted by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU City Committee [gorkom]. They will be an important support in the work of the capital's primary party organizations, many of which are working under "siege" conditions. Around 150 of them have failed to withstand a massed onslaught and, in a display of weakness, have disbanded. It is by no means the case that they were small in number and operating out of small offices. That would be a false consolation for us.

We cannot fail to see that many party organizations are not making use of their right of autonomy in arranging their own internal life and activity, and are failing to take additional measures to strengthen discipline, Ye.N. Makhov, acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission, said. Yet the new party rules and recent normative and methodological documents grant them this right. We need to make full use of democratic mechanisms to improve communists' activeness and develop their initiative, while at the same time ensuring strict observance of the provisions pertaining to the enhancement of organization, discipline, and responsibility in party ranks. The speaker stressed aspects of the monitoring of the fulfillment of party decisions under today's changed conditions.

This idea was developed by V.A. Kuptsov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In his opinion, demands on intraparty work at all levels have declined of late. Regrettably, this applies to the CPSU Central Committee as well.

P.K. Luchinskiy, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, drew attention to the need to popularize the activity of those territorial party organizations, which, under the new conditions, have acquired positive experience of renewing and strengthening their ranks. As a rule, he said, new recruits to the party are convinced and active supporters of the socialist option. After all, people are still joining the party even in those places where honest party members are being persecuted. We need to enhance the political importance of the work to organize admission to the CPSU, to make it a key element in the activity of primary party organizations, gorkoms, and rayon party committees, and to actively seek out new forces that are interested in implementing the transformations proposed by the party. Selection for the CPSU should be a partywide task, I.I. Melnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, stressed.

A.S. Dzasokhov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, talked about work with new recruits to the party. Young communists need to be surrounded with concern and attention. They each have to be helped to find their place and given an opportunity to show their ability. The reasons why people are leaving the party must be investigated in greater depth. Is it always a case of clearing out dead wood? After all, everyone makes his own independent choice to join the CPSU.

A.N. Girenko, Ye.S. Stroyev, and O.S. Shenin, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, shared their views of the proposals from the CPSU Central Committee Commission for Renewing the Activity of Primary Party Organizations, expressing several interesting ideas connected with democratizing intraparty life, ensuring that primary organizations are able to act effectively in the context of the acute political struggle, and raising their prestige among the working people's masses.

V.A. Ivashko summed up the results of the discussion. Taking account of the proposals voiced during the discussion, it was decided to send the commission's recommendations to local party committees, accompanying the document with a corresponding CPSU Central Committee Secretariat resolution with a list of priority measures aimed at strengthening party ranks.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat discussed and ratified the plan for links between the CPSU and foreign parties.

Organizational questions were also examined.

V.P. Motyashov, who had previously been sector chief at the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, was confirmed as chief editor of UTRO, the CPSU Central Committee's new current affairs, literary, and arts journal.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat ratified the decisions of a USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops CPSU Organization Party Committee prenum electing A.I. Kirilyuk party committee secretary; of a Railroad Troops party committee plenum electing V.P. Sosnin secretary of the troops' party committee; and of a USSR KGB party committee plenum electing N.I. Nazarov secretary of the USSR KGB party committee.

'Soyuz' Chairman Alksnis Interviewed on Reform

AU0705212591 Berlin DER MORGEN in German 6 May 91 p 4

[Interview with Victor Alksnis, "one of the four chairmen of "Soyuz," the conservative group in the Supreme Soviet," by H. Bilawer in Moscow; date not given: "Gorbachev's Concepts Have Led Us Into Anarchy and Chaos"]

[Text] [Bilawer] Mr. Alksnis, what events led up to the founding of "Soyuz?"

[Alksnis] The beginning dates back to October 1989, when the threat to the unity of our country became increasingly stronger. I was one of the initiators, and I also suggested the name "Soyuz" (union). A letter including the basic positions of our group was sent to all people's deputies. About 140 of them joined us. Now we are already a group of more than 740. Meanwhile, we have realized that many average citizens support our objectives. Therefore, at our congress in late April we decided to open the deputies' assembly to the voters.

[Bilawer] Considering the great number of political groupings in the country, how do you perceive your opposition role?

[Alksnis] We have stated that we want to be a constructive opposition both toward the CPSU and the democrats. For the time being we are still a movement, yet a movement that will develop into a parliamentary-type party.

[Bilawer] A deputy of the striking miners who sympathize with "Soyuz" claimed at your congress that "Soyuz" had many ideas but no concept of how to implement them, let alone any power within the state....

[Alksnis] As far as the publication of results of opinion polls is concerned even Mark Twain said that there are lies, mean lies, and statistics. One can say many things about us, particularly since hardly anybody really knows anything about us. We are affected by an information blockade. The domestic press only describes us in stereotypes, that is all.

[Bilawer] Is there pluralism within "Soyuz?"

[Alksnis] Of course there is; we represent a wide range of opinions, from social democrats to orthodox communists. Yet, for the time being we all support our main objective, which is the preservation of the unity of our state. Anything else appears to be of secondary importance to me.

[Bilawer] And in your opinion state unity can be achieved only by imposing the state of emergency?

[Alksnis] Yes, that is the only way out of the crisis. Today we cannot implement economic reform because there is no political stability, and we will not achieve this stability on the basis of declarations, declarations of intent, and the search for consensus. We have to resort to exceptional measures, because the economy is collapsing at a dramatic pace.

Unless we counteract this development, the outbreak of a civil war cannot be prevented here, and that would be tantamount to a third world war. After all, we are a nuclear superpower, and it is impossible that the disintegration of the USSR would not have certain consequences.

[Bilawer] You believe that six months of a state of emergency—which is what was proposed at the "Soyuz" Congress—might prevent the threatening apocalypse?

[Alksnis] In my opinion it was a mistake to limit the duration of the state of emergency to six months. It is indispensable to impose the state of emergency for a period of five to ten years.

[Bilawer] And what do you expect from martial law apart from putting a halt to the policy of privatization and introducing strict censorship of the press?

[Alksnis] The state of emergency provides for economic liberties and certain restrictions in political life. My formula is as follows: first market economy then democracy. Gorbachev's concept of reaching the market economy via democratization has led us into anarchy and chaos.

Examples of how a functioning market system has led to the democratization of social life are South Korea or Chile.

[Bilawer] Does this mean that you are demanding an immediate and complete change of the political structures that have developed and that you perceive a successful path toward democracy only as a result of a system like that of Pinochet?

[Alksnis] Of course. First of all it means that the soviets, the councils on a local basis, must immediately end their activities, that the vertical distribution of power must be reestablished. Yet it must not take place on the basis of the old party power, the CPSU, but on the basis of new structures of state executive organs at all levels, from Moscow to the remotest village.

The state of emergency also signifies an end to all party political activities, which also includes the CPSU. Against this background of limited political liberties absolute economic freedom will be created: Those who want to do business are free to do so for their own benefit and for the benefit of society.

[Bilawer] Is this what led to the demand for the resignation of President Mikhail Gorbachev?

[Alksnis] Officially, our group has never made such a demand. Yet, personally, I am in favor of Gorbachev resigning from his office.

[Bilawer] Mr. Alksnis, at the beginning you said that "Soyuz" would become a parliamentary party. Does this imply that the state of emergency will be restricted to parliamentary measures and that the Army will not play any role?

[Alksnis] Yes, but the Army will of course be involved. Although it will not be the main instrument in that connection, it will certainly play its role in the state of emergency.

[Bilawer] Is there a concept for the concrete steps that will be taken if martial law is imposed in the individual spheres of public life?

[Alksnis] We have presented a so-called "survival program" in this connection.

[Bilawer] This program links the observation of human rights in the USSR to the preservation of a state unity of the union. Where is the causal relation here?

[Alksnis] Just open your eyes and watch what is going on in this country now: there is bloodshed in practically all the republics. All these events are related to the fact that one part of the population of, for example, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Moldavian Republic is exposed to political or national discrimination.

[Bilawer] But there are also demands for sovereignty without any bloodshed in important republics, such as in Belorussia or in the Ukraine....

[Alksnis] And what is your explanation for Crimea having declared itself an autonomous region? It is a reaction of self- defense to the Ukrainian independence declaration.

[Bilawer] But the Crimea in particular was never threatened by discrimination.

[Alksnis] True, the Crimea never was. Yet, what is happening to the Russian minority and to Russian-orthodox believers in the western Ukraine? Is that not a typical case of nationalism?

One can notice that the Ukraine is disintegrating, cities like Odessa, Cherson, Nikolayev, Charkov, and the Donets Basin are drifting away.... Things are bound to reach a point like that of 1918: In Kiev one force in power, in Charkov another one. Thus, the only way out is the preservation of a single state and taking a reasonable position toward the tendency to create small states.

[Bilawer] Your opponents argue that 70 years of Soviet history teach the exact opposite. They want to rescue the state through unity, but at the same time, they want to change the USSR. Where will the difference be compared with the current situation?

[Alksnis] After the revolution the state that developed was not viable, and it granted the various republics of the union sovereignty. That was the first mistake, and we owe it to Lenin, who made the people's right to self-determination an absolute requirement. In 1917, there was a real danger that the empire would really fall apart, now there is no longer such a danger.

The thousands of wounded, the 2,000 dead, more than one million refugees in six years of perestroyka are the price for political processes that are still in their initial stage. If today Kurdish refugees are shown on television, the reporters fail to mention that here there are one million people in the same situation, while tens of thousands may still yet suffer the same fate. Those who think about the decline of the empire in Moscow are shortsighted.

Each and every citizen of Moscow will experience first-hand that the state was not founded to promote individual ambitions. Moscow needs the Baltics just as the Balts need Moscow or the Ukraine. We are one organism. It seems that it requires a strict and hard test to make people understand that.

[Bilawer] Yet, the Baltic republics in particular argue that leaving the union would not at all mean creating new, impenetrable borders. They are referring to the West European model.

[Alksnis] Do not confuse Western Europe with our country. There people go the opposite way: from individual states to a single Europe. We have an integrative economic system, which some want to destroy hoping that, economically, things will develop just like in Europe, while politically, one can pursue a completely different course.

[Bilawer] Still, the East European countries are politically sovereign and are now seeking new economic paths on that basis.

[Alksnis] The fact that even an economic giant like the FRG is unable to cope with the problem of the GDR, reflects the beginning of serious historic processes. We are facing the imminent Balkanization of Eastern Europe. The CSFR and Yugoslavia are disintegrating, conflicts between Hungary and the CSFR as well as between Hungary and Romania are becoming more and more serious....

[Bilawer] Which development makes you more optimistic: that of Eastern Europe or that in your own country?

[Alksnis] I am more optimistic regarding the developments in the USSR. I know that we will solve our problems. I am convinced that the unity of the USSR will be preserved. It will become a great, thriving country. I am absolutely sure about it.

[Bilawer] How can you be so convinced about that?

[Alksnis] I feel the atmosphere among the people, the result of the 17 March referendum. After all, the people did not vote in favor of some kind of federation or the preservation of the socialist state. Besides, everybody had their own view on the controversial formulation of the question of the plebiscite. This is why I think the people voted in favor of unity without any "-isms." The fact that the majority was in favor is reason for hope.

[Bilawer] You mentioned the various problems the USSR has to overcome: economic, political, national ones. How are these problems interconnected?

[Alksnis] That is a very complex matter. It is difficult to say where to start pulling to unravel that tangle. As long as the question of power remains unsolved the economic questions remain open.

The local parliaments have always only protected the power of the single-party system. Since the CPSU is now retreating, it becomes clear that the councils do not have any mechanisms. Instead of fulfilling the tasks they were entrusted with, such as local self-administration or repairing the sewage systems, they discuss the situation in the Middle East. It does not work that way.

[Bilawer] What is your opinion of the presidential system?

[Alksnis] I am in favor of the presidential system. Yet, Gorbachev has limited his reform to the territory of the Kremlin, while such reform is indispensable also on a local level. The reforms must work in a hierarchical way—from the top to the bottom.

[Bilawer] How do you assess Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov's economic reform?

[Alksnis] That is not a reform but something from the realm of wishful thinking, which, as we all know, paves the way to hell. One may agree with his concept, but there are no mechanisms for its implementation. The republics either fully or partly reject the orders given by Moscow, and what remains is a heap of broken pieces and the question of how all the republics can be forced to fulfill their duties.

[Bilawer] Many western politicians have also expressed their concern about possible disintegration of the USSR. People in the USSR are currently discussing an article by the former adviser to the U.S. President, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in which the author regards disintegration as unstoppable, as well as an opportunity for and a consequence of democratization. Brzezinski argues that the West must choose between a conglomerate of democratic states and a big single totalitarian state. He suggests supporting the first option.

[Alksnis] This is a characteristic example for the difference between words and action. People again and again express their alleged concern about the disintegration, while at the same time they speed up that process through interference. As far as the conglomerate of democratic states is concerned, we know that beginning in the twenties in the Baltics there were a multi-party system, elections, and similar things. Ultimately, at the beginning of the thirties there were dictatorships in all three republics. The only response to the accumulation of problems in the Baltics was pressure and dictatorship.

[Bilawer] You are speaking about the disintegration of the USSR and dictatorship in one breath. What about your concept of the state of emergency for the preservation of the state? Must it not be described as dictatorship?

[Alksnis] No, we will remain within the limits of our Constitution. Moreover, the majority of the population will support us.

Shevardnadze Accuses Government of 'Neglect'

AU0805144691 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 8 May 91 p 6

[Interview with former USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by unidentified NOVOSTI reporter; place and date not given: "I Accuse the Government of Serious Neglect"]

[Text] [NOVOSTI] Is the emphasis shifting in Soviet foreign policy? If so, is this due to the domestic situation?

[Shevardnadze] It would be to early to speak of a shift of emphasis at this point. If we succeed in stabilizing the economic and political situation and human relations in the Soviet Union, we can proceed from the assumption that the foreign policy based on new political thinking, created by our people under great pains within the framework of perestroyka, will continue.

However, if we fail to stabilize the situation, we will be facing chaos and even dictatorship, and hardly anything will remain of the new policy and the new thinking. Thus, the question will really be solved by domestic policy.

[NOVOSTI] You were one of the initiators of the new policy toward eastern Europe. Do you think that this policy is undergoing changes now?

[Shevardnadze] Our relationship with the eastern European states is different now because the old structures of our relations have failed or have been dismantled. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and economic relations must be shaped in a new way. For this reason, we are trying to find new ways and to establish new relations with our neighboring states.

This is mainly taking place at a bilateral level. I think this is good. This process started while I was still foreign minister. A new Soviet-Romanian agreement has already been signed. Treaties with Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are being prepared.

We must deal with these countries on the basis of confidence, mutual respect, and comprehensive equal rights. We must realize that these states are no "buffer states." Every state fulfills its mission and its function that are characterized mainly by its national interests.

[NOVOSTI] Let me ask you another question with regard to this. Was the leadership prepared for the difficulties that resulted from the withdrawal of a sizeable contingent of Soviet troops from European states?

[Shevardnadze] A number of shortcomings have occurred here. We should have started with the preparations as soon as Mikhail Gorbachev announced in 1987 that no Soviet soldiers would remain outside the Soviet Union. The responsible organs, including the Foreign Ministry, should have participated in this process. However, we were educated in the following spirit: Political statements are one thing, and practical steps another.

For this reason, I accuse the government, the planning organs, the Defense Ministry, and all the others who should have taken preparatory measures at the time of gross neglect.

There was also a certain element of surprise. We knew that the changes in eastern Europe were unavoidable (it is not true that we did not have any information). We knew that people would rise up if the leaders in our neighboring states did not restructure their countries. However, it was difficult to foresee dates, the order in which things would take place, and the consequences.

In short, everything has been settled, apart from the conditions under which our soldiers now have to live. Everybody should have tried to solve this problem. The construction of apartments is being accelerated now. The Germans are providing valuable help here.

[NOVOSTI] Western circles are increasingly worried about the imponderables of Soviet policy and of its former allied states. They ask the following question: Will the "common European home" remain merely a beautiful idea?

[Shevardnadze] If we stabilize the situation in all spheres in our country, European development will not be in danger. For this reason, Europe has a vested interest in the resolution of the crisis in the Soviet Union. I firmly reject the idea that there are people in Europe and the United States who are aiming at the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is mere speculation.

As far as the "common European home" is concerned, our attitude must remain unchanged. The more successfully the economic, legal, and cultural common European region develops, the easier it will be for us to solve our problems. In turn, our success will have a positive influence on Europe.

[NOVOSTI] Foreign readers know little about your work as the head of the Foreign Policy Association. What are the goals of this institution?

[Shevardnadze] They know little because it has not achieved very much so far. But it has plans. We are worried about the new political thinking and the readiness among politicians to develop their premises in theory and practice. We want to work out sensible recommendations for the government organs.

The Association has many projects of its own and projects in which partners from the United States, our colleagues from Germany, east European states, Japan, and some other countries participate. We are particularly concerned with strategic stability in the world, Soviet-U.S. relations, economic aspects of politics, and political elements of economic cooperation. Ecology is another focal point of our work.

Party Officials Reportedly Using Bodyguards

PM2504082191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[RIA report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Under USSR KGB Guard"]

[Text] Moscow—RIA [RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY] has learned that a number of CPSU and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party leaders have once again obtained a state guard. Nikolay Maklanov, chief of the USSR KGB Guard Service press service, said the following in response to an RIA correspondent's request that he comment on this report: "The CPSU Central Committee did indeed ask us to provide a guard for some Politburo members and CPSU Central Committee secretaries. This request has been met. The CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs is to cover all expenditures involved in selecting cadres, training personnel, and kitting out and maintaining guard subunits."

Moreover, the press service chief said that the Liberal Democratic Party has also made the same request to the USSR KGB. It announced the conditions for organizing protection for public party leaders via the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee.

IZVESTIYA Outlines 1991 Summer Time Changes

PM2103151391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "When to Put Back the Clock"]

[Text] The USSR State Commission for Standard Time and Standard Frequencies announces that the 1991 "summer time" period comes into force 31 March.

In connection with the USSR Cabinet of Ministers decision on the change of procedure for calculating time on USSR territory, when the transition to "summer" time takes place at 0200 hours 31 March:

1. The clock is not to be put back on the territories of the following republics, krays, and oblasts:

The Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan Republic, Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Turkmen SSR, and Ukrainian SSR;

Uralsk Oblast in the Kazakh SSR;

Kara-Kalpak ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], Bukhara Oblast, Kashka-Darya Oblast, Samarkand, Surkhan-Darya, and Khorezm Oblasts in Uzbek SSR;

Bashkir ASSR, Buryat ASSR, Dagestan ASSR, Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, Kalmyk ASSR, Karelian ASSR, Mari ASSR, Mordovian ASSR, North Ossetia ASSR, Tatar ASSR, Tuva ASSR, Udmurt ASSR, Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Chuvash ASSR, and Yakutsk ASSR;

Altay Kray, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Krasnodar Kray, Maritime Kray, Stavropol Kray, Khaborovsk Kray;

Amur Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Astrakhan Oblast, Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Kirov Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Samara Oblast, Kurgan Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhnyy Novgorod Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Orel Oblast, Penza Oblast, Perm Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tambov Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chita Oblast, and Yaroslavl Oblast.

2. Clocks are to be put one hour forward on the territories of the following republics and oblasts:

The Republic of Georgia, Latvian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, SSR of Moldova, and Estonian SSR;

Komi ASSR;

Kaliningrad Oblast;

Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug.

3. Clocks are to be put one hour back on the territory of the following republics and oblasts:

Kazakh SSR (except Uralsk Oblast), the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Tajik SSR;

Andizhan, Dzhizak, Namangan, Syr-Darya, Tashkent, and Fergana Oblasts of the Uzbek SSR.

When the "summer time" period ends on 29 September 1991, the clock is to be put one hour back on USSR territory, with the exceptions of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, and Tajikistan.

Economic

Kuzbass Committee Sets 10 May To End Strike

LD0805161691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1400 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] A report has come to our editorial office today from Kemerovo. It says that a decision to suspend the strike as of 10 May has been made by the council of Kuzbass workers' committees, albeit with the proviso that if there is no subsequent implementation of the agreement of the 10 [Gorbachev's agreement with nine Union republics two weeks ago] and of the documents on the transfer of Union property to Russian jursidiction, then the oblast strike committee will call on miners to resume the strike beginning 11 July. The labor collectives of the coal enterprises and strike committees of Novokuznetsk, Prokopyevsk, Kemerovo, and other towns in the region expressed agreement with this.

Vorkuta Coal Miners To Suspend Strike 10 May

LD0805205691 Moscow TASS in English 1940 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[Text] Vorkuta May 8 TASS—A majority of coalminers' collectives on strike here today supported a decision of the Vorkuta workers' strike committee to suspend strike from 0000 hours of May 10.

The committee's decision was taken after Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, USSR first deputy prime minister, and Yuriy Skokov, Russia's first deputy prime minister, issued an instruction to transfer coal industry enterprises, including those in the Komi Republic, to Russia's jurisdiction.

However, the suspension of the strike does not signify renunciation of coalminers' demands, G. Ryzhkin, drift miner at the Yun-Yaga coalmine, member of the Vorkuta strike committee on duty, told TASS. They intend to continue to press for full satisfaction of their demands, he added.

Two out 13 Vorkuta coalmines were out of operation today. Some coalminers remained on strike at a number of other coalmines. Coal production losses incurred by the Vorkutaugol amalgamation because of the strike have already amounted to 1,200,000 tonnes. About 900,000 tonnes of coal have not been shipped to users. The amalgamation's overall losses have amounted to over 200 million rubles.

Kuzbass Striking Miners To Reassess Position

PM0805153791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Viktor Kospokovskiy: "Is an End to the Strike in Sight?"]

[Text] Kemerovo—The political strike by the miners of the Kuzbass continued 8 May, and 30 mines are at a complete standstill.

An enlarged session of the Strike Committees Council was held the previous day in Kiselevsk. The discussion of the question of suspending the strike was truly dramatic. Some city committees, Kiselevsk's, for instance, were inclined to suspend the strike as of 10 May and to resume it if the so-called "statement by the 10"—the document on transferring the Russian Federation's coal industry to the charge of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] organs of state management, and the measures to implement the strikers' political demands elaborated by the interrepublican parliamentary group—are not consistently implemented. And 11 July—the second anniversary of the 1989 miners' strike—was mentioned as the control date.

Miners from Prokopyevsk and Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, however, made up a majority of the representatives of the striking enterprises, and their position is this: We have not yet seen the agreement between the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the RSFSR Council of Ministers on transferring base sectors to Russian jurisdiction, we have not got our hands on it, so for the moment we are not going to adopt a decision.

The document was delivered from Moscow 8 May, and the council is meeting again during the afternoon, this time in the oblast center. We will report the results.

Kuzbass Miners Await Transfer of All Industries

LD0705175291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 GMT 7 May 91

[Report by correspondent (Sergey Saltymanov) from Kemerovo; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] A broad-based meeting of workers' committees and strike committees of the Kuzbass is under way in Kiselevsk. They are planning to draw conclusions on the strike and the results of Boris Yeltsin's visit to the area. We now turn to our correspondent in Kemerovo, (Sergey Saltymanov):

Not one, but two, events, significant for the miners of Kuzbass, took place today. In Kiselevsk, as you have said, a broad-based meeting of the oblast council of workers committees took place. The future of the strike is being decided. In Kemerovo, the second and last day in the work of the organizational committee for the preparation of the founding congress of coal industry workers' trade union of Russia was going on. The congress will take place in Moscow at the beginning of the third 10 days of May.

Now more details about these events: The representatives of the enterprises on strike and members of Kuzbass workers' committees could not, in over six hours, come to an agreement on whether to stop the strike or to continue it. Over the last days, they were waiting for a joint statement of the country's Cabinet of Ministers and Russia's Council of Ministers on the transfer of the Union property on the republic's territory to the republic's jurisdiction. Judging from the earlier statements made by workers' leaders, the final decision will largely depend on this statement.

A resolution was adopted yesterday. What is the reaction? On the basis of that document and the recent joint statement by the 10 [nine republics plus the central authorities], as well as the conclusions that the legislative deputies' group came to concerning this statement, some participants today called on the striking enterprises to go back to work on 10 May. In case the measures planned can not be implemented, they reserve the right to continue the strike and start it again on 11 July, the third anniversary of the rebirth of the workers' movement.

The majority of the members of workers' committees did not support this suggestion, however. A decision has been made to continue the strike until all the major industries of the economy are transferred to Russian jurisdiction.

You can say this is dictate and violence; however, the miners interpret it in a different way. They declare that the working collectives of all industries themselves want to follow their example, but are not allowed to do so. If the miners alone go over to Russian jurisdiction, then the Union center will continue, in the miners' opinion, to set workers of different industries against each other and manipulate them all. Such are their arguments.

Now for some statistics: The workers' committee did not have any this time. I had to get them from another source, but a reliable one, I assure you. Today, 34 enterprises are on strike in the Kuzbass; 28 mines are totally paralyzed, eight mines carry out the extraction of coal but do not ship it to consumers. [passage omitted]

Cabinet of Ministers Discusses 1992 Economy

LD0805203391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1800 GMT 8 May 91

[Report by correspondent Valeriy Kiosa in Moscow on 8 May—recorded]

[Text] A meeting of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers was held in Moscow today. Its participants discussed the issue of the financial, material, and technical conditions for the functioning of the economy in 1992. Details in a telephone report by our correspondent, Valeriy Kiosa:

First, I will answer a question that has probably occurred to many of you: Why is there a discussion today about next year? Are there really no more urgent problems that require immediate resolution? I will remind you only of the situation in which our economy found itself at the start of this year. To a large extent, we are reaping the fruit of this situation today. It is precisely for this reason that today, in May, the government commenced an appraisal of the conditions that may arise at the start of next year and, correspondingly, started to work out a program for its actions.

I have to say that the material presented for this meeting by the country's Ministry of Economic and Forecasting evoked a negative reaction from those taking part in the meeting, primarily because it is based on rosy prospects for the growth next year of the basic economic indicators, which is completely unrealistic, taking into account the current situation in the country. The former inclination toward administrative planning from on high in the state orders system is clearly traceable in it, although it is expressed in a slightly modified way.

For precisely this reason, the whole discussion essentially focused on one fundamental matter: Should we continue to develop our economy by orders, or should we start up the market mechanism? Should we leave the centralized supply of enterprises with material and technical resources alone, or will they be provided with the opportunity to seek out these resources and reach agreements directly with their suppliers? Ultimately, will enterprises themselves finally be granted the freedom to resolve many problems? In the course of the ensuing almost four-hour, rigorous, very tense discussion, in which the most varied views were expressed, including disagreement with the introduction of market mechanisms, the Cabinet of Ministers felt that the material in question could not even be taken as a basis.

The country's prime minister, Pavlov, summed up this discussion in his concluding speech. He stressed that the conditions for the functioning of the economy next year should, without doubt, be market ones. Reliance should be placed on the freedom of enterprises, not on their being commanded from on high. He proposed that the appropriate departments define their positions in the very near future with regard to the levying of taxes and the issuing of credits for enterprises, and he stressed that strong enterprises should be counted upon. For this reason, everything that hampers them from working should be absolutely changed.

Regarding the plan for the production of consumer goods, the prime minister stated that the main thing should be not the plan, not the quantity of goods produced, but the satisfaction of demand. Such a concept must be introduced into all our economic calculations. He proposed not to atomize resources by satisfying all the deficits that we currently have but to remove two or three deficits so the population might feel at least some improvement on the shelves of shops.

He emphasized the need for the elaboration of a serious program to attract foreign investments into the country, including offering for sale incomplete construction sites. We have a very great deal of these, and it has not yet been determined what to do with them. In conclusion, the prime minister stressed that the forecast that should be prepared in the near future is not a goal in itself. It is only the general rules of the game on the single economic territory of the country.

The last thing that I would like to say is this: The timescale allocated for the elaboration of the essence of the new document, the new forecast for the economy's development next year, is very short—just one week.

Goskomstat First Quarter Statistics

914A0687A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 17, Apr 91 pp 16-18

[Report of State Committee of USSR for Statistics on USSR Economy in first quarter of 1991]

[Text] **General Description of Economic Situation**

The results of the first quarter attest to extremely complex and contradictory economic conditions in the country. Signs of crisis are present in virtually all spheres and branches of the economy.

The gross national product declined by eight percent from the product for the corresponding period of last year, national income declined by 10 percent, the productivity of social labor declined by nine percent, investment activity was radically diminished, and the volume of export-import operations decreased by a third. The output of manufactured consumer goods and agricultural products began to decrease.

The situation in the consumer market is critical, speculative demand became more pronounced, especially at the end of the quarter, there were shortages of virtually all types of consumer goods, and speculation was more widespread. The increment in commodity turnover was almost wholly a result of higher prices. The population's living conditions deteriorated.

The slump in production is connected with the deterioration of the national economy's supply of resources due to the disruption of economic ties, widespread work stoppages at enterprises as a result of shortages of crude resources and materials, delays in cooperative deliveries, strikes, interethnic conflicts, and ecological and other causes.

The complication of the socioeconomic situation in the country was largely responsible for the intensification of inflationary processes and the devaluation of the ruble. The failure of several republics to fulfill earlier commitments with regard to union budget revenues caused the budget deficit to acquire threatening proportions, and this led to serious difficulties in funding the national economy and major unionwide social programs.

The situation at the end of the first quarter of 1991 in the national economy was distinguished by the following basic indicators (in actual prices, in billions of rubles):

Indicators	First quarter 1991	% of first quarter 1990 (comparable prices)
Industrial product	407	95
Consumer goods production (retail prices)	129.7	98
Foodstuffs	37.3	94
Alcoholic beverages	14.6	105
Nonfood items	77.8	98
Products of light industry	29.9	92
Agricultural product (comparable prices)	22.8	87
New fixed assets of state enterprises and organizations (estimated cost, prices of 1 January 1991)	16.3	66
Capital investments of state enterprises and organizations (estimated cost, prices of 1 January 1991)	39.6	84
Centralized	15.9	75
Investments financed by union budget and union economic stabilization fund	7.5	—
Enterprise and organization investment funds	23.7	90
Employed population, millions of people	134.8	99.9
In public sector	130.8	99.8
Average monthly consumption-related resources per worker, in rubles	300	110
Average monthly wages of kolkhoz farms in kolkhoz public sector, in rubles	207	110
Monetary income of population	187	124*
Compensation for price increases	11	—
Population's expenditures on goods, services, mandatory payments, and contributions	163	124*

Increase in population's deposits in branches of USSR Savings Bank and payments for certificates and other securities	27.1	179*
Retail commodity turnover in state and cooperative trade	131.3	100.2
Paid services	16.7	100.4
Free retail price index (goods and services)	—	123.8
New Housing of state enterprises and organizations, millions of square meters of total area	8.4	73

* In actual prices.

We can assume that the decline of business activity everywhere, which is so apparent from the results of the first quarter, will continue in subsequent quarters, and this is attested to by an analysis of the economic objectives of enterprises and organizations for the current year.

The volume of industrial production projected by enterprises for the current year is approximately 10 percent below the actual level for last year. Projections of the output of many types of agricultural products are substantially lower.

The volume of capital investments from all sources (with the exception of the enterprises of specialized ministries and departments) projected by builders for the year was around 200 billion rubles instead of the estimated 262.2 billion in forecasts. The situation with regard to housing starts is comparable. Whereas forecasts for 1991 set the volume (excluding individual housing construction) at 113-123 million square meters, builders' intentions set the figure at 68 million square meters.

The production plans of industrial enterprises have not been formalized in contracts yet. As of 18 March, agreements had been concluded on only 88 percent of the products scheduled for delivery this year.

Contracts signed by agricultural enterprises with procurement organizations have secured only 79 percent of last year's purchasing volume of livestock and poultry, 87 percent of the volume of milk, only 47 percent of the egg volume, and 66 percent of the wool volume this year. Contracts for the sale of grain to the state have secured 73 percent of last year's procurement volume, with corresponding figures of 75 percent for oil-bearing crops, 69 percent for raw cotton, 76 percent for sugar beets, 98 percent for potatoes, and 83 percent for vegetables.

The state of reserve stocks of products is also unsatisfactory.

The remaining energy-producing coal at enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry measures 6.2 million tons (or 18 percent) less than during the same period last year, and 2.4 million tons (8 percent) for March, and remaining coking coal is 1.8 million tons (35 percent) less than last year's reserve, including 1.1 million tons (25 percent) in March.

The coal reserves of consumers on 1 April amounted to 37.4 million tons, or 83 percent of last year's level, and reserve coking coal at metallurgical enterprises amounted to 800,000 tons, or only half as much as on the same date in 1990.

In several parts of the country the kolkhoz and sovkhoz supply of seeds of spring crops was inadequate. There are sufficient quantities of seeds of spring wheat (101 percent of demand), millet (106 percent), and buckwheat (108 percent). The demand for rice seed has been satisfied by 91 percent, and the demand for legume seeds has been satisfied by 87 percent. Farms have only 80 percent of the potato seeds they need, and the shortage of seed potatoes exceeds 2 million tons.

The shortage of commercial resources is resulting in the systematic removal of goods from wholesale and retail trade stocks, where the volume of these reserves decreased by 11.8 billion rubles (or 14 percent) just in 1990 and was 17.8 billion rubles (27 percent) below standard levels by the beginning of 1991.

Increasing difficulties in the consumer market and the disastrous outbreak of buying frenzy (just before the new prices went into effect on 2 April) put another 5.4 billion rubles' worth of reserve stocks into the trade network, including 3.4 billion rubles' worth in just a single month (March).

Employment

The number of people employed in the national economy in the first quarter was 134.8 million. The number of people employed in the state sector decreased, largely in connection with the development of different forms of ownership and management. The distribution of workers among economic sectors is illustrated below (in millions of people):

Economic sectors	Jan-Mar 1990	Jan-Mar 1991
State sector	114.4	112.8
Cooperative sector	16.7	18.0
Kolkhozes	10.4	10.3
Consumer cooperatives	3.5	3.5
Cooperatives producing goods and services (excluding moonlighters)	2.8	4.2
Private sector	3.8	4.0
Peasant farms	—	0.1
Private subsidiary plots	3.5	3.7
Individual occupations	0.3	0.2

The total number of managerial personnel in the country was 15.7 million at the beginning of 1991, including 1.6 million staff members of state and economic administrative bodies. Most of these people—14.1 million (90 percent)—work on the lowest level of management, directly in plant administrations and the shops of enterprises and organizations.

Losses of work time due to strikes in the first quarter amounted to 1.169 million man-days, including 573,000 in the RSFSR and 577,000 in the Ukrainian SSR. The number of strikes in the coal industry rose dramatically in March.

Finances and Monetary Circulation

During the first quarter, 26 billion rubles in taxes on the profits of enterprises, associations, and organizations (25.5 billion rubles during the same period last year) entered the country's budget network (excluding the Baltic republics), including 3.6 billion rubles in the union budget, 13.7 billion in republic budgets, and 8.7 billion in local budgets. Union budget revenues were just over one-fourth as high as they were in the first quarter last year, while republic budget revenues increased 2.2-fold and local budget revenues increased 2.5-fold.

Turnover tax amounted to 22 billion rubles, or 6 billion less than in January-March 1990, which was due to lower production volumes and the wholesale price reform. All turnover tax is deposited in republic budgets.

Sales taxes amounted to 3.2 billion rubles. Republic budgets were to receive 70 percent of the total and the union budget was to receive 30 percent, but the union budget actually received 300 million rubles (nine percent of the total), republic budgets received 2.4 billion (75 percent), and local budgets received 500 million (16 percent).

State taxes in the amount of 13 billion rubles were collected from the population, or 1.6 billion more than during the same period last year. All of these taxes were directed into republic budgets.

The administration of the union budget was extremely unsatisfactory in the first quarter. According to preliminary estimates, budget income amounted to 21.3 billion rubles (39 percent of the plan), expenditures amounted to 48.2 billion (73 percent of the plan), and the deficit totaled 26.9 billion rubles although the approved maximum deficit for the year is 26.7 billion. The deficit was covered with bank credit. The main reason for this state of affairs is that some republics did not secure the union budget revenues envisaged in the agreement for 1991 on the stabilization of socioeconomic conditions in the country.

Union budget expenditures in January and February totaled 31.2 billion rubles, including 3.3 billion in national economic financing, 2.6 billion for sociocultural measures, 1.5 billion for science, 300 million for the maintenance of governing and administrative bodies, 15.1 billion in military expenditures, 500 million to service the domestic state debt, and 1.3 billion to finance special programs.

Enterprise and organization profits in January and February were estimated at around 45 billion rubles, showing a 1.4-fold increase over profits for the same period last year in connection with the higher wholesale prices.

Credited investments in the national economy in January and February increased by 6.7 billion rubles and amounted to [371.4] billion on 1 March.

Defaults on short-term bank loans and accounts between enterprises and economic organizations on 1 March amounted to 43.5 billion rubles and were 61 percent higher than on the same date last year.

The monetary income of the population amounted to 187 billion rubles and was 36 billion rubles higher than during the same period last year.

Consumption-related resources per worker were 300 rubles a month on the average. Wages represented 95 percent of the total, and five percent consisted of various social benefits of an individual and isolated nature, as well as awards for year-end results and one-time incentives. Besides this, around 11 billion rubles was paid out to cover additional expenditures connected with the rise in retail prices and rates in March, including 8 billion rubles to the employed population and 2.2 billion to retired individuals.

All types of pensions were increased in January 1991 by an amount ranging from five to 40 rubles depending on the duration of the pension period; social pensions were instituted for jobless citizens who are unable to work and are ineligible for labor pensions.

Financial aid to families with children was increased. State stipends for individuals caring for children up to the age of a year and a half, including compensatory payments, rose to 110 rubles a month, and stipends for individuals caring for children from 18 months to six years of age rose to 80 rubles a month. Monthly payments were instituted for children between the ages of six and 16 (and up to 18 for those still in school).

Insurance coverage and payments of insured sums to the population amounted to 2.3 billion rubles.

The per capita monetary income of workers and employees was 19 percent higher than in the first quarter of 1990 and amounted to 203 rubles a month, and the respective figures for kolkhoz farmers were 24 percent and 179 rubles.

The amount the population spent to buy goods and pay for services (consumer spending) rose by 25 percent, mainly as a result of price increases and the overpayment for goods and services at speculative prices that were two or three times as high as state prices.

The population's deposits in branches of the USSR Savings Bank reached 407 billion rubles on 1 April, rising 25.6 billion in three months. This was an increase of [6.9] percent since the beginning of the year. Besides this, USSR Savings Bank certificates held by the population amounted to 6.3] billion rubles.

The population's cash reserves decreased by around 3 billion rubles. Besides this, more than 4 billion rubles' worth of 50- and 100-ruble banknotes were not exchanged—i.e., were effectively taken out of circulation.

Price and Rate Dynamics

A price reform was instituted in order to bring prices closer in line with the actual cost of producing and selling products, to give enterprises a stronger economic incentive to expand production, and to stabilize the consumer market. New enterprise wholesale prices were instituted in industry at the beginning of 1991, and purchase prices in agriculture were gradually increased in the second half of 1990. New estimate prices in capital construction and new rates for transportation and communication services went into effect on 1 January this year. Contract prices were used widely, along with the fixed or state-controlled prices of the main types of products.

The overall level of the wholesale prices of producers of manufactured goods, including fixed and contract prices, was 67 percent higher in January (than during the same period last year), 85 percent higher in February, and 96 percent higher in March. On the average, wholesale prices were 83 percent higher than in the first quarter of 1990. Data on enterprise wholesale price indexes (after turnover tax) in different branches of industry are presented below:

Branch	Jan-Mar 1991 % of Jan-Mar 1990
Fuel and energy complex	199
Metallurgical complex	168
Machine building	173
Chemical and timber complex	189
Construction materials industry	213
Light industry	190
Food industry	179

Freight shipment rates were 16 percent higher than in the first quarter of last year, passenger fares in public transportation were four percent higher, and public communication service rates were 1.8 percent higher.

The prices of consumer goods rose much more quickly in the first quarter. In January 1991 they were 20 percent higher than they were a year before, in February they were 27 percent higher, and in March they were 30 percent higher.

The retail price and rate index for consumer goods and services, calculated on the basis of registered prices of representative goods (and services) and recording the change in prices in the state trade network along with the influence of prices in urban cooperative stores and the kolkhoz market and the products of cooperative and individual labor, was equivalent to 123.8 percent of the index for the first quarter last year, including 125.9 percent for goods and 109.2 percent for services. State prices of goods (sales of these goods represent 94.6 percent of retail commodity turnover) rose 25 percent, the prices of urban cooperative networks (2.7 percent) rose 28 percent, and kolkhoz market prices (2.7 percent) rose 71 percent.

The retail price reform began on 2 April this year.

Consumer Market and Service Sector

The situation with regard to the manufacture of consumer goods did not improve. Industry produced consumer goods, including alcoholic beverages, worth 129.7 billion rubles (in retail prices) in January- March, a figure 3 billion rubles or two percent below the figure for the same period last year.

According to first quarter results, the output of foodstuffs was six percent below the figure for the same period in 1990.

The following data measure the output of the main food products (in thousands of tons):

Foods	Produced in first quarter, 1991	First quarter of 1991 in % of first quarter of 1990
Meat (including subproducts of the first category)	2,558	86
Sausage	917	92
Edible fish products, including canned fish	1,443	91
Whole-milk products, calculated in milk units	7,859	93
Butter	252	84
High-fat cheeses	164	86
Margarine products	347	83
Granulated sugar	1,211	79
Vegetable oil	899	98
Confectionery	1,352	96
Bread and baked goods	7,912	114
Flour	9,955	104
Groats	1,296	99.5
Noodles	503	105
Canned goods, billions of standard cans	3.4	90
Canned fruits and vegetables	2.3	93
Mineral water, millions of decaliters	28.0	75

The output of foodstuffs decreased in virtually all union republics. The main reasons were the nonfulfillment of contracts for the delivery of raw materials to processing enterprises, the lower production and procurement volumes of agricultural enterprises, and the use of part of the agricultural product for barter transactions and for sale in kolkhoz markets in some parts of the country.

The output of alcoholic beverages in the first quarter of 1991 amounted to 32.7 million decaliters (in absolute alcohol units), or two percent more than during the same period last year.

The output of inedible consumer goods (excluding the products of light industry) was a billion rubles higher than in the first quarter of 1990.

The following data measure the output of the main non-food items:

Items	Produced in first quarter of 1991	First quarter of 1991 in % of first quarter of 1990
Television sets, millions	2.6	101
Color sets	1.7	104
Refrigerators and freezers, millions	1.7	100.4
Radios, millions	2.2	95
Tape players and combination radio-players	0.4	109
Tape recorders, millions	1.7	109
Video recorders, thousands	61.2	99.3
Sewing machines, thousands	440	97
Washing machines, millions	1.9	100.7
Vacuum cleaners, millions	1.5	108
Motorcycles, thousands	255	97
Bicycles (excluding children's models), millions	1.5	97
Passenger cars, thousands	307	96
Matches, millions of standard boxes	4.1	96
Wallpaper, millions of standard pieces	149	99.9
School notebooks, millions	1,098	90
Dry, primary, and nickel-alkaline 10 Ahr batteries, millions	258	93
Garden structures, including accessories, frames, and modular units, thousands	30.8	91
Small packages of synthetic detergents, thousands of tons	298	99.9
Household soap, thousands of tons	163	82
Facial soap, thousands of tons	77	91
Electric meat grinders, thousands	241	135
Electric mixers, thousands	640	123
Electric irons, thousands	3,748	86
Electric teapots, thousands	858	83
Razor blades, millions	405	96
Pencils, millions	95.3	36
Shaving cream, millions of cakes	2.9	53
Toothpaste, millions of standard tubes	122	88
Filtered and nonfiltered cigarettes, billions	81.1	94

The output of light industry products amounted to 29.9 billion rubles, or 2.6 billion (8 percent) less than in the same period last year. The output of virtually all of the major products of light industry decreased.

The following data measure the output of light industry products:

Products	Produced in first quarter 1991	First quarter 1991 in % of first quarter 1990
Fabric—total, millions of square meters	3,017	90
Cotton	1,908	92
Silk	493	90
Wool	164	87
Knitwear, millions of items	419	85
Children's knitwear	232	81
Hosiery, millions of pairs	473	84
Children's hosiery	177	87
Men's socks	170	89
Children's sandals, millions of pairs	57.8	83
Women's sandals, millions of pairs	71.9	81
Footwear, millions of pairs	187	89
Children's footwear	83	86

One out of every five light industry enterprises failed to meet contract obligations in January-March, resulting in underdeliveries of 730 million rubles' worth of goods.

The disruption of economic ties caused work stoppages in more than 300 enterprises in the branch in March.

Total retail commodity turnover in state and cooperative trade as a whole reached 131.3 billion rubles in the first quarter. The increase over the same period last year was 26.6 billion rubles in actual prices (or 25.3 percent), with 26.3 billion, or 98.9 percent of the increase, due to the higher prices.

The consumer market was distinguished by a disastrous outbreak of buying frenzy in March. In the second half of the month before the new prices were instituted, literally all goods were "swept off" store shelves. In March the population was sold goods worth 52.3 billion rubles—14 billion, or 36.5 percent, more than in March last year.

Studies of 125 oblasts, krays, and republics by statistical agencies in the first 10 days of April revealed that there were almost no footwear, clothing, underwear, hosiery, and fabric for sale. Just as in the past, people had to stand in line when these were sold. Durable goods were not being offered for sale on the open market either. They were being sold mainly on the basis of enterprise lists and advance orders.

The assortment of meat products was somewhat broader in some regions. Whereas there were no meat and meat products for sale in approximately half of the surveyed territories at the beginning of the month, 20 percent of the regions reported a lack of meat for sale or interruptions in sales of just meat on 10 April.

Most of the butter and sugar was being rationed in virtually all of the surveyed regions.

Dairy products were on sale everywhere, but customers had to stand in long lines. These products are delivered in limited quantities and are sold out within two or three hours. The situation with regard to confectionery, groats, noodles, flour, and vegetable oil did not improve. The absence of groats and noodles for sale was recorded in around 20 percent of the surveyed territories, and a lack of flour was recorded in 40 percent.

Sales of meat, poultry, fish products, butter, cheese, non-alcoholic beverages, and vegetable and fruit juices in the first quarter were 14- 26 percent below the sales figures for the same period last year, sales of confectionery, sausages, dairy products, potatoes, vegetables, margarine, and eggs were six-12 percent lower, sugar sales were three percent lower, and sales of tea were at the same level as last year. Sales of baked goods rose seven percent, sales of vegetable oil and citrus and other fruits rose 15-20 percent, and sales of canned meat increased 1.5-fold.

The disruption of economic ties between regions is causing substantial problems in the provision of the population with foodstuffs. The meat products shipped to Moscow in the first quarter, for example, were 14 percent below the planned quantity, shipments to Leningrad were 16 percent below, shipments to Moscow Oblast were 27 percent below, those to the Azerbaijan SSR were 17 percent below, those to the Turkmen SSR were 36 percent below, those to the Republic of Georgia were 25 percent below, those to the Uzbek SSR were half as high as the projected figure, those to the Tajik SSR were 61 percent below, and shipments to the Republic of Armenia were 73 percent below the planned figure.

Contractual obligations for the delivery of meat products to the union supply as a whole were fulfilled by 110 percent, and the respective figures for dairy products and eggs products were 87 and 72 percent. Deliveries of meat products to the union supply were 49,000 tons below the figure for the first quarter of 1990 (the Ukrainian SSR and Moldova SSR reduced their deliveries by almost half, and the Lithuanian Republic reduced its shipments by two-thirds); dairy product deliveries were 502,000 tons below the 1990 level (deliveries from the Ukrainian SSR were reduced by more than half, and shipments from the Belorussian SSR were reduced by a third); the figure for egg shipments was 506 billion eggs below last year's figure (the Ukrainian SSR was responsible for three-fourths of the reduction).

In the three months the trade network received 133,000 tons (or eight percent) less potatoes than last year and 180,000 tons (11 percent) less vegetables, and reserve stocks of these products on 1 April were 39 percent and 23 percent below the respective figures for last April.

Conditions in the market for nonfood items grew worse. The trade network received 10 percent (5.2 billion rubles' worth) less of these goods than in the first quarter of last year, due both to the reduction of production volume and to decreased imports. Sales of television sets, refrigerators, and cotton and wool fabrics were 25-30 percent below the sales figures for the first quarter of 1990, sales of silk fabric, hosiery, leather footwear, household soap, furniture, and radios were 13-20 percent below, and sales of knitwear, glassware, tobacco products, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, facial soap, and detergents were 4-10 percent below. Sales of passenger cars stayed at approximately the same level as last year (because of ongoing production), and sales of china, timepieces, cameras, tape recorders, bicycles, mopeds, motorcycles, motor scooters, clothing, and underwear rose two-seven percent.

The reduction of commodity stocks in response to the buying frenzy and the broader regimentation of sales practices caused virtually all goods to disappear from store shelves, even those which had not been in demand before. Reports of the absence of manufactured goods (with the exception of goods produced by cooperatives and individuals and those procured from the population and sold at commercial prices) in the stores came in from Blagoveshchensk, Guryev, Vladikavkaz, Orel, Kostroma, Novgorod, Murmansk, Vladimir, Sukhumi, Izhevsk, Ust- Kamenogorsk, Saransk, Yaroslavl, and other cities at the beginning of April.

The work of public catering enterprises was organized poorly. The increment in their turnover was wholly due to higher prices. Besides this, public catering enterprises are selling fewer of their own products, the sales of which amounted to 7 billion rubles in the first quarter, or 68.3

percent of total commodity turnover in the public catering network as compared to 71.8 percent during the same period last year.

In the first quarter of 1991 the volume of paid services rose 9.6 percent in actual prices and amounted to 16.7 billion rubles. The volume of consumer services increased by 18 percent. The entire increase in paid services, however, was due to higher prices and service fees. In comparable prices, the volume of paid services increased by only 0.4 percent, and that of consumer services decreased by 4.6 percent.

Industry

Total industrial output in January-March, estimated in comparable prices, was five percent below the figure for the same period last year, including a 6-percent drop in March.

The reduction of industrial output affected all national economic complexes. The largest reduction (six percent) was in the output of goods used for production purposes (branches of group "A"). The rate of decrease was 3 percent in branches producing consumer goods (group "B").

During the three months contracts signed with consumers were underfulfilled by 7.1 billion rubles' worth of industrial products (1.9 percent of the total). This was 1.5 times as high as during the same period last year (estimated at comparable prices). The average increase over January- March last year for all of industry was exceeded most substantially by underdeliveries of products in the metallurgical (2.8 times), fuel and energy (2.3 times), and chemical and timber (1.8 times) complexes. Delivery commitments were unfulfilled by 15 percent of the enterprises in industry (44 percent in the chemical and timber complex, 43 percent in the metallurgical complex, 32 percent in the fuel and energy complex, and 29 percent in the machine-building complex).

The disruption of economic ties led to the further deterioration of material and technical supply conditions, and this stopped production in many cases. Shortages of electrical power, fuel, and material resources caused lengthy (lasting more than one shift) stoppages at 1,200 enterprises in March.

The output of the main types of products is still decreasing in the fuel and energy complex and the metallurgical complex, and this is illustrated by the following data:

Products	First quarter 1991	In % of first quarter 1990
Electricity, billions of kilowatt-hours	480	101
Oil (including gas condensate), millions of tons	132	91
Gas, billions of cubic meters	211	100.3
Coal, millions of tons	166	89
Coking coal	41	82
Steel, millions of tons	36.8	92
Rolled ferrous metals (finished products), millions of tons	26.8	93
Steel pipe, millions of tons	4.8	97
Iron ore, millions of tons	55.4	94
Coke with 6% moisture content, millions of tons	18.2	92

The output of fuel and energy resources in standard units totaled 534 million tons, or 30 millions tons (5 percent) less than during the same period in 1990.

The coal industry suffered difficulties.

The output of coal in March was 18 percent smaller than during the same period last year, including 33 percent less coking coal. Whereas 2 million tons of coal were mined each day in January and February, the average daily yield in March decreased to 1.8 million tons. Direct losses due to strikes exceeded 6 million tons, and this affected coal deliveries to the metallurgical and chemical industries.

The output of electricity was higher than the output of the first quarter of last year by one percent. There was a significant decrease, however, in some republics: of 25 percent in the Latvian Republic, 13 percent in the Moldova SSR, of 15 percent in the Republic of Georgia, and of seven percent in the Estonian Republic.

The work of the metallurgical complex is still being affected by difficulties in supplying enterprises with coking coal and metal scrap—the main elements of the raw material used in metallurgy.

The production of many of the most important products of the machine-building complex in the first quarter was far below the level for the same period last year.

Products	First quarter 1991	% of first quarter 1990
Metal-cutting tools, thousands	38.5	95
NPC tools	5.1	83
Forging and pressing machines, thousands	10.1	93
Electric alternator engines, millions	2.3	88
Motor Vehicles, thousands	509	92
Trucks	181	86
Buses	20.6	94
Tractors, thousands	124	91
Feed combines, thousands	6.3	75
Excavators, thousands	9.2	93

The main reason for the smaller output of machine-building products was the unsatisfactory provision of enterprises with material and technical supplies.

The output of the main products of the chemical and timber complex is decreasing:

Products	First quarter 1991	% of first quarter 1990
Mineral fertilizers (calculated in 100% nutritive substances), millions of tons	7.9	92
Sulfuric acid, millions of tons	6.6	91
Soda ash, millions of tons	1.1	84
Caustic soda, thousands of tons	742	97
Chemical fiber and filament, thousands of tons	337	85
Synthetic resins and plastics, millions of tons	1.4	95
Thermoplastic pipe and tubing, thousands of tons	39.8	78
Truck tires, millions	6.4	92
Car tires, millions	6.4	99
Medicines, billions of rubles	2.0	105
Commercial timber (excluding kolkhoz supplies), millions of cubic meters	83.9	87
Lumber (excluding products of auxiliary enterprises of non-industrial organizations), millions of cubic meters	15.7	85
Paper, millions of tons	1.5	94
Newsprint, billions of square meters	8.6	92
Cardboard, thousands of tons	963	88

The work of enterprises producing the main raw materials for the chemical industry is deteriorating.

In comparison with the first quarter of last year, the production volumes of three-fourths of the enterprises producing soda ash and around two-thirds of the enterprises producing sulfuric acid were reduced. The production schedule in polymer chemistry was disrupted. The reduced output of polystyrene, styrene copolymers, and polypropylene was the reason for the growing shortage of polymer raw materials. Interruptions in the work of the enterprises of the complex are creating additional delays in filling the consumer market with consumer goods. The output of chemical fibers and filaments, synthetic dyes, rubber footwear, and movie film has decreased substantially. Although the total output of medicine increased, smaller quantities of Euphylline, Cordiamin, Clophylin, and several other extremely scarce medicines were produced than in the first quarter last year.

The following figures measure the output of the main products of the construction industry:

Products	First quarter 1991	% of first quarter 1990
Cement, millions of tons	32.7	95
Asbestos cement slate (roofing), billions of standard tiles	2.3	100.4
Asbestos cement pipes and sleeves, thousands of kilometers of standard pipe	20.7	100.2
Flexible roofing and insulation materials, millions of square meters	441	91
Window glass, millions of square meters	55.3	95

There has been a decrease in the output of certain types of prefabricated construction elements—precast reinforced concrete, including structures for frame-and-panel housing construction, structural elements made of aluminum alloys, and steel wall panels.

The construction program has been affected adversely by cuts in the production of household fixtures—heaters and convectors, stoves, and bathroom and laundry sinks.

Agroindustrial Complex

Production declined at agricultural enterprises in the first 3 months of the year. During the last quarter the value of the agricultural product for the whole country was 13 percent below the figure for the same period last year. This is the first production decline of this magnitude in recent years.

Animal husbandry production volumes decreased dramatically, and purchases of hothouse and field-grown early vegetables were reduced. This had an adverse effect on the state of the country's consumer market.

The following figures indicate the output of animal husbandry products on kolkhozes and sovkhozes and at interfarm enterprises:

Products	First quarter 1990	First quarter 1991	1991 in % of 1990
Meat (livestock and poultry sold for slaughter), millions of tons in live weight	5.5	4.8	88
Milk, millions of tons	18.0	16.2	90
Eggs, billions	15.2	14.0	92

The output of animal husbandry products decreased on farms in all of the union republics, especially in the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Armenia, and the Moldova SSR.

The main reasons for the decrease were the shortage of fodder, the reduction of the livestock herd, and its low productivity.

The following data measure the reduction of the number of livestock at agricultural enterprises (millions of head):

Livestock	1 April 1990	1 April 1991	1991 in % of 1990
Cattle	93.3	89.4	96
Cows	28.1	27.4	97
Pigs	57.9	52.9	91
Sheep and goats	126.8	116.9	92

Procurements of animal husbandry products were reduced in many parts of the country. Purchases of animal husbandry products from farms of all categories in the last quarter were the following:

Products	First quarter 1990	First quarter 1991	1991 in % of 1990
Livestock and poultry, millions of tons			
Live weight	5.4	4.6	86
Slaughter weight	3.5	3.0	86
Milk, millions of tons	15.3	13.4	88
Eggs, billions	13.6	11.7	86

Purchases of animal husbandry products were lower than during the same period last year in all republics but the Uzbek SSR, where there was a slight increase in purchases of livestock and poultry (of 0.6 percent) and milk (of one percent).

The amount of hothouse and field-grown early vegetables purchased this year was 63,600 tons, which is below the figure for the same period of 1990 by 15,800 tons or 20 percent.

The main reasons for the reduction of state purchases of hothouse vegetables were production cuts and the sale of more of these vegetables on the market by the immediate producers.

Agricultural enterprises in the southern regions of the country are planting spring crops. By the middle of April spring crops had been sown on an area of 9.7 million hectares, including 6 million hectares of grain crops. Sowing this year, however, has still not reached last year's level in these regions. Last year spring crops had been sown on an area of 20.3 million hectares by this time, including 12 million hectares of grain crops.

The number of tractor-driven cultivators agriculture received in the first quarter was 13,600, or 31 percent, below the number for the same period last year, and the number of tractor-driven plows was 12,200, or 24 percent, below. Machines for the application of solid organic fertilizer were delivered in an amount below the figure for the same period last year by 3,100 (or 28 percent), with corresponding figures of 4,100 (13 percent) for tractor-driven sowers, 508,000 tons (eight percent) for mineral fertilizers, and 1.5 million tons (16 percent) for liming materials.

The process of establishing autonomous peasant farms is taking on broader dimensions in rural areas. By the beginning of March over 47,000 had been registered throughout the country, and the number of people working on these farms on a permanent basis was 127,000. The land they have been allocated covers an area of over a million hectares, or 22 hectares on the average for each farm (444 hectares in the Kazakh SSR, 189 hectares in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, 44 hectares in the RSFSR, and 26 hectares in the Estonian Republic). The most vigorous efforts to encourage the establishment of peasant farms have been recorded in the RSFSR, Uzbek SSR, Republic of Georgia, Kazakh SSR, Latvian Republic, and Ukrainian SSR.

Capital Construction

State enterprises and organizations used 39.6 billion rubles in capital investments. This was 16 percent below the figure for the same period last year, and this was a result of the overall decline of investment activity and the withdrawal of some enterprises from the state sector of the economy.

State centralized capital investments in the amount of 15.9 billion rubles were used in the first quarter, and 47 percent of the amount came from the union budget and the union fund for economic stabilization. The proportion accounted for by centralized investments in the total investments of state enterprises continued to decrease, amounting to 40 percent as compared to 45 percent in the same period last year.

Just as in earlier years, the completion of 93 percent of union construction projects and 92 percent of the projects financed by state enterprises and organizations with their own funds and supplied with material resources on a centralized basis is scheduled for the fourth quarter. This distribution of the start-up of production capacities, as past experience testifies, will cause delays in the completion of the union start-up program. Only two of the six facilities scheduled for start-up in the first quarter could begin operating.

The capital investments financed by the union budget and union fund for economic stabilization are being used inefficiently. The annual limit on capital investments in priority union construction projects and facilities where production capacities are being established was depleted by nine percent in the fuel and energy complex in the first quarter, 12 percent in the metallurgical complex, 11 percent in the machine-building complex, and six percent in the chemical and timber complex, with respective figures of six and eight percent for conservation projects and the intersectorial scientific and technical complexes and experimental bases of research and design organizations.

The present state of affairs in the construction of production facilities precludes the reduction of the volume of unfinished construction this year.

State enterprises and organizations built 140,700 dwellings with a total area of 8.4 million square meters in January-March with centralized capital investments and their own funds. This figure was 3.1 million square meters, or 27 percent, lower than the figure for the first quarter of 1990. The supply of new housing decreased in all of the union republics but the Belorussian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR, and the Republic of Armenia. State enterprises completed 700,000 square meters of total area with funds from the union budget and the union fund for economic stabilization. This was 5 percent of the amount planned for the year.

Residential buildings with a total area of a million square meters, or 12 percent of the total, were built in rural communities.

The completion figures for most sociocultural construction projects were below the figures for the same period last year. Projects completed in the first three months of this year included general educational schools for 36,700 students less than during the same period last year (or 30 percent less), pre-school establishments for 25,600 children less than last year (or 21 percent less), hospitals with 2,100 fewer beds (40 percent), polyclinics for 14,000 fewer out-patient visits a day (eight percent), cultural centers and clubs with 5,600 fewer seats (45 percent), and boarding houses for the elderly and disabled for 500 fewer people (26 percent less).

State construction and installation organizations performed contracted work worth 25.1 billion rubles in January-March, including 10.3 billion rubles' worth of work on priority projects. The most significant decreases in work volumes in comparison with the same period last year were recorded in organizations of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification (11 percent), the USSR Ministry of Transport Construction (10 percent), the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry (8 percent), the Neftegazstroy concern (31 percent), and the Vodstroy concern (12 percent).

One of the main reasons for this state of affairs is the reduction of contracted shipments of construction materials and structural elements. In the first quarter, for example, deliveries to organizations of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification were 15 percent below the figure for the same period of 1990 in the case of rolled ferrous metal products, 13 percent for cement, and 53 percent for steel pipe, with respective figures of 18, 18, and 15 percent for deliveries to the Neftegazstroy concern.

Transportation and Communications

The following data are indicators of freight shipments in the public transportation network:

Modes of transport	First quarter 1991, millions of tons	First quarter 1991 in % of first quarter 1990
All forms of transport	2,633.9	92.2
Railway	892.2	92.0
Pipeline	302.1	96.6
Sea	52.9	93.5
Internal waterway*	16.3	62.3
Motor*	1,369.9	91.6
Air	0.5	85.9

* Excluding Lithuanian Republic.

The amount of freight shipped by rail was 77.7 million tons less than the amount shipped in the first quarter last year, mainly as a result of the reduced output of many products. For example, the reduction of the coal output by 11 percent was accompanied by a reduction of nine percent in the amount of coal shipped by rail, with respective figures of eight and nine percent for coke and of five and three percent for cement.

The plan for freight deliveries to the state was fulfilled by 99.7 percent, but assignments for 10 types of freight were fulfilled only in the case of grain and ground grain products, ferrous metals, and coke. Assignments were not completed in the case of seven other types of freight, with underdeliveries of hard coal amounting to 3.2 million tons, or 1.8 percent of the planned total, and respective figures of 1.4 million tons and 1.4 percent for oil and petroleum products and of 1.3 million tons and 4 percent for chemical and mineral fertilizers.

At the end of February there were over 56 million tons of freight (excluding construction lime), ready to be shipped, on the loading platforms of enterprises and railway stations. This was 11 percent below the figure for the same date last year. The decrease in unshipped timber was 51 percent, with corresponding figures of 43 percent for ferrous metals and 11 percent for oil and petroleum products. Some amounts of unshipped freight were larger, however, than they had been on the same date last year, including 1.6 times as much iron and manganese ore, 1.3 times as much chemical and mineral fertilizer, and 1.2 times as much cement.

The amount of freight in seaport warehouses awaiting shipment by rail decreased slightly. It amounted to 800,000 tons at the end of March, including 500,000 tons of imported freight (the respective figures for the same date last year were 1 million and 700,000 tons).

The amount of oil shipped by pipeline was below the figure for the first quarter of last year by 11.6 million tons, or 8.5 percent, including figures of 9.1 percent for the RSFSR, 6.9 percent for the Uzbek SSR, 4.5 percent for the Turkmen SSR, and 2.8 percent for the Kazakh SSR.

The amount of freight shipped by sea was 6.5 percent less than in the first quarter last year. Assignments for the shipment of state- requisitioned freight to regions of the Far North and comparable locations were fulfilled by 100.4 percent.

The amount of freight in seaports awaiting shipment by sea at the end of March was 4.5 million tons, including 4.2 million tons of export freight (the respective figures for the same date last year were 4.4 million and 3.7 million). The largest quantities of export freight accumulated in the following ports: Mariupol (480,000 tons), Izmail (371,000), Vostochnyy (349,000), and Ilyichevsk (279,000).

The amount of freight shipped by public motor transport decreased by 8.2 percent. There was a decrease in all republics, especially the Moldova SSR (32.1 percent), the Republic of Georgia (31.8 percent), the Estonian Republic (18.8 percent), the Latvian Republic (16.7 percent), the Tajik SSR (16.5 percent), and the Turkmen SSR (11.5 percent).

The public transportation network carried 12.7 billion passengers in the first quarter, or 5.6 percent less than during the same period last year. Passenger traffic decreased by 2.4 percent and amounted to 239 billion passenger-kilometers, including respective figures of 4.4 percent and 109.9 billion on buses and of 2.6 percent and 82.5 billion on trains. Passenger travel by air rose three percent and totaled 46.4 billion passenger-kilometers. The passenger traffic assignment was fulfilled by 101.6 percent by railway transport and 103.8 percent by air transport.

Communications enterprises performed services worth 1.2 billion rubles for the population in the first quarter, which was 15 percent higher than the figure for the first quarter of 1990.

State of the Environment

During the three months agencies of the State Committee of the USSR for Hydrometeorology recorded cases of air pollution by various substances 10 or more times in excess of permissible limits in 50 industrial centers (53 centers in the first quarter of 1990). They included such large cities as Arkhangelsk, Volzhskiy, and Bratsk, where high levels of methylmercaptan pollution were also recorded in 1990, Saratov and Krasnoperekopsk, where the same was true of hydrogen chloride pollution, and Berezniki and Gubakha (Perm Oblast), where hydrogen sulfide pollution had been recorded in 1990.

There were 827 cases of high concentrations of pollutants in 213 bodies of water, and the most frequent cases were recorded in the basins of the Ob and its tributaries, the Irtysh and Tobol (26 percent of all cases), the Volga, Oka, and Kama (20 percent), and the Don and Northern Donets (eight percent). Concentrations of zinc compounds of nitrate and ammonium nitrite and petroleum products in some sections of these rivers were up to 50 times in excess of permissible limits.

Cases of the sudden (accidental) pollution of the environment, with a particularly negative effect on the air, water, and soil, displayed virtually no decrease.

Crime

The crime rate is still rising in the country. Over 694,000 crimes were reported in the first quarter, or 16.6 percent more than during the same period last year. One out of every six crimes was a grave offense. The highest increases in the number of crimes were recorded in the Estonian Republic—1.4-fold, the Republic of Armenia—23.3 percent, the RSFSR—18.7 percent, the Azerbaijan SSR—18.5 percent, and the Lithuanian Republic—18.1 percent. More than 330,000 reported crimes remained unsolved, which was 33.4 percent higher than the figure for the same period last year.

The number of premeditated homicides and attempted homicides was the same as the number for the same period last year—6,000. The number of intentional felonious assaults decreased by 3.4 percent (15,000 reported cases), and the number of rapes and attempted rapes decreased by 7.6 percent (5,200 reported cases). There were 346 thefts of guns and ammunition, or 13.3 percent less than in the first quarter last year.

There was a slight decrease in the number of crimes in which minors were the perpetrators or accessories and the number of crimes committed under the influence of alcohol. They numbered 52,400 and 106,000 respectively.

The number of crimes connected with thefts of state and public property is rising. Discovered cases numbered 107,100, or 39 percent more than in the same period last year. Thefts of the personal property of citizens increased by almost a third, including an increase of 34.3 percent in burglaries, and the respective numbers of reported cases of these crimes were 238,800 and 88,700.

There were 38,800 reported robberies and 6,200 muggings, which exceeded the figures for the same period last year by 22 percent and 15 percent respectively. There was a slight rise (of two percent) in the number of cases of criminal vandalism, numbering 38,600 in the three months. Crimes by repeat offenders (81,300) increased by seven percent. Group crimes increased by 17.2 percent (66,500).

Around 328,000 criminals were apprehended in January-March, including 48,200 (15 percent) women and 64,400 (20 percent) people who did not work or go to school (16 years of age and older). Criminal proceedings were instituted against around 70 percent of the people who had committed crimes.

Foreign Economic Relations

The total volume of export-import operations in January-March amounted to the equivalent of 34.3 billion rubles in hard currency in actual prices and was 33.8 percent below the figure for the same period last year. Total exports fell below the figure for the same period last year by 18.4 percent, amounting to only 17.9 billion rubles in hard currency, because of the decline of industrial production and the limited export resources in the fuel and energy complex. The limited amount of foreign currency receipts from sales of goods abroad led to the reduction of imports by 45.1 percent, with a total volume of 16.4 billion rubles in hard currency.

Difficulties arising in foreign trade transactions with former CEMA countries, connected with new forms of payment (in hard currency), reduced exports to these countries by 40.9 percent and imports from these countries by 48.3 percent. Trade operations with capitalist countries were distinguished by a decrease of 10.7 percent in exports and of 45.2 percent in imports.

There was a positive balance of foreign trade operations in January- March in the amount of the equivalent of 1.5 billion rubles in hard currency, whereas there was a negative balance of 7.9 billion in the same period last year.

In January-March the Soviet Union exported 15 million tons of oil, 5 million tons of petroleum products, 5 million tons of hard coal, 26 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 2 million cubic meters of rough lumber, and other commodities. In comparison to the first quarter of last year, exports displayed the following reductions—19 million tons of oil and petroleum products, 300,000 tons of cast iron, 200,000 tons of cotton fiber, 183,000 refrigerators, and 367,000 television sets.

In the first quarter imports of ferrous metals were reduced by 957,000 tons, with corresponding figures of 303,000 tons for pipe, 21,000 tons for rubber, 33,000 tons for poultry, 45,000 tons for butter, 20,000 tons for citrus fruits, 6,000 tons for coffee, 23,000 tons for tea, and 38,000 tons for sunflower oil. The reduced purchases of imported foods had an adverse effect on the country's consumer market.

More than 30,000 participants in foreign economic operations were registered on 1 April 1991.

Local Control Urged for Tyumen Oilfield

PM0705151391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 91 First Edition p 2

["Alarm Signal" report by correspondent V. Orlov: "Less and Less Oil"]

[Text] Tyumen Oblast—Almost 11 million tonnes less oil was extracted in Tyumen Oblast in the first quarter, compared with the corresponding period last year. Even last year was a flop for Tyumen Oblast oilmen—extraction of "black gold" fell 30 million tonnes. This year the drop in oil extraction is already approaching 50 million tonnes. This alarming indicator is, alas, increasing.

PRAVDA wrote quite recently of the optimism and hopes with which oilmen had greeted the news that the problems of their sector's development had been examined by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. The government and the president had promised to take emergency measures, to remove the barriers hindering the productive labor of Siberians, and to give the oilmen all possible assistance.

"Unfortunately," Tyumen Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] Chairman L. Roketskiy said, "the decisions being made at various levels to stabilize the economy in the sectors of the oil and gas complex have not produced the expected results because they have not been backed up by concrete action; therefore, the situation is exacerbating."

Leonid Yulianovich knows the topic of conversation not by hearsay, for he has been working in the Tyumen north for more than 10 years. Prior to his present post he was for a long time chairman of the soviet executive committee of an oil city—Surgut—and so he has his own convincing reply to the age-old questions "Who is to blame" and "What is to be done?"

As before, enterprises and management organs in many parts of the country are avoiding concluding contracts with Tyumen Oblast people, and those that have been signed already are not being fulfilled. Drilling people, oilmen, and gas extractors continue to lack pipes, christmas trees, insulation, pumping units, and electric motors.

The region's food supply has deteriorated catastrophically. Volumes of housing construction have almost halved. Practically every second family is standing in line for housing. Only 67 children out of 100 are able to attend children's preschool establishments. The schools work a three-shift day.

Where is the way out? The people of Tyumen Oblast put to the government the question of granting them the opportunity to conclude direct contracts for mutual deliveries with republics, krays, and oblasts. This is the only way, they believe, that it is possible to influence subcontractors. Yet people in some places are accustomed to regarding gasoline, diesel oil, and gas as manna from heaven. It is necessary to act tough: If you do not fulfill the contract terms, your fuel deliveries will be cut off.

"It is a paradox, but we make a loss out of extracting oil and gas in the oblast," L. Roketskiy reasoned. "A situation has taken shape whereby oil and gas men have no interest in increasing extraction of hydrocarbons. Today the local budget gets a minimal income from oil and gas. We make our main profit on the turnover created by our processing enterprises. It is necessary to give labor collectives and soviets an interest in increasing or at least maintaining the level of oil and gas extraction. As a priority measure to resolve independently the basic questions of developing the social sphere and providing the population with food and consumer goods, we ask that the oblispolkom be granted the rights to purchase some oil from the oblast's oil- and gas-extracting enterprises on the strength of state deliveries already this year and to issue licenses for its sale on the market. In addition, enterprises of the oil and gas complex must be given the opportunity to manage things independently, so they can have at least partial control over the product being produced."

With a view to stabilizing the economic situation, extending independence and responsibility in utilizing the region's resources, and combining the interests of departments and local soviets, there is a proposal to the government to examine the possibility of transferring to the oblast soviet the right to control all proven oil and gas fields not on the balance sheet of extracting organizations. This accords with the laws being adopted. In that case the oblast soviet will be able to transfer the development of these deposits to any enterprise, including a joint venture and a foreign enterprise, on a paying and, as a rule, a competitive basis. All the funds accruing to the oblast soviet, the okrug soviet, and the rayon soviets for the development of deposits could be used for socioeconomic development, the ecological improvement of territories, the creation of stabilization funds, the encouragement of enterprise, and more.

Rumors of Further Price Hikes Called 'Joke'

PM0905084191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, BALTFAX, RIA, REUTER reports: "Price Rise Rumors Exaggerated"]

[Text] RIA has learned that the USSR Cabinet of Ministers is preparing a major new price rise for the second half of May. The scale of the increase in the cost of living can be judged from the fact that a kilogram of butter will cost customers 16 rubles [R] instead of R10.

Anatoliy Komin, first deputy chairman of the State Committee on Prices, who was telephoned by an RIA correspondent, called the rumors about a new price rise a "joke played by a fool or a clever provocateur." He said that only a madman would take such a step at the moment, since the government has still not worked out the consequences of the previous change in prices.

Military

Warsaw Pact Commander Formally Relieved of Post

PM0705161591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Unattributed "Diary" report]

[Text] A 6 May 1991 USSR presidential decree states that Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov has been relieved of the post of first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces, and first deputy commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states in connection with his transfer to other work.

Defense Minister's Victory Day Article Published

PM0805193091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov under the rubric "Greatness of the People's Feat": "Victory: Memory and Truth"]

[Text] Tragedy and greatness. Grief and joy. Pain and memory... All this is Victory. It shines like a bright, inextinguishable star on the horizon of our country's history. Nothing can cloud it—neither years nor events. Not for nothing is Victory Day a holiday that, far from fading over the years, actually takes an increasingly important place in our life.

This year's Victory Day is no exception. We have come to it with knowledge of the bitter truth about the price of Victory. We can no longer live without this truth. In a thrall to expedient lies about the great tragedy and triumph of our people and their Armed Forces, our forgetful, indifferent hearts were hardened and our minds grew indolent. Unaccustomed to thinking about the past, they did not think about the present either, still less about the future.

The truth roused our souls and awakened our minds. Today it is abundantly clear that we were victorious in the most terrible war that history has ever known; therefore, we have no right to let the grass of forgetfulness grow over the memory of that war and of those who bore incredible military hardships and privations and overcame a strong and dangerous enemy.

They were the rank-and-file soldiers of the front, the modest, selfless toilers of war. They bore the unprecedented hardships of prolonged and bloody battles.

They were the officers, the generals, the marshals. All who commanded companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, corps, armies, and fronts, who led staffs, who worked at the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Later generations owe to the skills and talent of the commanding officers and political workers and the heroism of the soldiers the victories of Moscow and Stalingrad, the Kursk Bulge, Belorussia, and the Ukraine, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the taking of Berlin.

They were the workers, the peasants, the scientific and creative intelligentsia. Through their labor in plant shops, in the grain fields, in design bureaus and scientific laboratories, they forged the weapons of Victory and supplied the front's every need.

They honorably fulfilled their duty to the Fatherland, and they deserve to have the truth about their deeds and the grateful memory of their feat live forever.

I.

Memory and truth—these form the links in the indissoluble chain of time. Without this link, the individual loses his sense of kinship with his people and his land, loses his sense of responsibility for the country's fate, becomes blind and deaf to its griefs, its hopes, its sorrows and its joys. That is why I think the attack on the history of the Great Patriotic War that has been unleashed and is being conducted by our homegrown falsifiers is so terrible. Acting out of ambitious political calculation, they substitute verisimilitude for truth, deny our people's patriotism, courage, and will for victory, and belittle the Soviet soldiers' and officers' level of knowledge and skill.

True, there is much in the history of the Great Patriotic War that is now seen and interpreted differently. Our failures and successes, victories and defeats, mistakes and miscalculations are discussed honestly, frankly, and—most important—on the basis of the evidence. I do not think that this in any way diminishes the prestige, the merit of the victors—on the contrary, it only consolidates them further.

I cannot tolerate it when hasty, pseudoscientific ideas and views of the course and outcome of the war and the role of particular individuals and events in it and sanctimonious talk about the "excessively high price of Victory" are presented as the ultimate truth. I know history does not recognize the conditional mood, but let us ask ourselves a simple question: What would have become of the country, Europe, the whole world, in the end, if the Soviet soldier who defended Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad had not fought to his last breath against the enemy, but had followed the example of certain "enlightened" Europeans and counted his own life too high a price to pay for the lives of hundreds of thousands of his compatriots?

Let me remind you that the Hitlerites had far-reaching plans in this respect. In particular, the so-called "Ost" plan foresaw the elimination of Poland and the Soviet Union and the annihilation of tens of millions of people. The same fate awaited other countries. It was not for nothing that W. Churchill, who was never noted for being particularly sympathetic toward the USSR, stressed in a message to J. Stalin: "Future generations will consider themselves in debt to the Red Army as unreservedly as we who witnessed these magnificent feats." Here is what D. Eisenhower said: "The Red Army's great feats during the war in Europe aroused the admiration of the entire world. As a soldier observing the Red Army's campaign, I was filled with deepest admiration for the skill of its leaders."

It is distressing to see how even natural human respect for the memory of the fallen, to say nothing of recognition of their services to the Fatherland, is entirely absent from the "researches" of various newly fashionable historians. Is this not the origin of the campaign—shameful and humiliating to a victorious people—to vindicate traitors and war criminals? Is this not why in some parts of the country, and also abroad, monuments to Soviet servicemen are destroyed and people who butchered their own people are extolled and represented as "ideological fighters against totalitarianism"?

A particular word about the Communists, the party. Today some people are trying to reduce its decisive role in organizing the routing of the aggressors to one of coercion and terror. It was during those years, however, that the Communist Party was as V.I. Lenin always wished to see it, the people's vanguard—both politically and morally.

Some 80 percent of communists fought in the ranks of the Armed Forces against the enemy. Three million of them—almost one in two—fell in battle. It is well known that the German troops were given the order not to take communists prisoner, but to shoot them on the spot. Our adversary was well aware that the party was the force rallying, organizing, and leading the people in the struggle against him, and he could not vanquish that force.

Communists did not only fight on the front line; they were the soul and conscience of the underground, the partisan movement. They organized the selfless struggle for every tonne of steel, every pound of grain, every tank, every plane. They were the first to fulfill norms many times over, the first to work overtime, the first to give their savings to the Victory Fund. And that cannot be erased from history.

II.

The decades since the war make it possible to properly assess the greatness of our victory and the world-historical significance of its lessons. The main lesson is that you must fight against war before it breaks out. This requires great vigilance and constant readiness to defend the homeland on the part of Soviet people. It is from this standpoint that we assess the events taking place in the country and the world and it is on this basis that we measure our steps in the sphere of international relations and defense.

A peculiarity of the present era is the understanding and recognition of the obvious fact that the ensuring of national and universal security is increasingly moving from the military sphere to the political, economic, and technological spheres. In the context of this thesis great opportunities open up in such an important sphere as disarmament and arms limitation and reduction.

The Soviet Union has recently taken major steps in this direction. The 500,000-man reduction in the Armed Forces announced in December 1988 will be completed in the first half of this year. Taking into account the additional measures to transfer units and formations to a defensive structure, 20,800 tanks, 28,400 artillery systems, and over 1,900 combat aircraft have been reduced in the European part of the USSR. Twenty-six submarines and 45 surface ships and motor launches have been withdrawn from combat service and are to be scrapped. By mid-1991 it is planned to fully complete the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia will be completed in 1992. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Poland and Germany has begun.

The military reform is being implemented in precise accordance with the demands of the defensive Soviet military doctrine, which takes into account the need to maintain the Armed Forces at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency. The composition, structure, and equipment of the Army and Navy views on using them in repulsing aggression, the orientation of troop and forces training, and much more are changing. Major new reductions of troops and armaments will be implemented after the entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

Of course, the reductions must be mutual and must ensure the preservation of parity while steadily lowering its level. Especially as there are still no guarantees of the irreversibility of the positive processes that have begun in the international arena. Military danger and attempts to assert a "new world order" by relying on force are an objective reality. Events in the Persian Gulf zone cogently confirmed this.

We cannot fail to be perturbed by the fact that the termination of the activity of the Warsaw Pact military organization has not resulted in the creation of a bloc-free system of European security. The formation of such a system in the foreseeable future becomes extremely problematical after the well known events in the Near East. Because of this the military-political situation in Europe is changing fundamentally, and not in our favor. Essentially the USSR Armed Forces are confronted by the huge NATO military machine. Implementation of the Paris accords will still further change the correlation of forces to the detriment of the USSR.

I want to make myself clear: We are not seeking one-sided advantages for ourselves. But, even in the name of peace, we cannot irresponsibly disarm ourselves, lose our vigilance, and thereby create the possibility of a repetition of 22 June 1941.

III.

The victory in the Great Patriotic War became possible thanks to our state's mighty military-economic potential, society's political stability, and the spiritual unity, courage, and selflessness with which Soviet people went to the defense of the motherland. The troops of fascist Germany and its allies smashed against this monolith. The calculations of Hitler and his entourage regarding the weakness of the Soviet system and the fragility of the union of republics were not realized.

The course and outcome of the war cogently prove the absurdity of the claims being made today that the 1922 Union Treaty was invalid and, supposedly, was violently imposed. The war brought pain and suffering to the country's peoples, but it rallied them still more closely in the face of danger. May 1945 would have been impossible if each republic had acted alone. The example of German-occupied Europe is graphic evidence of that.

When ambitious nationalist, separatist forces today are doing everything possible to wreck the Union, you cannot help wondering: Do they know what they are doing? What is more important to them—satisfied political vanity or the fate of peoples who for centuries have traditionally lived in harmony in the land today called the Soviet Union? I think that even today the majority of people want to work calmly in this land and to raise children.

Only a strong and united Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics can act as a great state in the world arena. It is this that the war proved to the world. Without close political, economic, and military union no individual Soviet republic could regard itself as, in Lenin's words, "secure from economic exhaustion and military rout."

I think that the desire of certain republics and regions of the country to withdraw from the Union's economic life and to operate outside the framework of the unified national economic complex will produce nothing but a deterioration in people's lives and intensified social tension.

The attempts to create "national armies" and other armed formations in certain republics do not improve the situation either. What kind of troops will they be; whose funds will arm and pay them; and what will this "military sovereignty" cost the people?

Everyone with even a slight acquaintance with military matters realizes that only a state with a great economic potential can maintain a modern army and train highly skilled military cadres. Do the republics that are planning to create their own armed forces have this?

In our country the defense industry complex consists of enterprises of union significance. They are sited throughout the territory and have strong scientific and production links. It is futile to create a republic defense industry on the basis of them. That is ruinous and infeasible for any of the republics.

From the political viewpoint the creation of republic armed formations may help to turn interethnic conflicts into fratricidal war. It is also perfectly obvious that the appearance of new military formations in the country would contravene existing international agreements on the reduction of troops and armaments and would introduce an extra element of instability into the military-political situation.

From the military viewpoint this will inevitably entail the destruction of the integral and reliable defense organized in the light of the geostrategic importance of specific regions. There would be still greater difficulties in Armed Forces manpower acquisition and the training of military cadres. So are the political ambitions of certain leaders worth a sacrifice like ruining the country's defense? I think the answer is clear: Only united Armed Forces serve as a guarantee of the sovereignty and security of each of the republics and our entire Union.

IV.

The victory was a triumph of indissoluble unity of the people and Army. Front and rear, the heroism of the soldier and the working person, worked in unison to rebuff the aggressors. At the front every soldier knew, sensed, that the country and people were behind him, and that gave him strength and helped him to endure unthinkable hardships, to survive the grief of losses and defeats, and to look mortal danger fearlessly in the face.

Today the sons and grandsons of the front-line fighters have inherited the soldier's hard work and the glorious name of defender of the fatherland. Much has changed recently in the Army—conditions of service, armaments, the very situation. One thing has not changed: Faith in the sanctity and inviolability of the soldier's duty to the motherland and people. The soldier's duty binds the soldier indissolubly to his people and leads him safely through the hardships of everyday army life and the dangers of fulfilling combat tasks.

Loyalty to the soldier's duty—the central moral pivot of the soldier's nature—has today become a target for those who do not like the Army and its cohesion. A distorted idea about Soviet servicemen and the Armed Forces is persistently instilled into the public consciousness. Basically what is happening is the erosion of the people's defense awareness and groundless criticism of the Army with the aim of destroying the foundations of the Armed Forces' durability—their kinship with the people.

In some places an intolerable moral atmosphere is developing around servicemen and their families. They are subjected to blatant discrimination on questions of housing, residence permits, admission to jobs, and the children's education.

Rumors about a possible military coup and military dictatorship have recently been vigorously and deliberately fanned. People are trying hard to make society believe that the Army is in confrontation with the people, but the Armed Forces, true to their constitutional duty, will never stand against their people, of which they are part.

Intensive combat training is now in progress in the troops and fleets. Within the framework of military reform, measures are being implemented that affect the very nature of the Army's life and the future of hundreds of thousands of servicemen. In the context of an unstable political and economic situation in the country, all this entails great difficulties. Army and Navy servicemen do not complain, realizing how hard it is now for the people and government to resolve the difficult problems of overcoming the crisis and renewing society. They have great faith in the people's wisdom and enormous potential, however. This faith has entered the heart of every military man along with the memory of our great country's history, in which Victory Day will remain forever a bright chapter.

Defense Minister's Victory Day Order Published

PM0905100191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[Order of the USSR Defense Minister No. 210, signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov in Moscow on 9 May]

[Text] Men of the Soviet Armed Forces, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet working people!

Today is the 46th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. In the course of the cruelest battle, our multinational fatherland's freedom and independence were defended, our native land cleared of the invaders, a crushing defeat inflicted on fascist Germany and its satellites, and the peoples of Europe freed from the fascist yoke.

The Great Patriotic War involving the whole nation convincingly confirmed the insuperable vital force of the friendship and fraternity between the USSR's peoples and their economic, political, and military alliance. Our Armed Forces augmented the glory of their combat banners on the battlefields. Soviet troops displayed unparalleled mass heroism, supreme combat skill, and devotion to their military oath, military duty, and their people. Militiamen, underground fighters, and partisans routed the enemy shoulder to shoulder with them. Soviet people rightfully take pride in the USSR's crucial role in routing fascism and remember and honor the services of all those involved in World War II in the fight against the common enemy.

Our victory offered mankind the prospect of establishing lasting peace on Earth. Over the last few years these prospects have materialized with the normalization of the international political climate and the practical achievements secured by the negotiating and disarmament process. The reality nowadays, however, is such that the positive changes have still not become irreversible and military danger still exists. The memory of the Great Patriotic War requires of Soviet people supreme vigilance and tireless concern for the country's defense capability.

With their modern equipment and supreme professional training, the Armed Forces, relying on the people's support, represent a real factor to avert war, a bastion of security and sovereignty for all the peoples of our homeland—the USSR. Soviet troops are steadfastly loyal to their constitutional duty and the heroic traditions of older generations. They take an active part in renewing Soviet society and insistently resolve complex tasks of military reform, improve their training, and maintain Army and Fleet combat readiness at a sufficient, reliable level.

I greet and congratulate all Army and Navy personnel and war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans on this Victory holiday.

To mark the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945,

I ORDER:

That today, 9 May 1991, at 2200 hours local time, a ceremonial 30-gun artillery salute be fired in the capital of our motherland, the hero-city of Moscow, in the capitals of the union republics, in the hero-cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Tula, Smolensk, and Murmansk, in the hero-fortress of Brest, and also in the cities of Kaliningrad, Lvov, Rostov-na-Donu, Samara, Novosibirsk, Chita, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Severomorsk.

Eternal glory to the heroes who died in the fight for our homeland's freedom and independence!

Long live the heroic Soviet people and their valiant Armed Forces!

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense

Moiseyev Addresses Veterans, Servicemen

PM0905090491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladykin report: "Combat Experience Is Invaluable"]

[Text] A meeting of Great Patriotic War veterans and internationalist servicemen now serving in the USSR Defense Ministry's central apparatus was held in Moscow 7 May. Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, delivered a report. He said that in connection with numerous proposals from servicemen who fulfilled their international duty in various years, the defense minister has set the task of creating councils of internationalist servicemen within Army structures. On 22 May this year, an All-Army Conference of Internationalist Servicemen is to be held in the capital, to which the central apparatus workers are to elect delegates.

The speaker went on to note that, on the subject of the numbers of General Staff servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty, as of today there are 175 of them. If the question of time and place is raised, the following are represented: Spain, Cuba, Egypt, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola. But fate has ordained that the greater part of our generals, officers, and warrant officers (148 of them) fulfilled their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan.

In forming social organizations of internationalist servicemen and defining their tasks and the content of their work for the future, we must take full account of the realities in which we live and fulfill our military duty. The world has seen that the danger of war being unleashed has receded, but it has not disappeared. The euphoria caused by the first successful steps in the disarmament sphere is increasingly giving way to a sober evaluation of their results. There is a growing awareness of the danger of a global violation of the parity of established forces, and not in our favor. This assessment gives us military men no reason to be complacent or self-satisfied.

In forming councils of internationalist servicemen, the speaker said, we should be clearly aware that one of their most responsible tasks will be to propagandize and spread their combat experience. Undoubtedly only a man who has passed through the tests of war can say convincingly and authoritatively what is really meant by this principle: "Teach the troops what they need in war."

The participants in the meeting supported the idea of forming a council of internationalist servicemen in the USSR Defense Ministry central apparatus, and elected the council members. Delegates were elected to the All-Army Conference of Internationalist Servicemen.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Leaders Continue Official U.S. Visit

Attend Congressional CSCE Hearings

LD0805161291 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0900 GMT 8 May 91

[Excerpt] The visit of the Estonian delegation continued in the United States on 7 May. Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and those accompanying him took part in the hearings of the CSCE commission of the U.S. Congress. Alongside the Estonian delegation those also at the hearings included Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis and Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis. The hearings dealt with various facets of the independence process in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, within the context of the Helsinki process, with relations of the Baltic states with the USSR and with U.S. economic aid to the USSR, while separating out a specific section of it for support of the economy in the sovereign Baltic states.

Edgar Savisaar, Vytautas Landsbergis, and Ivars Godmanis made speeches in the Congress at the Helsinki commission hearings. Touching upon Estonia's relations with the USSR in his speech, the Estonian Government leader said, among other things, that within the positive changes in Europe, the Republic of Estonia has acquired a better position internationally to fight for its lawful right to become independent. At the same time, relations between the Republic of Estonia and the USSR are in a dealock.

Edgar Savisaar also dwelt on the crucial nature of the Helsinki process toward resolving the issue of the Baltic states. In this connection the Estonian prime minister explained the aims of organizing an international Baltic conference. An international conference on the Baltic issue would demonstrate convincingly, emphasized Edgar Savisaar, that the Baltic issue is indeed an international issue. In his report Edgar Savisaar also dealt with the issue of withdrawing Soviet troops from the Baltic states. [passage omitted]

Make Report for U.S. Congressmen

LD0805164391 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1015 GMT 8 May 91

[Report from Washington by ELTA special correspondent Kestutis Jankauskas]

[Text] Yesterday a report on the relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union and about the political and economic situation in Lithuania was made by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, at the U.S. Congress Helsinki Committee. Many influential senators are members of the committee.

Opinions were exchanged concerning granting credits to the Soviet Union and the Baltic states by the United States, the reform of banks and the economy in the Baltic states, and concerning the possibility of setting up U.S. information centers in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn. The possibility of obtaining observer status for the Baltic states at the CSCE were also discussed.

Factual material about the tragic events in Lithuania on 13 January was handed over to the members of the U.S. Congress.

Leaders of the Latvian and Estonian governments, Ivars Godmanis and Edgar Savisaar, also made reports to the committee.

A declaration was signed which proclaims that an interparliamentary group for the support of human rights and democracy in the Baltic states has been set up. This document was signed by the three leaders of the Baltic states and by many U.S. senators and congressmen.

A solemn reception was held at the capitol. A meeting with U.S. President Bush is to take place today.

Meet With President Bush

LD0905073791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2040 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Excerpts] Washington, 9 May (TASS)—President Bush met Lithuanian Supreme Council President Vytautas Landsbergis, Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, and Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis in the White House on Wednesday. [passage omitted]

According to I. Godmanis, the Baltic figures raised "the issue of support in the event of an economic blockade, which may start after the signing of the Union treaty by the nine republics. The Baltic states will never sign this treaty." Godmanis reported that the U.S. President told the meeting's participants that "the next time he meets M.S. Gorbachev, he will tell him the same thing that he has always said, that it will be beneficial to the Soviet Union to have three little neighbors, three little Finlands that will always maintain very good relations with eastern neighbors."

It seems to me, E. Savisaar stressed, that the Baltic states need their own "Marshall Plan," just like Europe after World War II. "Our joint meeting with the President," he continued, "will possibly allow a foundation to be laid for good relations between the Baltic countries and the United States of America."

"This meeting is of special importance and was possibly a symbolic one," Landsbergis pointed out. "I see this importance in the fact that it demonstrates ... that the United States is specifically interested in and supports our efforts to restore independence...."

Replying to the question about what kind of "advice" the Baltic leaders gave the President regarding the granting of grain subsidies to the USSR, I. Godmanis said that this problem was not discussed. To the question of whether the President offered any kind of new political or economic aid to the Baltics, I. Godmanis replied: "We largely spoke about the main problem—how to settle the problem of Baltic independence in a peaceful manner. Any other problems completely depend on this."

E. Savisaar pointed out that the question was raised at the meeting of "convening an interparliamentary conference on the Baltic problem. This idea was put forward by the Nordic Council, and we have found support for this idea in the course of our meetings in congress yesterday," he continued. "We thought the President's reaction to this idea was a positive one, although he did say that he would like to examine all the pros and cons."

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft were present at the meeting.

According to the White House statement, the meeting of President Bush with the leaders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was organized at their request. In Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater's statement on the results of the meeting, it is indicated that in the course of the conversation "the President confirmed the policy of nonrecognition by the United States of the annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union by force in 1940."

"The President," it says in the document, "said the United States is hopeful of a resumption of the talks between the Soviet Government and the Baltic states. The United States thinks that fair and constructive talks are the only way to achieve a settlement of the complex problems existing between the Moscow and Baltic governments. He pointed out that the United States hopes that all sides in these talks can display flexibility and pragmatism with the aim of achieving a just and sound settlement of the problem."

Outward Calm Hides Tension in Northeast Estonia

PM0805162791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 91 First Edition p 4

[Major M. Sklyar report: "Indigenous 'Migrants' from Ida-Vironmaa; Estonia: The Political Situation"]

[Text] Ida-Vironmaa, the northeast of Estonia, has such a charming name and outwardly is among the most picturesque corners of the Baltic republics. The serenity of the landscape clearly does not correspond to the mood of the inhabitants of the district today. Economic "dystrophy," which has struck the whole republic, is being exacerbated here by acute political problems. It is not hard to understand the essence of these problems. They are not just worrying the population of Kohtla-Jarve, Narva-Joesuu, and other towns and villages in northeast Estonia, but also the inhabitants of Rezekne in Latvia, Eisiskes in Lithuania, Komrat in Moldova, and Sukhumi in Georgia—the territories that are called—in the impassive "dialect" of statistics—"places with a high density of ethnic minorities."

You could endlessly discuss the reasons for the prevalence of non-Estonians in this district. As a military journalist, I talked to Estonian Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Ruutel in the lobbies of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. He attributed the current relationship between the ethnic groups in Ida-Vironmaa to the "Stalinist nationalities policy" aimed at the artificial "intermingling" and assimilation of small peoples. I do not intend to justify the "great genius" of all possible sciences, including the "science" of destroying nations and stirring them up against each other. Although the Russians, Ukrainians, and other non-Estonians will scarcely agree with the dishonorable role of "authorized representatives" of Stalin that Mr. Ruutel assigns to them. Be that as it may, today three-fourths of the inhabitants of Ida-Vironmaa consider the language of Pushkin and Dostoyevsky their own. Even five years back this fact scarcely interested the students of local lore. In our alarming times it is taking on truly dramatic overtones.

"Kohtla-Jarve is the unofficial capital of Ida-Vironmaa and is an extremely important center for slate quarrying and the chemical processing of slate. Our people are restrained and indeed the standard of living is quite high by union standards," city soviet chairman A. Tsvinev explained to me. "In recent years the slate quarriers have achieved a great deal: The working conditions have improved, they earn almost 1,000 rubles, and greater attention is being paid to the environment. It was not without reason that the strikes that have embraced the main mining centers in the country passed us by. Yet.... You know, our peacefulness is in some ways like living on a volcano. Whatever you occupy yourself with, you do not forget for one second about a possible eruption. Particularly since the referendum."

I must specify: There was not one but as many as three referendums in Kohtla-Jarve: a republic one, a city one, and a union one. Each of them proposed different variations on the same theme to the city's inhabitants, a theme that was brilliantly formulated by the Shakespearean hero: To be or not to be? "Should there or should there not be an independent Estonia?" the organizers of the republic referendum wondered. The sly question did not really dispose people to openness. The voices of the participants were equally divided. "Should Estonia be part of the Union or not?" the city authorities asked. A total of 65 percent of the electorate answered unequivocally "Yes." "Should there or should there not be a renewed federation of Soviet republics?" asked the authors of the question in the ballot-papers of the union referendum. "Yes" was the answer that 90 percent of participants in the ballot gave, but 20,000 Estonian voters silently sabotaged this measure.

"According to juridical canons the victory went to the supporters of the Union," A. Tsvinev continued. "Even

I, a resolute federalist, did not find this success very joyous because never before have mutual relations between Estonians and non-Estonians in our city been as tense as now."

This is not a question of the actual referendum's bringing an "influx" of mutual mistrust between the communities and the incredible psychological exhaustion both of the "victors" and the "vanquished." The problem is deeper. The results of the all-Union plebiscite have placed Ida-Varonmaa in a very strange position, which I would call a legal collapse. In actual fact we are reflecting on a primary school-type question: What are Kohtla-Jarve, Narva, and Sillamae, which said "yes" to Moscow and "no" to Tallinn, supposed to do henceforth? What is awaiting the district in the event of "de facto" Estonian state sovereignty? Will it remain an inalienable part of Esti Vabariik [Free Estonia], or will it join the renewed USSR? Only now, when over a month has passed since the final results of the referendum were summed up, is it becoming clear that the organizers of the vast state measure failed to predict something important: The mechanism for realizing the people's will.

The most civilized method in this situation is to hold a "roundtable" of all interested parties. The authorized representatives of the Estonian Republic and the Ida-Vironmaa "rebel" cities could discuss questions concerning the future of the district with the indispensable participation of representatives of the federative leadership. The city soviets of Kohtla-Jarve, Narva, and Sillamae are insisting on this very option. But the political forwards from Toompea castle are responding to the proposal made by the other side with revolutionary intransigence. The Estonian leadership believes that there can be no question of any special administrative status for Ida-Vironmaa (for instance, Estonian-Soviet co-administration), and there can be no question of this region's broad autonomy (with the exception of the national-cultural autonomy of representatives of the non-indigenous population).

"Why do the Germans not organize a Turkish autonomous oblast on their territory?" M. Lauristin, deputy speaker of the Estonian legislature discoursed emotionally in a recent interview with MEGAPOLIS-EXPRESS. "There is a principle that has been stipulated in the Helsinki agreements—the principle of territorial integrity. In accordance with it, Estonia is integral and indivisible; therefore, there can be no question of any territorial division."

As you can see, the principle of "integrity and indivisibility" which, with respect to the USSR is called nothing other than "Moscow's imperialist policy," turns out to be quite suitable for "application" within Estonia. But the weakness of M. Lauristin's argument lies not only in its inconsistency, namely the fact that what is permitted to some is not permitted to others. I think it extremely unconvincing and incorrect to equate the Russian-speaking community in Ida-Vironmaa, which makes up the majority of the population in the district, with the Turkish "guest workers" who make up less than one percent of the indigenous inhabitants in the FRG....

The reaction of the republic leadership to events in Ida-Vironmaa is not limited to harsh political statements. By all accounts, the Estonian rulers of destinies are prepared to move from words to action. In Kohtla-Jarve City Soviet I was told about existing plans to "divide" the city into several autonomous administrative units. The pretext used is as innocent as can be—to improve the city administration. But you would have to be infinitely naive not to see in this "improvement" a shrewd political maneuver. To separate Kohtla-Jarve means primarily to ruin the united, strong federalist-minded center, it means eliminating a resolute and prestigious city soviet. It looks like a completely Stalinist method: While there is a city, there is a problem; no city—no problem...

The growing economic chaos has recently pushed politics into the background. Today, people in Kohtla-Jarve speak much more frequently about prices, taxes, and shortages than about the referendum that has been held or the imminent Union treaty. But life has repeatedly convinced us that the "base" and "superstructure" are are so closely intertwined that it is practically impossible to separate them in real life. For instance, in the Ida-Vironmaa district the food supply has deteriorated sharply. The contents of the Kohtla-Jarve meat counters are almost half what they were last year. At first sight, this is a purely economic problem. But only at first sight.

Why are meat and milk products rapidly disappearing in Estonian trade? Why are the waiting lines for bread reaching Russian proportions? It is because Estonia has been forced to pay with produce for the policy of "state independence." Gas, oil, mixed fodder, machine-building output, and many other goods that were previously centrally distributed to the republic at all-Union dumping tariffs have to be bought today. And in order to buy them you have to first of all sell something. And there is almost nothing to sell apart from food, which is in short supply practically throughout the whole of the USSR's territory.

"We warned the government in the first place that no economic borders would help us," Kohtla-Jarve mayor V. Korb told me. "Just as customer cards, coupons, and exorbitant prices did not help before. While we paddle our own canoe, hoping to be united on a utopian "blessed isle," we will get nowhere. But they did not listen to us and are continuing to sacrifice the economy to politics. Now it is patently obvious who was right. Customs officers in Narva and at dozens of other checkpoints are toiling by the sweat of their brow, taking in millions of budget rubles, incidentally, but the situation in the commodity market is getting worse every day.

My own opinion is that the inhabitants of Estonia should not count on any improvement, at least in the near future. The recently published Joint Statement on Urgent Measures to Stabilize the Situation in the

Country and Overcome the Crisis, which has already been dubbed "nine plus one," clearly says that the republics that do not sign the Union Treaty will not obtain the right to most favored nation status. And Estonia, as far as I know, is in no hurry to sign the treaty. Consequently it will have to settle accounts with its trade partners in the formerly native Union market either with currency or with scarce food products.

...The journey from Kohtla-Jarve to Johvi railroad station is 20 minutes along a well-worn track. Flashing past the windows are the dark squares of the lonely fields, loose heaps of gravel, and typical neat little Estonian houses. People are full of spring-time energy, brimming with endless troubles. And there are no outward signs of volcanic activity...

Latvia Leaders on Approach to Signing Treaty

LD0705155691 Moscow TASS in English 1444 GMT 7 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga May 7 TASS—The Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium's decision to drop the only representative of the opposition from the official delegation to talks with the central authorities proves once again that the republic's parliament does not plan to sign the federal treaty.

This is quite strange, because many top Latvian political leaders are fully aware of what their republic can expect. Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Gorbunov, for instance, has confidently declared: "The Latvian people and all the population of our republic will land in a catastrophic situation if the economic border with the USSR is closed."

Latvian Prime Minister Ivar Godmanis is sure that the republic will not be able to avoid the economic difficulties now experienced by the Union. "The common monetary system and our dependence on many suppliers, as well as the growing inflation," he said, "produce negative affects on the Latvian economy."

According to Latvian Communist Party chief Alfred Rubiks, "the problem of leaving the republic within the renovated Union is of fundamental importance today." The congress of communists from the three Baltic republics, held late in April, noted that if the Latvian Supreme Soviet "did not heed the voice of the part of the population and socio-political organisations wishing to live in a renovated Union, the republic will be in for some vary difficult days."

Rubiks assessed the Latvian leadership's refusal to sign the federal treaty as an a "irresponsible and indifferent attitude towards the people, who have not only given them high posts, but entrusted to them their future and the life and welfare of future generations."

This is why communists believe it is necessary to launch a movement for joining the federal treaty and to elect plenipotentiary people's representatives to talks with the new Union's constituent republics on the terms of Latvia's accession to it.

Dimanas 'Removed' From Latvian Negotiating Team

LD0905071691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1520 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent V. Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga, 8 May (TASS)—Sergey Dimanis, leader of the "Ravnopraviye" [equal rights] opposition faction in the Latvian Supreme Council, has been removed from the official delegation representing the republic at talks with the Soviet Union. The decision was made by the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, although the individual composition of the delegation was endorsed by the legislature of that Baltic republic.

The formal reason was the fact that Dimanis is a member of the CPSU Central Committee, while the Communists are supposedly against the independence of Latvia. Here is how Sergey Dimanis explained this himself in today's interview with the "CINA" newspaper: "In my view, this is a kind of small revenge that usually is not characteristic of such popular representative bodies as the legislature and its Presidium." In Dimanis's view, the reason for his resignation lies in the fact that the Latvian delegation, at the meeting in Moscow, did not succeed in getting what it wanted, and the agenda was determined primarily under the influence of the Union delegation.

Sergey Dimanis thinks the Popular Front faction in the legislature does not want to understand a simple thing: that the opposition is not against the rights of the people of Latvia to self-determination. We think that to restore what existed in the 1920's and 1930's is simply not logical and is absurd. Now it is a completely different economic, poltitical, and democratic situation..."

In the view of the "Ravnopraviye" faction, now, when each of the Union republics has proclaimed its statehood, we need to get down to signing an economic union treaty, "otherwise we will not survive". The leader of the opposition is convinced that the Popular Front faction has shown itself to be politically unskillful: "For them it would be far more suitable if I worked in the delegation and not in the corridors with the USSR delegation". The talks that are begining between Latvia and the Union are not at all about the independence of the republic, as the majority faction wants to depict it. "These are talks about how to survive in the near future—and they need to be conducted by all the republcs together—on how to live, how to divide property and debts, and at the same time 'how to preserve that essential unity that made it possible for everybody to stay afloat....'"

Latvian Legislature Discusses Group Statement

LD0805205191 Moscow TASS in English 1937 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga May 8 TASS—The Latvian parliament today refused to discuss a statement sent to the legislature and the republican government by 42 factories, strike committees and mass organisations.

The document says that "the working people cannot see any longer how legislators and executives at all levels, losing the sense of reality and forgetting their election promises, are bringing mass impoverishment to people."

The statement expresses the following demands: to slash prices for goods and services to the all-Union level, to introduce the indexation of wages and compensations from the republican budget and to repeal a decision to return land, houses and enterprises to their former owners or their heirs.

The statement's authors see a chance "to prevent the sliding of the republican economy towards complete disintegration" in signing a Union treaty.

If their demands are ignored, they call on all workers at enterprises to send their representatives on May 14 to participate in a meeting that will draft retaliatory measures.

When parliament refused to put the statement on the agenda of this week's sessions by a majority vote, president of the Latvian parliament Anatolijs Gorbunovs said that the statement would be discussed by the presidium.

Deputies made amendments to the code of labour laws. The annual leave cannot be shorter than four weeks beginning from May 10, the average pay includes all types of labour remunerations, and the minimum wage cannot be lower than the minimum subsistance wage set in the republic at 190 rubles.

"All this is wonderful, but where to take funds?" noted a legislator, a manager of a small enterprise.

Latvian Government Proceedings Described

LD0905105791 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0533 GMT 9 May 91

[Text] At the Supreme Council yesterday, the plenary sitting examined two draft laws, on the state statistics and on insurance. These were not adopted, however, because additions and some alterations are necessary. In the afternoon, the deputies of the Supreme Council attended the memorial service for victims of World War II at the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity in Riga, which was addressed by representatives of all the Christian confessions and the chairman of the Supreme Council, Anatolijs Gorbunovs.

Meeting with Deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, Arnis Kalnins, Minister of Economics Janis Aboltins, and Director of the Department of Foreign Economic Relations Maris Gailis were representatives of the European Parliament and Common Market. The guests were interested in guarantees for investment of foreign capital in Latvia.

There was a session of the Council of Ministers, which heard information from the Riga City Executive Committee on the construction of purification plants, about the national grain production program, about the creation of unified price controls, and other questions.

Majority Faction Discusses Prospects, New Faction

LD0805201891 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0430 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] The prospects for the existence of the majority faction have been discussed. At a recently held session of the majority faction, the People's Front of Latvia, in the Supreme Council, the question of this faction's future existence as a whole was examined for the first time. The leader of the faction, Janis Dinevics, called on the faction's (?legal) working group to present proposals for the mechanism for forming a new coalition of factions. This proposal has evidently come about as a reaction to the activities last week by the deputy of the Latvian National Independence Movement, Aleksandrs Kirsteins, who is reported to have disclosed preparatory work for the formation of a Latvian National Independence Movement faction. The possibility of forming the faction in the Supreme Council has evoked broad discussion. On the pretext of the laboriousness of such action, however, the majority of the deputies in the People's Front of Latvia faction do not believe it is possible to achieve anything on this matter before the summer holidays.

Lithuania Criticizes Military Action in Caucasus

LD0805201191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Here is a statement by the Lithuanian Supreme Council: The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania strictly condemns armed attacks against the civilian population committed by the Soviet military forces in the villages of Getashen and Martunashen and in other areas of Azerbaijan and Armenia where there are many casualties already.

The statement is signed by Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithaunia.

Soviet Troops Round Up Lithuanian Defectors

LD0805224191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] According to the Lithuanian State Defense Department, Soviet Army units are being stationed in Vilnius, Kaunas, Alytus, Ionava, Marijampole, and also in the Kaliningrad region for rounding up defectors from the Soviet Armed Forces and those young men who refused to sign up for obligatory service.

Yesterday evening in Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city, two men in civilian clothes, both of them most probably Soviet officers, entered a private apartment and took away a 19-year-old youngster who did not respond to a call to come to a military commissariat.

The young man was driven away in a car with falsified licence numbers to an unknown destination.

Lithuanian Leaders View Military Activity

PM0805125191 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 27 Apr 91 p 1

[ELTA report: "Worrying Situation"]

[Text] A session of the Lithuanian Republic's defense leadership took place on the evening of 24 April to discuss the dangerous situation connected with the increased activity of the USSR Armed Forces and preparations for a possible economic blockade by the Soviet Union.

Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Kazimieras Motieka, and Supreme Council Secretary Lyudvikas Sabutis [as transliterated] met with Lithuanian Government leaders and ministers 25 April. Talk centered on a plan for joint action.

Deputy Motieka Addresses 4 May Vilnius Rally

LD0805222691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1705 GMT 4 May 91

[Address by Deputy Kazimieras Motiecka at a 4 May rally at Vingis Park in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Many laws have been adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Council. Some of them are perhaps better prepared than others. This is a question of quality. We are not saints or politicians with great experience. Our task was to overthrow the Soviet power, hated by everyone, and we did it. [shouts of approval]

From the point of legislation, we started our life from scratch, from absolute zero. Therefore, all the laws that have been adopted are indispensible to us, like air and water. [passage omitted]

I would invite the Sajudis to become the power in the society. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Supreme Council Registers Groups

LD0905110491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0600 GMT 9 May 91

[Summary] Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, has told us that yesterday legislative groups in the Lithuanian Supreme Council were registered by the Supreme Council Presidium.

"[Stankevicius] We have registered the following legislative groupings: The Sajudis Center Faction led by Aloizas Sakalas; the United Sajudis Faction, led by Karvelis; the Seventh Faction, led by deputy Kacinskas; the National [Tautininkai] Faction led by deputy Treinys; the Liberals Faction, led by deputy Vilkas; and the Leftists Faction led by deputy Beriozovas."

Stankevicius said that according to the registration documents the legislative groupings have to present their political declaration in which the factions pledge to observe the Lithuanian Constitution and the Lithunian laws, to reinforce the independence of Lithuania and to protect its territorial integrity.

RSFSR

Ryzhkov Launches Russian Presidential Bid

PM0905093791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[I. Demchenko report: "N. Ryzhkov Launches His Election Campaign"]

[Text] The first election campaign briefing given by RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential candidate N. Ryzhkov was held 6 April. Noticeably thinner after his illness, but looking cheerful and smiling his famous smile, the former USSR prime minister answered journalists' questions.

N. Ryzhkov said that he had been through a difficult inner struggle before making his decision to launch his election campaign. "I had a moral right simply to refuse, since I have already headed the government and I know how difficult that job can be," he said. "But today the situation in Russia is so complex that as a citizen I consider it simply inadmissible to stand aside from what is happening. If I had seen Russia recovering, I would have thought very seriously about entering the fray. But the situation is getting worse, and for myself I took a hard decision to contest the presidency for Russia's sake, for our country's sake."

N. Ryzhkov went on to say that he regards his participation in the election campaign as a duty, and also a duty to those who put forward his candidacy, and that he counts on the support of former autonomous republics which have now become republics belonging to the RSFSR, and also the labor collectives of industrial enterprises, kolkhozes [collective farms], and sovkhozes [state farms]. N. Ryzhkov is also awaiting the Russian Federation Communist Party's verdict on his candidacy.

The RSFSR presidential candidate announced that he is working on an action program that will be based on a thorough analysis of the government program of last May-June, in the adjusted form that it assumed by 1 September when it was competing with the 500 days program. In addition he is making an attentive study of all the current economic plans that have been adopted or put forward and considers it impossible to ally himself unconditionally with any of them. N. Ryzhkov considers it essential to elaborate a socioeconomic position designed to ensure that the requirements of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia are satisfied to the maximum, and moreover not those of 5 percent of the population, which is what the authors of some programs sometimes count on, but the requirements of no less than 95 percent.

N. Ryzhkov gave his unequivocal assessment of the legislative base that is being churned out by the RSFSR higher organs of power. Making the stipulation that the problem needs to be thoroughly studied, he noted that there are positions where he cannot agree with the decisions reached by the Russian legislature and the local soviets. For example, he does not believe that privatizing housing, dismantling the state apparatus, and introducing private property should be implemented hastily. N. Ryzhkov said that he is against private ownership of land (enshrined in legislative form, as we know, by decision of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in December 1990). Among the questions that need to be thoroughly analyzed N. Ryzhkov named the problems of prices and social protection for the population, which were being carefully worked on in precisely those government programs which were prepared under his leadership.

Assessing the transfer of the Kuzbass to Russian Federation jurisdiction, N. Ryzhkov stated that he had not seen the documents but was of the view that questions of carving up spheres of influence in industry between the republics and the center should be decided within the framework of the Union treaty, once it has been signed. Randomly picking out separate islands would in his opinion result in disruption to the interdependent operation of the national economic complex.

As far as the upcoming election campaign against B. Yeltsin is concerned, N. Ryzhkov stressed that their positions differ on a number of issues, that he would of course defend those positions in which he believes, and that if elected RSFSR president he will try to put them into effect.

According to Russian Federation legislation, the republic's vice presidential election is held at the same time as the presidential election. N. Ryzhkov said he would be in a position to name "his" vice president in a few days. "I have two or three candidates I am currently working on," he added. In N. Ryzhkov's opinion, the vice president is the second most important man in the Russian Federation Government, a person who holds the same views as the president and acts as his confidant. He should be at least eight to 10 years younger than the president and should specialize in fields that complement the head of state's spheres of activity.

N. Ryzhkov said that campaign funds would be raised and spent in strict accordance with the Law on the Election of the RSFSR President. His team representative A. Silantyev, a USSR Foreign Ministry staffer, explained in turn that the candidate's team mainly comprises N. Ryzhkov's personal acquaintances, who are prepared to work selflessly. The team is headed by V. Savakov, a former aide to the former USSR prime minister, and the campaign headquarters have been donated by the "Telekom" concern which has been created under the aegis of the USSR Ministry of Communications.

N. Ryzhkov consulted his family before making his decision to run for the office of head of the Russian Federation (his wife said: "If the people trust you, you must do it"). Following the May Day rally on Red Square he informed M. Gorbachev of his decision, whereupon the USSR president, according to Ryzhkov, said: "I wish you success in this difficult venture."

Questions of assessing the Union Government's activity under N. Ryzhkov's leadership during the period of deepening economic and sociopolitical crisis in the country were not aired at the press conference. Nikolay Ivanovich [Ryzhkov] did not refer to this topic either.

Views Presidency, Pavlov Program

PM0805131191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with N.I. Ryzhkov, former chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by TASS correspondent T. Zamyatina in Ilinskiy; no date of interview given; first six paragraphs are an introduction: "N.I. Ryzhkov: You Cannot Keep Aloof"]

[Text] The news that N.I. Ryzhkov intends to run for the post of Russian president gave this TASS correspondent an opportunity to telephone the former USSR prime minister and ask him for an interview.

...Nikolay Ivanovich answered the telephone. I recognized his voice but, accustomed to arranging meetings with high-ranking people through aides and secretaries, I asked whether I could speak to... Nikolay Ivanovich.

Another surprise: My documents were not checked when I arrived at the site of government dachas in Ilinskiy, where the Ryzhkovs have been assigned a detached home by virtue of a USSR Supreme Soviet decision. I was, of course, pleased to see that the doors were opened only after a telephone call, but sensible precautions would obviously have been perfectly understandable here.

The correspondent was welcomed without any sign of ceremony, in a very ordinary manner really, at the threshold of the two-story house where the official part of the meeting was about to begin.

The Ryzhkovs are imperceptibly similar: It is said that this is a sign of a happy family. Nikolay Ivanovich and Lyudmila Sergeyevna share a delicacy of manner and a calm tone of voice, they even look somewhat alike. The only point was that, compared with the "smart" television image, the former prime minister looked noticeably slimmer in his casual sweater.

We sat in the host's office. The tape recorder was on.

[Zamyatina] Nikolay Ivanovich, what prompted your decision to run for election as RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president?

[Ryzhkov] Why did I agree to it, having gone through the well known trials of life? Let me tell you frankly that I do not strive for power. I've had it up to here (putting the edge of his palm to his chin)—after all, I did spend five years as chairman of the Council of Ministers.

[Zamyatina] How would you explain the sense of power?

[Ryzhkov] Many perceive it as an opportunity to rise above others—to issue orders, to feel above all others. This is a dangerous desire, like a drug addiction, to be on top, to be in the public eye, to be in charge.

[Zamyatina] Were you ever accused of having been changed by power?

[Ryzhkov] No.

[Zamyatina] By nobody at all?

[Ryzhkov] I don't know. It seems to me that power did not change me.

(Lyudmila Sergeyevna, who brought in tea, joined the conversation.)

[Lyudmila Ryzhkova] He never strove for power. My impression is that he is still the same as always. This is true regarding domestic matters, in any case.

[Ryzhkov] I was guided by different considerations when I consented to be nominated as candidate for Russia's presidency. After the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, I started getting telephone calls from public organizations, from directors of enterprises in the Urals and in Moscow, asking me: "Nikolay Ivanovich, think about it, why not stand as candidate?" I could not give an affirmative answer immediately. I spent a week, if not longer, weighing all the "pros" and "cons."

Then I decided. The country is in a most serious state. It was probably like that during the war. At a time like this you must try and do everything within your power for Russia, for the state. You cannot keep aloof at a time like this.

A year has passed since the new RSFSR leadership came to power. Nothing has changed for the better. Plenty of arguments and confrontations. Suppose that nobody stands against the head of the Russian legislature in the election and he gains a vote of confidence. Can we be certain that everything in Russia will change?

So, after serious deliberations, I arrived at the conclusion that I must join the struggle. If I gain victory—I think that I can lead Russia to the right path. This is how I perceive my civic duty—to join the struggle and win it (and I intend to win, why run otherwise). Therefore, I must cast aside all personal motivations.

[Zamyatina] Do you feel resentful about losing the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers?

[Ryzhkov] Let me give you a frank answer: There is no resentment. Let me state what might even be the obvious: I knew that our government was doomed. After all, we did draw fire—unpopular measures, the innovative nature of all the proposed changes, the unpreparedness of the people and of public awareness for market relations. We created a storm and we were the first to be struck by it.

Therefore, the loss of my post did not generate any resentment, any hostility toward anyone, or any unpleasantness.

[Zamyatina] Despite the fact that Premier V.S. Pavlov and you are completely different people and completely different politicians, you both are the targets of similar complaints. You were criticized for having embarked on transition to the market by raising prices, the premier is criticized along similar lines....

[Ryzhkov] When we presented the program for transition to the market in May last year, it was built on a comprehensive approach. If you were to carefully study that document, you would find in it privatization, destatization, development of business enterprise, share issues.... The simple answer is that, at that time, these questions were overshadowed by the price reform, even though prices were just one of the planned measures.

I think that now we have experienced the same effect, when people discerned only the price factor in Pavlov's anticrisis program. It is true, though: The necessary work that accompanies the transition to the market is being done very slowly. Who is hindering the privatization of small enterprises? Even the organizational structures for this are still to be created....

[Zamyatina] Who is to blame for the fact that enterprises are banking only on prices instead of creating a labor market, privatizing, and selling shares?

[Ryzhkov] The center is to blame for having talked and argued for too long. After all, we argued from July until year's end—is this permissible? The arguments were not economic but ideological and political. Ideological pressure thwarted the transition to the market. In my last speech at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies I actually said that ideology had gained the upper hand over economics in our country. I could criticize myself for not having insisted on a reform of price formation in 1988, when all that was needed were two signatures beneath the prepared decisions. But I found myself alone: At that time, Politburo decisions were mandatory for execution....

[Zamyatina] Now this painful decision has been approved by both the Supreme Soviet and a CPSU Central Committee plenum. What is your appraisal of what happened 2 April?

[Ryzhkov] They've gone too far in my view, much too far. To raise prices by 311 billion (!) I think that a much softer approach toward reform could have been adopted.

This is an unjustifiably harsh blow. When I heard the news of the price rise on television, I told my wife: "This can't be true." Because I remember the percentage increase proposed last May for children's goods. We were planning to raise prices only to the level of output profitability and to give parents compensation, the way it is done all over Europe.

I think that, in this situation, you cannot go on to talk about further liberalization of prices as proposed by the anticrisis program. The people cannot take any more, it would be impermissible to bring them to a state of total despondency. You can have free prices—for a Japanese tape recorder, for example: If you want it, pay the 5,000. But this cannot apply to a slice of bread, not to children's pantyhose, not to children's overcoats. In other words, I think that prices for prime necessities must be kept in check by the state to ensure the protection of children, mothers, and veterans. I asked my opponents: Why does Japan maintain a firm price for rice? This is a fact, after all. No matter how strongly classical economists might attack me, saying that Ryzhkov is again advocating price regulation, I will continue to insist that prices must be maintained for certain foodstuffs, for prime necessities, and especially for children's goods. Let them either criticize or spare a thought for the elderly and the children. We are talking on the eve of Victory Day: Please convey to the veterans my humble respect and best wishes. Life is very hard for many of these people. And now life is dealing them fresh blows which they do not deserve. Please tell them that I will protect their interests always and in everything.

Of course people might ask: Should we elect an ill person as president, will he manage to perform his functions? Before giving my consent to stand for election, I approached the physicians' council and bluntly asked: Are there any contraindications or not? They told me that there are no contraindications.

[Zamyatina] You have prompted my next question. It seems that our politicians have finally started realizing the importance of their physical condition and their image for the election campaign and for remaining in politics in general. How do you keep fit?

[Ryzhkov] I have always tried to keep fit, doing gymnastics and exercises. I tried to look after myself, to eat less. At one time, when I was chief plant engineer, I unfortunately used to smoke. I virtually never got home before 2300 hours and used to smoke a lot, to the point where I was drugged. I turned black, literally like a piece of cinder. [sentence as published] My wife told me: "Listen, quit smoking, otherwise the end is perfectly obvious." When I got to 40 years of age I threw away the cigarettes—I was smoking "Stolichnyye" at the time—and then gave away the "Ronson" lighter someone had given me as a gift. And that's it—I have not smoked since that time.

[Zamyatina] Do you have any other weaknesses which you have yet to overcome?

[Ryzhkov] Steam baths. Actually, yesterday was a memorable day: I resumed my favorite habit.

[Zamyatina] What helps you keep your composure at the most critical times, at times when things cannot get any worse?

[Ryzhkov] Some people get confused and nervous whenever they go through difficult times, whenever a difficult question has to be resolved. I am the exact opposite, I immediately get a grip of myself.

I also have this rule: Whenever I come home, I leave all my worries at the doorstep. Of course, my family understand everything from hints, but nonetheless the home atmosphere is very tranquilizing when it is not overburdened by sundry emotions. I know many people with whom I started working 30-40 years ago. Wonderful talented kids.... Unfortunately, family matters got on top of them, arguments, disruptions. Many of them could not cope with it all. Pity.

[Zamyatina] Are you not worried by the unequal starting conditions of the election campaign? It seems to me that everything, both at the congress and among public opinion, is working in just one candidate's favor.

[Ryzhkov] I am worried. Because there is not a lot of time left. Indeed, the prevailing situation is such that Comrade Yeltsin, the main contender, is in many regards in a better position that the rest, myself included. He has all the structures, the whole apparatus is working for him. While others have only just enough time to seek out like-minded people and aides. What do I count on? On the belief that people will support the program on which I am working and will have faith in me.

Bakatin Considers Running for RSFSR Presidency

PM0805133591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 p 1

[A. Podkopalov report: "If the People Ask...."]

[Text] An organizational session of the action committee to promote V. Bakatin's candidacy for the post of Russian president took place in Moscow yesterday. Similar groups have already registered and have begun to collect signatures in Kirov Oblast and Petrozavodsk.

The rumor that Bakatin had refused to be nominated for the Russian presidency is indeed just a rumor. USSR People's Deputy B. Pylin announced that during talks with him Vadim Viktorovich said that he does not intend to initiate the process for his personal nomination, but if he senses the people's support then he will not refuse to participate in the presidential elections.

Centrist Bloc Discusses Russian Candidates

LD0805205991 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Polishchuk]

[Text] Moscow May 8 TASS—A regular meeting of the centrist bloc of political parties and movements was held here today. The meeting discussed the only item on the agenda: the nomination of candidates for the posts of Russian vice-president and Moscow mayor.

Leader of the Centrist Bloc V. Voronin said that he intends to run for the presidency of the Russian Federation at the forthcoming elections in June.

"If elected, I intend to work for principles and ideals recorded in the charter of the Centrist Bloc," he stressed.

"The main thing is to defend human rights. Aims must be achieved only in compliance with humane laws, precluding violence and actions aimed at fanning up political, ethnic, religious and social strife."

It was announced at the meeting that the bloc now consists of 17 parties and organisations. The all-Union Liberal Democratic Party led by V. Zhirinovskiy withdrew on April 18 according to its own wish. The bloc now has its own publications: the TSENTR newspaper and the OTKRYTY MIR STRANY magazine.

After a lengthy discussion, meeting participants nominated Y. Kayumova for the post of Russian vice president. A candidate for the post of Moscow mayor will be discussed on May 12.

Yeltsin Chairs Russian Coordinating Council

LD0805214291 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1900 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] In the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] House of Soviets today there was a routine session of the higher consultative coordinating council under the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The session was chaired by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, reported the press service of the presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The socio-political and economic situation in the Russian Federation and throughout the country, and the position in specific areas of the republic, were discussed. Practical measures to stabilize the situation were determined.

Yeltsin: Sabotage in Land Reform Implementation

PM0805134991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, BALTFAX, RIA, REUTER reports: "B. Yeltsin on Sabotage During Implementation of Land Reform"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, answering an RIA correspondent's question about the progress of land reform in Russia, said: "Things are going well in some cities and oblasts, but in others the reform is being sabotaged. Consequently, the republic prosecutor's office and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and other organs have been instructed, if such sabotage continues, to institute proceedings against city and oblast leaders which could lead to their losing their positions."

Russian Supreme Soviet Adopts New Laws

Law on State of Emergency

LD0805082591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1702 GMT 7 May 91

[By TASS legislative correspondents Yuriy Kozmin and Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 7 May (TASS)—The law on a state of emergency in the Russian Federation acquires particular importance in a period of a difficult social situation in the country, accompanied by bursts of 'interethnic conflicts' in various regions of the USSR. A draft of this document today became the chief point on the agenda in the work of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

In submitting the draft law, Sergey Sirotkin, member of the legislative committee on human rights, noted that in contrast to a similar law of the USSR which in his view does not single out reasons for introducing a state of emergency, mass disorders, interethnic conflicts, and actions directed at overthrowing the constitutional system, may become a cause for such measures in the republic.

The authors of the document think that only the president of the republic or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation can introduce a state of emergency. A decision on this should of necessity be endorsed by the Russian Supreme Soviet. It is noted in particular that the state of emergency is introduced in the republic for a period up to 30 days, after which the Supreme Soviet should either extend it or end it. The draft law notes that the introduction of such a regime on the territory of republics which are within the composition of the Russian Federation is only possible with the agreement of the Supreme Soviets of those republics.

During the discussion which subsequently got under way members of the legislature made a number of remarks about the document, the majority of which boiled down to the fact that the USSR Supreme Soviet must not have the right to introduce a state of emergency on the territory of the Russian Federation without the agreement of the republic's legislature.

This amendment was taken into account and the draft law was adopted as a basis. A draft law was also adopted today at the first reading. According to the document, first and foremost, enterprises in the services sphere, light and food industry, and transport, to the overall cost of 1.2 trillion rubles [as received], are subject to privatization.

Law on Aid for Repressed Peoples

PM0805094191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 May 91 First Edition p 3

[RSFSR law dated 26 April: "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples"]

[Text] Moscow, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] House of Soviets—The renewal of Soviet society in the process of its democratization and of the formation of a rule-of-law state in the country requires all spheres of social life to be purged of the deformation and distortion of pan-human values. It has created favorable opportunities for rehabilitating the people who suffered repression during the years of Soviet power and who were subjected to genocide and slanderous attacks.

The policy of arbitrariness and lawlessness practiced at the state level regarding these people was unlawful and offended the dignity of not only repressed people but also all other people in the country. Its tragic consequences are still affecting the state of interethnic relations and creating dangerous hotbeds of interethnic conflicts.

Guided by international acts, by the USSR Supreme Soviet declaration of 14 November 1989 "On Deeming Illegal and Criminal the Repressive Acts Against People Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring Their Rights," by the resolutions of the Congresses of RSFSR People's Deputies, and also by the existing RSFSR and USSR legislation enshrining equal rights for Soviet people, and seeking to restore historical justice, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet proclaims the repeal of all illegal acts adopted in respect of repressed people and adopts this law on their rehabilitation.

Article 1. All repressed people of the RSFSR are to be rehabilitated, and repressive acts against these peoples are to be deemed illegal and criminal.

Article 2. People (nations, nationalities or ethnic groups, and other historically evolved cultural and ethnic communities of people—the Cossacks, for example) are deemed to have been repressed if a policy of slander and genocide has been conducted against them at the state level on grounds of nationality or other allegiance, accompanied by their forcible resettlement, by the abolition of national-state formations, by the redrawing of national-territorial borders, or by the establishment of a regime of terror and violence in places of special settlement.

Article 3. The rehabilitation of repressed peoples means recognition for and the realization of their right to restore the territorial integrity which existed prior to the anticonstitutional policy of the forcible redrawing of borders, to restore the national-state formations which had taken shape prior to their abolition, and also to be compensated for the harm done by the state.

Rehabilitation provides for the return of peoples who did not have their own national-state formations to the sites of their traditional habitation on RSFSR territory, in accordance with their will.

In the process of rehabilitating repressed peoples the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens currently resident on the territories of repressed people must not be infringed.

Article 4. Agitation or propaganda conducted for the purpose of preventing the rehabilitation of repressed people is not permitted. Proceedings are instituted in accordance with the procedure laid down by law against persons who commit such actions, as well as against those who incite them.

Article 5. The national-state formations of repressed people are restored and altered on the basis of the legislative regulation of interethnic relations.

Article 6. The territorial rehabilitation of repressed people provides for the implementation, in accordance with their will, of legal and organizational measures to restore the national-territorial borders which existed prior to their forcible, anticonstitutional alteration.

A transitional period may be established where necessary to implement territorial rehabilitation. The decision to establish a transitional period and to restore national-territorial borders is adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 7. The political rehabilitation of repressed people who used to have their own, illegally abolished, national-state formations provides for the restoration of these formations in accordance with the procedure laid down by Article 6 of this law.

Article 8. The political rehabilitation of repressed people who did not have their own national-state formations signifies their right to free national development, to return to sites of former habitation on RSFSR territory, and to be provided with equal opportunities with other people in realizing their political rights and freedoms guaranteed by existing legislation.

Article 9. The harm done by the state to repressed people and individual citizens as a result of repression is to be compensated for.

The procedure for compensating rehabilitated people and individual citizens for the harm [done to them] is laid down in legislative acts of the USSR, the RSFSR, and the republics making up the RSFSR.

Compensation for harm [done to them] is given to rehabilitated people and individual citizens in a phased manner.

Article 10. The social rehabilitation of repressed people means that the time which citizens subjected to repression spent in special settlements (places of exile) counts three times over. In this connection provision is also made to increase the size of old-age pensions for every year of work with due regard for the periods provided for in the RSFSR Law "On Pension Provision for Citizens in the RSFSR."

Article 11. The cultural rehabilitation of repressed people provides for the implementation of a package of measures to restore their spiritual heritage and to satisfy their cultural needs.

This also means recognition of the right of repressed peoples to restore the former historical names of population centers and localities illegally wrested from them during the years of Soviet power.

Article 12. All acts adopted by Union, republic, and local organs and officials in respect of repressed peoples, with the exception of acts restoring their rights, are deemed unconstitutional and lose their force.

Article 13. Special features of the application of this law in respect of repressed peoples who live or have lived on the territory of the Russian Federation are governed by individual RSFSR legislative acts adopted in respect of each repressed people.

[Signed] B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Silayev on RSFSR Foreign Economic Policy

PM0805135191 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian 29 Apr 91 p 11

[Interview with Ivan Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, by correspondent Yuriy Lebedev; place and date not stated: "Russia in the World Economy"]

[Text] [NOVOYE VREMYA] Do I understand your government's plans correctly—Russia intends to be independent in the world economy?

[Silayev] The basic idea of the new Union treaty is the independence of republics united by common aims and tasks. Therefore, the main functions and commitments stemming from the principle of sovereignty and independence fall under the jurisdiction of the republics themselves. The possibilities for independent economic activity are broadening significantly.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] That well-known dictum "foreign countries will help us" is perceived in many ways today. What is your attitude toward attracting foreign capital and foreign entrepreneurs into our country?

[Silayev] To get out of the crisis situation and, more importantly, to secure the large-scale development of our economy in market conditions, true economic integration with developed states is required. Investments are also envisaged, especially in such base sectors of the economy as the extractive industry—the output of oil, gas, coal, metals, and lumbering.... We would like to invite Western and Eastern partners to our country so that they might participate in the introduction of new technologies. This will benefit our foreign partners, too, despite the complex domestic political situation in the USSR. First, we are prepared to guarantee investment returns in the form of supplies of raw and finished products. Second, we will open up our domestic market (in this case I am talking about the Russian domestic market) for foreign entrepreneurs and firms producing consumer goods and equipment for agriculture and light industry. We will create the necessary and propitious conditions for their activity and establish beneficial tariff duties, abolishing them altogether for certain goods.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] What do you think of the practice of creating joint enterprises in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]?

[Silayev] We want to have the deeper roots of joint enterprise both on Russian territory and abroad. Naturally, the Russian business world will get help and specific guarantees from our government.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Foreign businessmen are extremely concerned that there should be guarantees for their contributions to our economy....

[Silayev] I would like to reassure our foreign partners and potential contributors. We have already created real guarantees for their activity. Joint production, joint enterprise, and even joint control over funds and real estate—all of this is either already permitted by Russian laws or will be permitted in the very near future. Priority opportunities for commercial activity by any foreign businessman are being created in the republic. We are paying particular attention to cooperation in the sphere of production geared toward the consumer market. Foreign entrepreneurs can have their own property on Russian territory in the form of stores and small enterprises. Finally, we intend to admit foreign goods to border regions and even, in a number of cases, allow the producers themselves to organize their sale.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Republics, individuals, enterprises, and departments have acquired the right to engage independently in the foreign market. Republic governments have activated external links. Recently you completed the first official visit to Turkey. How did they receive you? Is it true that until then all links were effected at Union level?

[Silayev] I stated from the very beginning of the talks in Ankara that we do not aim to conduct any kind of autonomous, independent policy in our relations with Turkey. We have the power to cooperate with foreign countries fairly independently, but at the same time we consider that Russo-Turkish links are an integral part of interstate relations between the USSR and Turkey. I am happy with the talks' results.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Why did you choose the Turkish Republic as the first country to visit?

[Silayev] One of the deciding arguments in favor of our trip to Turkey was its remarkable economic rise. We wanted to familiarize ourselves more closely with the practice and peculiarities of "liberalizing the economy." We were particularly interested in the experience of privatizing industry and redistributing state property. Transformations in both countries are based on administrative and centralist principles.

There are many differences of principle, but the similarity in our initial positions at the start of perestroyka means we can make real use of the Turkish experience. Particularly the decisiveness and lack of compromise in conducting the approved program of economic reforms.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] What does the RSFSR leadership think of Turkish President Turgut Ozal's proposal to set up a cooperation zone?

[Silayev] This is very attractive to the Russian Federation: The issue concerns a zone which geographically unites Russia, other Union republics, and foreign countries—Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania. In principle we support the idea of creating a mechanism for economic cooperation between states adjoining the Black Sea, all the more so as here the interests of all Union republics in the region are taken into account. We have already begun creating individual free economic development zones, in particular on the Russian Black Sea coast.

Sobchak Addresses Price Increase Issue

LD0805173491

[Editorial Report] Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 7 May carries a four-minute report on a news conference by Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet in Leningrad on 7 May. Among numerous issues, he touched upon the issue of price increases. He said: "There are a number of items concerned which we must, at all costs, preserve the level we had prior to the price increases. The first thing is that the essential foodstuffs should be safeguarded at a level of at least that of last year. If currently Leningrad gets between 60 to 65 percent of what it used to get by way of meat products last year, we should still supply the canteens at enterprises, organizations, insitutions, and student canteens at a level of 95 to 100 percent of last year's supply. We are trying to do everything we can to preserve that."

Sobchak criticizes the excessive cost of taxi fares, council telephone calls, and mark-ups at public catering outlets. He goes on to say that all prices that are established administratively are based on one's own costs—production costs—but these costs can be artificially inflated and this does take place. As an example, he cites the heating costs of an unnamed sports complex, which amounted last year to 219,000 rubles and this year to 1 million rubles. No explanation for this is forthcoming. He says: "In this way we cover up, at citizens' expense, our own mismanagement. That is why the criticism that is currently voiced about the central government ought also to be addressed to us. We, too, are guilty of the fact that we are proceeding along a path of increasing prices without taking Leningrad people's interests into account. After all, if prices are to be increased at all, in each specific case the grounds for this must account for each and every ruble of the increase."

Kuptsov Explains Anticrisis Measures to Voters

PM0905085791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Stay in Vologda Oblast"]

[Text] CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.A. Kuptsov visited Vologda Oblast 4-7 May. His stay in his electoral district was devoted to explaining the decisions of the recent combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission and the anticrisis program of the country's government.

In all the meetings, people voiced serious concern at the danger that the high degree of social protection for man in Soviet society will be lost. Addressing the CPSU Central Committee secretary, working people insisted on the need for the party to take specific action to implement the anticrisis measures and for persistence in fulfilling the plenum decisions.

The meetings in Vologda Oblast showed the increased determination of the majority of Communists to consolidate the party's ranks and their readiness to live and act in the area of people's main interests.

New Moscow Militia Chief Myrikov Interviewed

PM0705100591 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 91 p 8

[Interview with Major General of Militia N.S. Myrikov, new chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration, by D. Spiridonov; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA introduction; under the rubric "Interview After Appointment": "General Is Ready for Dialogue"]

[Excerpt] On 17 April the USSR minister of internal affairs signed an order appointing Major General of Militia N.S. Myrikov chief of Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] Internal Affairs Main Administration. The new metropolitan militia chief is 64. He is well known to those who have organized and held various demonstrations and rallies in Moscow. It is General [as published] Myrikov who has always been responsible for ensuring order during mass events.

We provide the interview that N.S. Myrikov gave to a MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent after taking up his post.

[Spiridonov] Nikolay Stepanovich, did the new appointment come as a surprise to you?

[Myrikov] In all honesty, yes. My name was not mentioned during discussion in the collegium of possible candidates for the post of chief of the Internal Affairs Main Administration. But nevertheless the minister's choice fell on me. Apparently the fact that I am better acquainted with the capital than anybody else played a part. All my life has been connected with Moscow. In the war year of 1942 I started work as an apprentice fitter at the Second Bearing Plant. When the war ended I was sent to the internal affairs organs on a Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] pass. I started out as an ordinary militiaman and simultaneously studied at the militia school. Then I became chief of the Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Militia Department, and was chief of the metropolitan automobile inspectorate for seven years. For the past 18 years I have held the post of deputy chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration.

[Spiridonov] And what impression are you left with of the Internal Affairs Main Administration's work in the years when you were deputy chief?

[Myrikov] Are you are hinting that 12 years out of 18 were in the so-called "years of stagnation?" What can one say to that? In the Internal Affairs Main Administration I was responsible for the conduct of mass events. The Olympiad, festivals, demonstrations—I was responsible for everything. Of course, at that time the militia was completely subordinate to the party, and a party worker was usually appointed to the post of chief of the Internal Affairs Main Administration. But I did my duty and can safely say that I did it honestly. I worked where I was ordered to. I do not know who can reproach me for that now....

[Spiridonov] But what do you think about the depoliticization of the internal affairs organs, on which many are now insisting?

[Myrikov] It is entirely normal. However, the paradox is that lately the Internal Affairs Main Administration has been really striving to depoliticize the militia. Because the metropolitan militia chief had already been turned from an official into a political figure, whom various political forces attempt to utilize in their struggle. In my view such a situation is completely intolerable in a rule-of-law state.

[Spiridonov] The title of the post that you now hold, irrespective of the metropolitan militia's change in status, has remained the same: chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration. Have you really not left Moscow City Soviet's control?

[Myrikov] Of course not. We will be subordinate to Moscow City Soviet and Moscow Gorispolkom. You will agree that it is ridiculous when an entire department is formalistically responsible for order in a particular city while the city authorities themselves bear no responsibility at all. However, nobody has abolished the militia's double subordination yet. And while there is a law compelling Moscow's internal affairs organs to follow the ministry's orders, Internal Affairs Main Administration staffers are obliged to carry out those orders. I say this not because I am trying to hang onto the position I have obtained. Let us reason logically: How will an organ charged with ensuring order in society cope with its task if there are anarchy and disorder within itself?

[Spiridonov] But Moscow City Soviet is actually stating that the best way out of the situation is to transfer all authority over the militia to it.

[Myrikov] From Moscow City Soviet's viewpoint—yes. But not from the viewpoint of ensuring the best order in the capital. Moscow is a city and not an appanage principality. And criminals come to us from various parts of the country. Catching them requires the coordination of efforts on a Union level. But how will you ensure this coordination if the Internal Affairs Main Administration leadership is "at odds" with the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]? For us quarreling with the ministry simply means scrapping many crime-fighting programs at a stroke. After all, the Union leadership not only allocates a large portion of resources for financing the metropolitan militia's work, but also supplies it with essential equipment, technology, fuel, and spare parts. On its own will Moscow City Soviet be able to manage to ensure proper provision for the law enforcement organs of such an enormous city as Moscow? I am sure it won't, even with the help of the Russian MVD.

And then, the city also has its rayons. What if tomorrow the rayon leadership, not agreeing with the policy of the "center" (I mean Moscow City Soviet), appointed its "own" Internal Affairs Rayon Administration chief? And declared that the Internal Affairs Main Administration's decision "encroaches on its sovereignty?" Then the next thing you know the inhabitants of the street will elect their own precinct inspector. And where will that take us then?

[Spiridonov] Yes, it wouldn't do us much good.... I understood that you have a negative attitude toward creating a municipal militia?

[Myrikov] Far from it. I think that it is possible and necessary to create a municipal militia. But not now. In the current conditions of tough political confrontation the creation of parallel militia structures will only make the situation worse. The appearance of new armed formations accompanied by the total vagueness of their mutual relations with the state organs already operating could lead to undesirable and even tragic consequences. The creation of a municipal militia is a serious matter; it cannot be approached like an ordinary structural change in some Moscow Gorispolkom department.

[Spiridonov] Nikolay Stepanovich, Moscow City Soviet and especially the commission for legality gave your appointment a frosty reception, as they say. In such circumstances how do you intend to cooperate with the city organ of power?

[Myrikov] The Internal Affairs Main Administration does not want and is doing its level best to avoid confrontation with Moscow City Soviet. Unfortunately, certain deputies' ambitions are having a negative effect on our mutual relations. I have already said that we do not intend to leave Moscow City Soviet's control. The Internal Affairs Main Administration offers to discuss differences with the Moscow City Soviet Presidium. Now, in the light of the city militia's new status, a representative of the USSR MVD must also take part in the meeting. I hope that we manage to reach agreement on the division of power between the Union and local authorities. The main thing is just that reason should prevail in this dialogue.

Everything I have said also concerns the commission for legality to the fullest extent. The Internal Affairs Main Administration has specific proposals on cooperation with deputies. In the event that the commission receives complaints against militia staffers, we are prepared to let it have the materials in our possession. Or to create joint commissions to investigate violations in the MVD organs and make joint decisions on punishing offenders. The deputies would also be able to count on our help in carrying out any kind of actions associated with trade abuses and other measures to ensure law and order. I think that this is precisely the kind of activity by the commission that would enhance its authority, rather than endless conflicts and hunger strikes.

[Spiridonov] On 19 April in the "Oktyabr" Hall there was a meeting between the chairmen of Moscow City Soviet and Moscow Gorispolkom and metropolitan militia staffers. You too attended this meeting. What impressions has it left you with?

[Myrikov] Strange as it may seem, not all that gloomy ones. I am talking about Gavriil Kharitonovich's speech. His speech and answers to questions, although they contained lots of contradictions, also had positive aspects. I do not mean his comments about me personally, but a certain shift in the Moscow City Soviet chairman's [Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov's] position in relation to the metropolitan militia can nevertheless be seen. Although for the moment only through powerful binoculars.

Unfortunately this cannot be said of Yu. Luzhkov's speech. The Moscow Militia was promised a big wage raise, apartments, and plots of land were it to fully transfer to the control of Moscow City Soviet. It could have everything at once if it wanted, were it not for the Union leadership's "machinations." Not to mention that such blandishments are not very proper, to put it mildly, and are sometimes reminiscent of playing with fire. The feasibility of such promises is highly doubtful. The city does not even have enough money for the most urgent needs: road repairs, lighting, street cleaning.

And another thing. In his speech Gavriil Kharitonovich invariably stressed that all actions Moscow City Soviet takes are exclusively dictated by concern for the city's inhabitants. But what good could a conflict between the city organ of power and the militia do Muscovites? Because it is precisely they, Muscovites, who will have to cough up for the noncoordination of actions between Moscow Gorispolkom and the militia. That is what deputies ought to think about first of all.

To round off this painful topic I will cite a well-known but good thought: Desperate situations are created by people themselves, and it is they who must search for the way out. They must search for it on the path of dialogue, respect for others' opinion, and compromise. The Internal Affairs Main Administration leadership is ready for dialogue and compromise solutions. I believe the Union MVD is, too. The one thing that we must stand firm on is not permitting in any circumstances Internal Affairs Main Administration personnel to be dragged into the political struggle. The militia must watch over the law, and not politics. And this opinion, I am convinced, is shared by the overwhelming majority of staffers in the capital's Internal Affairs Main Administration. [passage omitted].

IZVESTIYA Gives Details of Sakhalin Oil Spill

*PM0805150191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 May 91 Union Edition p 8*

[Correspondent Yu. Balakirev report: "Another Environmental Disaster Zone"]

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk—The inhabitants along the coast of the largest warm-water bay in southern Sakhalin greeted the May Day holiday amidst a state of emergency. A vast oil slick developed in the waters, threatening all wildlife.

According to some information, the slick has reached 200 square km in size. Every available means has been called upon to combat the sea pollution. Fortunately, the unique "Vaydgubskiy" offshore oil collector, which previously had its baptism of fire off Alaska, was in the vicinity.

What happened on the island? V. Timofeyev, chairman of the Korsakov City Soviet, refused to give IZVESTIYA any information, saying that he could not waste his time on interviews. Although he is responsible for the gross negligence that brought about the environmental disaster. The oil was pumped from a tanker to the Korsakov port tank farm, I was told, via a pipeline that was not connected to the onshore storage tanks. More than 500 tonnes of deadly petroleum products spilled onto the shore around the mooring structures, and from there the oil moved out to sea. The disaster arose in Korsakov and was still further augmented in neighboring Anivskiy Rayon, where the oil spilled over a 52-km stretch of coastline.

It is precisely at this time that young noble fish are traveling down the spawning rivers to the sea. Death now awaits the immature salmon at the mouth of the Lyutoga, Taranay, and Uryum Rivers. Migratory birds that have chosen Anivskiy Bay since ancient times have also had a bad time. The island's main beaches and private truck gardens have suffered damage, but it is still too early to talk about the extent of the damage.

I was told by N. Lukyanov, chairman of Anivskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, that the soviet has mobilized vehicles and bulldozers from all enterprises in the rayon to clean up the shoreline. Paying no attention to the rain and snow, people have gathered up the oil-soaked soil and sand and taken them far away from the water. The state of emergency has now been lifted. But the entire shoreline is still under supervision.

Vladivostok Special Militia Company Formed

PM0805143591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by Captain First Rank C. Shirokov: "Special Reinforcement for Militia"]

[Text] Vladivostok—The crime level in the Maritime Kray capital, and it is no secret to Vladivostok's inhabitants, is unfortunately not declining. The local city newspaper VLADIVOSTOK asserts that in April this year there was a murder in the city every other day. Of course, in such a crime-conducive atmosphere you cannot manage without militia special subunits. The relevant formation of law enforcement forces equipped with everything necessary for effective work has finally been created in Vladivostok.

A company of special militia has been made up of carefully selected boys—they are all tall, strongly built, well developed physically, and prepared for resolute actions to render criminals harmless in the most complex situations.

Militia Lieutenant Colonel Z. Rytov, deputy commander of a separate battalion of the patrol post service, told journalists:

"Finally we have a small hope of equipping people properly and providing them with material incentives. The opportunity to select people on a competitive basis has correspondingly also appeared."

So far the preferential conditions for the special militiamen are as follows: Their wages have been increased to 500 rubles [R] and as of January next year they will each receive a food ration worth R150. The annual leave is 45 days not counting a free air trip to any part of the country. In addition a year's service for the special militiamen counts as 18 months in the work record. Many of them are continuing study in secondary and higher educational establishments.

Well, we should not doubt that this subunit will be of benefit and the strong fearless boys from the special militia company will pay for themselves many times over, as the saying goes.

Ingush Leaders Discuss Confrontation With Cossacks

LD0805135191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 8 May 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A fight between Cossacks and Ingushes, in which firearms were used, took places in the large Cossack village Troitskaya in Checheno-Ingushetia at the end of April. People from both sides were killed and wounded. Representatives of all the regions of the republic, religious men, village elders, and representatives of the authorities gathered at an assembly in Achkhoy-Martan to discuss this extraordinary situaton.

[Unidentified correspondent] Addressing the assembly, Gersoy Makhmud, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chechen-Ingush Republic called on the elders of the republic to spare no effort so that this event does not happen again. Gorkay Makhmud, deputy mufti of Checheno-Ingushetia's Muslims; Izmailov Abd-al-Hamed Haj, the imam of the mosque in the village of Ekazhevo; and Bogatyrev Abd-al-Rashid Haj, the imam of the mosque in the Ordzhonikidzevskaya village; as well as Hansul Mychayev, hero of the Soviet Union, and others were unanimous that the ties of brotherhood which for centuries linked the village dwellers and Cossacks were unshakeable and that incidents like that must be handled in the severest possible manner, because they can destabilize the situation not only in the republic, but also in the region. The situation is completely under control now and an investigation is in progress. Those who took part in the scandalous brawl have been arrested or are being sought. Visits by envoys from the neighboring republic, carrying alcohol and provocative appeals, are also being stopped. [video shows assembly]

Western Republics

Control Commission's Makhov Visits Belorussia

PM0905144991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meetings in Belorussia"]

[Text] Ye.N. Makhov, acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission [title as published], was in Belorussia 4-5 May.

During numerous meetings with the Belorussian party aktiv and workers from Minsk's "Kholodilnik" plant Ye.N. spoke about the results of the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission and the decisions adopted by it.

He also took part in and addressed a conference-seminar attended by chairmen of the control commissions of the Belorussian Communist Party's oblast party organizations and of the republic's capital, and in the work of a joint plenum of the party committee and control commission of the Belorussian Military District's CPSU organization.

There was a critical exchange of the work experience of party control organs, concerning their place and role in implementing the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and in strengthening discipline and the unity of party ranks.

Ye.N. Makhov also visited the Great Patriotic War invalids' hospital, where he warmly congratulated the veterans on Victory Day.

Belorussian Workers Discuss Possible New Strike

LD0805233591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Belorussian 1917 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Workers of Belorussia are preparing for a general all-republic strike scheduled for 21 May, the day the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet session is to open. According to our correspondents, strike committees have ben created at the biggest enterprises in Brest. A meeting of all these committees is planned for 18 May working out tactics on holding a strike in the town.

On 11 May, with the same purpose, a session of strike committees from many towns in Belorussia will take place in Minsk.

Kiev Victory Day Meeting Held Despite Authorities

PM0905103491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Lieutenant Colonel N. Gorenko report from Kiev: "Compensation for the Holiday?"]

[Text] The Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies and the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] had made no decision by the very last day on how the people of Kiev should mark Victory Day. Basically the organs of power were evading this sacred duty. The Ukrainian Communist Party gorkom [city committee], veterans, and the military-political directorate of the Kiev Military District had to take the initiative. But when they requested permission to use the modern "Ukraina" Palace or the October Palace for a ceremonial meeting, they were told that the premises were occupied by planned concerts. If you want to mark Victory Day, they were told, you will have to pay compensation for the cancellation of the concerts.

Some politicians and city leaders have short memories.

But the festival is taking place. A ceremonial meeting was held 8 May in the Officers' Institute. On 9 May veterans and servicemen of the nineties will march along Kreshchatik and military bands will play. Later there will be a solemn requiem in memory of the fallen.

Officials Discuss Kiev Region Draft Problems

PM0705133791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with V. Timoshok, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers Committee for Liaison With the Defense Ministry, and Lieutenant General V. Boriskin, identified as chief of staff of Kiev Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov; date and place not specified; first paragraph is introduction: "Spring Draft: View of the Problem. It Is Not Only the Draftee to Blame"]

[Text] Last fall the plan for dispatching draftees to troops in the region on whose territory the Kiev Military District is located was only 91-percent fulfilled. Our correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov spoke about the problems of organizing the draft this spring with V. Timoshok, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers Committee for Liaison With the Defense Ministry, and Lieutenant General V. Boriskin, chief of staff of Kiev Military District.

[Polyakov] I would like you to determine your positions straightaway: How do the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers view the Army, its organization, and manning? Are their disagreements on this as far as the district staff is concerned?

[Timoshok] Most people in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and Government deem it necessary to have a Union Army. Although the view exists that young men should be sent outside the republic for strategic defense needs, but Internal Troops, civil defense subunits, and construction detachments on the republic's territory should be manned by its citizens alone. The main thing is, I believe, the realization of the need to pay most careful attention to the army, as indicated by the fact that our committee has been set up.

[Boriskin] We have no disagreements in principle with the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. The army should be internationalist in spirit and staffed on the nonterritorial principle. We proceed on this premise in organizing the draft.

[Polyakov] It is well known that the fall draft did not go entirely smoothly in some areas of the Ukraine. What documents guide those people who are responsible for conducting the fall draft?

[Boriskin] We are guided above all by the USSR Constitution, the Law on Universal Military Service, USSR Cabinet of Ministers resolutions, and the defense minister's orders. You may of course ask: What about the decisions adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet and certain oblast soviets? We take them into consideration. When a decision was adopted, under pressure from the students' hunger strike, enabling draftees to volunteer to serve outside the Ukraine, every draftee who wanted to serve outside the Ukraine wrote an application stating that fact. Ispolkoms [executive committees] at all levels have been made responsible for organizing the draft. Yet draft commissions are headed by military commissars and so soviets and ispolkoms are only responsible in extremely theoretical terms for the draft.

[Timoshok] There have been cases in the western Ukraine of there being a chairman of the draft commission, that is, a military commissar, but no commission members. That is why I think that a representative of the executive should head the draft commissions.

[Boriskin] I agree with what Valeriy Ivanovich has said. Although in such cases the commissar has the right to enlist army medics and trade union and public representatives....

[Polyakov] Do you agree that a civilian should head a draft commission? What if they suddenly wreck the draft?

[Timoshok] Don't think that there are such irresponsible people in the soviets. Do you know who was the first to turn to our committee on draft questions? The chairman of the Lvov Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]. We discussed everything with him in detail. No, the well-known principle—the plan at any price—will not hold sway over civilians; invalids will not be drafted into the army.

[Boriskin] Valeriy Ivanovich is, in my view, somewhat overexaggerating the significance of one individual. Every year demands regarding the qualitative selection of draftees are tightened up to satisfy the order issued by the defense and health ministers; medics have the deciding say here.

[Polyakov] So, organs of Soviet power are responsible for the draft. What is their attitude to it?

[Boriskin] It differs. Last fall it was decided to suspend the draft in Kharkov. This decision was then repealed but the plan for the fall draft was only 79-percent fulfilled. Whereas 107 people failed to turn up at the draft commission in 1989 in Kharkov itself, in 1990 this figure was 508. It's a different matter in Kiev Oblast, for instance. V. Sinko, chairman of the Kiev Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and of the Kiev Oblispolkom, personally visited the assembly point on several occasions and addressed new recruits and their parents. The result is that that the draft plan was fulfilled in full in the oblast.

Incidentally, Sinko has been presented with a valuable gift by order of the district troop commander—a watch engraved with his name.

[Polyakov] Last year can be said to have been a difficult year. What conclusions have been drawn?

[Timoshok] As far as I am concerned the main lesson is that there should be closer work with public organizations and army structures. The committee is only beginning its work but I have already had three meetings with the USSR defense minister and the chief of the General Staff.

I think that General Staff personnel should also be more vigorous in restructuring themselves and establishing closer contacts with us.

[Boriskin] Incidentally, the General Staff has already set up a directorate liaising with these committees and military commissariats, but it must not operate in the old way: fill out forms, execute, draft. Contacts with the Soviet authorities should be very close and no one should strike poses. I will say that people at the Kiev Municipal Military Commissariat did not understand this straightaway. The Kiev City Soviet was prepared to adopt the decision to suspend the draft. Colonel K. Khrol, deputy military commissar, then came along to the soviet. He was told: You don't allow representatives of the public and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers to come to the draft post. They're welcome.... [he replied]. People were put in a bus, taken to the military commissariat assembly point, told and shown things, and the tension abated immediately.

Military commissariats should have a better knowledge of the situation in the area. For instance, last August Kiev's Leninskiy Rayon Military Commissariat reported that 55 people would be drafted, but it only drafted 34. Not everything tallied for the district as a whole: There were 1,885 more invalids than we had expected. And 1,819 more guys entered VUZ's [higher educational establishments].

[Polyakov] The opinion is current that the draft is more orderly in rural areas and more difficult in cities, is that the case?

[Timoshok] The draft is more orderly in those areas where military-patriotic work is better. Take Chernigov Oblast. It is situated where the republics of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia meet. Life itself here is pervaded with a sense of internationalism. The Chernigov area is a region of partisan glory, it has always been one of the oblasts where the draft constitutes a festive event.

[Boriskin] I would add that leaders of all ranks in Cherkassy, Chernigov, Kiev, and certain other oblasts take a supremely responsible attitude toward training the rising generation. Nonetheless the draft is, indeed, more complex in large cities. Some 830 of 1,200 guys who failed to turn up at the draft commissions are from Kharkov and Kiev. Children in the countryside are probably taught from childhood to be more independent, have more respect for labor, and more confidence in their own efforts, while people in the cities all strive to protect minors from all difficulties. We recently brought cases with the prosecutor's office against draftees T. Burnos and Ye. Kovalskiy for draft dodging. The former's father is a director at the Dovzhenko Studio, while the latter's mother is first secretary at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. Their sons' actions are on their conscience.

[Polyakov] A recent sitting of the district military council in whose work representatives of organs of power in the region's oblasts took part gave alarming figures for the numbers of draft dodgers and deserters, and law-enforcement organs were reproached for their sluggishness in ensuring that draftees and enlisted men observe legality....

[Timoshok] I also attended and spoke at the military council sitting. Certainly, there are shortcomings in the army and no one intends tolerating them, but draftees are not entitled to evade military service. The law should have its say here. It is most frequently silent or answers, as the Vatutinskiy Rayon Prosecutor's Office told the rayon military commissariat: Proceedings cannot be initiated against draft dodgers "owing to their failure to show up at the prosecutor's office."

[Boriskin] Last year the prosecutor's office referred back to us more than 400 cases against refuseniks; these cases can only be initiated after the draftee's third no-show. In short, red tape is rife here and the laws are regrettably not operating. Incidentally, there is also another example. In 1989 proceedings were initiated in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast against 13 out of 90 draft dodgers and in 1990 the number of dodgers halved here. Of course, we are not in favor of punishing people, but everyone should know that no case of draft dodging will go unanswered.

[Polyakov] However difficult it is, the draft should not be repealed, the homeland must be defended. Intensive drafting will begin at the start of May. What kind of atmosphere do you predict during the draft?

[Timoshok] Serving the homeland is a man's work. Both my son and I have completed our term of service honestly and will, like thousands of guys, remember our comrades from all republics. I think that the current lull should not comfort those organizing the draft. Our committee espouses principled positions: Intra-army problems must be resolved in public, without fueling irritability and without dramatizing the situation.

[Boriskin] There are forces that intend to resist the draft—and we know some personally. Last November Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] People's Deputy L. Taburyanskiy, in conjunction with representatives of the Ukrainian Republic Party and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, took part in a rally near the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Military Commissariat, urging young men and their parents to boycott the draft. Some representatives of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers have drawn general conclusions from isolated instances. Major General A. Pletenets, chief of the district's organizational mobilization directorate, knows many of the committees' representatives well and has met with them on several occasions. He meets with silence when he asks them the following questions: Why don't they demand that we punish offenders and criminals and why has no committee invited along the parents of those people who taunt their sons?

But nor are we thinking of sitting idle. Analysis has shown that one military commissariat worker accounts for 20 draftees in the district. So, it has been decided that he must meet personally with each draftee. This work is already under way.

[Polyakov] It was pointed out at a recent sitting of the military council that the mass media cause draftees to have plenty of negative feelings...

[Boriskin] Our officers and generals have improved their contacts with the public and are taking part in television and radio broadcasts, and the district's LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA publishes contact numbers that you can telephone to obtain answers from district staff officials. Nonetheless one must be self-critical and acknowledge that we obviously underestimate close work with the mass media. Whether journalists or publications be "left-wing" or "right-wing," it is necessary to meet, debate, and exchange opinions with them....

[Timoshok] We undoubtedly need contacts. Both military men and civilians who value our great country must concern themselves with its defense capability.

Grinev: Implement Ukrainian Sovereignty

91UN1441A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 23 Apr 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with Vladimir Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, conducted by D. Arkadyev; date and place not given: "Vladimir Grinev: 'Without Political Struggle We Have No Future!'"]

[Text] The seventh April of perestroyka has made an abrupt change in our family budgets and, it would seem, exacerbated to the utmost the political struggle between the unbending devotees of the "socialist choice" and a "renewed federation" and the supporters of truly democratic change and a union of sovereign states.

And all this against the background of multithousand-strong meetings and miners' strikes, jacked-up prices and lines, and concern and uncertainty. We have been confronted head-on with the most savage problems, and the authorities, with the people. And no one can avoid making decisions. Only the approaches to them are today very different.... Vladimir Borisovich Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, reflects on this.

[Arkadyev] Vladimir Borisovich, at the end of March Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev gave an interview to Central Television in which he expressed the firm belief that the Union treaty could be signed in April or May. You are the person in the Ukrainian legislature for whom the subject of the Union treaty has as of last summer been virtually the main one. Hence the question: Is the signing of the Union treaty in the immediate future realistic, in your view?

[Grinev] The very term "immediate future" is somewhat vague. If we are speaking about April, this can be ruled out completely. The Ukrainian legislature has today only just embarked on the formulation of its position on the Union treaty. The standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet are only now examining its central features, and the research group of the Supreme Soviet Secretariat has only now managed to have its vision of the Union treaty examined in the standing commissions. Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk disseminated his observations on the Union treaty at the last session incidentally. That is, the process in the Ukrainian legislature has only just begun, and until the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet has clearly expressed its view of this document, speaking about the signing of the Union treaty at the level of the whole Union is pointless. So I consider the desire of the president and his euphoria, as it were, in connection with the speediest signing of the Union treaty to be unjustified.

Although, as you can see, my understanding of an unhurried approach differs not only from the view of the general secretary, but also from the suggestion "be in no hurry" made by S.I. Gurenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The unhurried approach of party leaders is dictated, I believe, by a desire to preserve and strengthen the old structures—the Central Committee, the cabinet, and the national president.

[Arkadyev] What time frame do you anticipate?

[Grinev] Sometime this fall. I believe that the Ukrainian legislature will not agree to sign the Union treaty without having determined its position on its own constitution. I am profoundly convinced of this. Otherwise an explosion is possible. There are, you know, in mathematics strong associations and weak associations. Thus the Ukrainian legislature is currently insufficiently strongly associated with the very process of creation of the Union treaty. After all, when one commission is participating in this, even considering that this is the Sovereignty Commission, this is, for all that, still not the opinion of legislature. And one further serious aspect. The Union treaty in the vision of the Ukrainian electorate is, for all that, not entirely that which the president imagines at this time. I am profoundly convinced of this. Therefore evidently we will not be in any hurry to make any declarations (as the president is doing currently). The Ukrainian legislature is oriented toward strict and precise work—without haste! Strictly speaking, we are, after all, really approaching a document which will determine the future of the Ukraine.

[Arkadyev] Incidentally, in the same interview with Central Television, in the opinion of the president of the USSR, our people, having said "yes" to a "renewed federation" (per the referendum results), in fact supported the published draft Union treaty [sentence as published]. This is what Mikhail Sergeyevich thinks. You most likely have your own opinion on both the results of the all-Union referendum and the draft Union treaty. Am I right?

[Grinev] They say that practice makes perfect. I would not say that the first attempt in all 73 years to learn the people's opinion turned out precisely thus. But, in my view, the interpretation of the results of the referendum is still being perfected. Just look at what the president and the representatives of certain political forces are attempting to maintain currently. Let us address the example of the Ukraine. Two referendum ballot papers: The first was connected with a re-creation of the unitary state, and it may be interpreted only thus, the second—republic—with the creation of a union of sovereign states. Many voters said "yes" to both the first and the second because evidently they have as yet an insufficiently clear grasp of the essence of the problem. But nonetheless we obtained, for all that, eight percent more positive answers to the question of the Ukrainian poll. This cannot today be interpreted other than as an opportunity for the Ukrainian legislature to promote a policy which is in a sense alternative in respect of the center; that is, a policy which by no means figures in the president's interpretation. One further point. The wording of the main question in Kazakhstan differed from the all-Union wording. In terms of ideas it was close to the wording of the Ukrainian poll, what is more. But here is the paradox: It is as though we are ignoring the content of the wording in Kazakhstan, and the referendum results there are incorporated in the all-Union results; that is, are interpreted in a way that is currently beneficial to the president. In a word, from the viewpoint of interpretation everything is quite ambivalent. I would like to call attention to the following point also: two-thirds of the total number of voters of the Ukraine said "yes" to the version proposed by the Ukrainian legislature, and this affords much reason to consider as constitutional the right to an interpretation of the results of the Ukrainian poll and to view it more seriously than the results of the all-Union referendum on the territory of the Ukraine. Of interest in this respect are the words of Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, when, analyzing the results of the Ukrainian poll, he called for people to act independently and boldly! This is very important. We really must act independently and boldly today not for the destruction of all that exists within the framework of the Union, but for realization of the sovereignty of the Ukraine as, to an equal extent, of the sovereignty of Russia, Kazakhstan, and other republics, and for the creation of a genuine community of sovereign states on this vast territory sick with all the pains, troubles, and ailments of totalitarian socialism. And I am profoundly convinced that such a path is today realistic. True, the president considers it unrealistic, but this is a matter of his political concerns. In my view, there are sufficient forces in the Ukrainian legislature today for realization of the idea of a union of sovereign states.

[Arkadyev] The results of the special Congress of People's Deputies of Russia will probably play a positive part here?

[Grinev] Undoubtedly. And it is worth recalling, if only briefly, how events unfolded at the forum of the people's elect of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. After all, those who had initiated its convening went to this congress with the hope, quite ephemeral perhaps, that they would succeed in forcing Yeltsin's resignation. But the congress culminated in the head of the Russian legislature acquiring special powers. In this transition—from the hope of certain political forces of Yeltsin's resignation to a strengthening of his power—there resides, in my view, the logic of the development of the political events of the special congress of the people's deputies of Russia. And such a phenomenon as the creation in the course of the Russian congress of the group of deputies headed by Rutskiy—“Communists for Democracy!?” After all, it was joined by more than 170 CPSU member deputies, who declared their full support for the policy of the Supreme Soviet and the authorities of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. That is, a particular faction of communists channeled their efforts into support for Yeltsin! I am sure that this change in the political situation in Russia will be reflected in the whole situation in the Union and, specifically (which is exceptionally important today), in an acceleration of the economic transformations. Hope has emerged that real radical economic reform will finally begin. This, I believe, is the main political result of the special Russian congress.

[Arkadyev] Before asking you the next question, permit me to recall an episode of the president's speech to the miners. “I wish to appeal to all miners,” M.S. Gorbachev said in conclusion of his speech. “Let us, comrades, now get down to practical business. If some people succeed in dragging us into political battles and mass meetings, the most severe ordeals await us. This should be understood.... We are all in the same boat—let us row in one direction.” But, having heard the president out, the miners left Moscow for their own regions, and, alas, not all of them went to the face. The present miners' strikes are no longer those which took place in '89. One notices the severe political demands of the strikers. I would like to know your view of the development of the present miners' strikes.

[Grinev] The circumstance which you noted in your question is exceptionally important. Today the main essence, the crux, perhaps, of the striking miners' demands is their political demands. After all, at the miners' meeting with the president, with the cabinet, and with Pavlov economic issues were secretly removed, as it were. But the miners today have recognized—and this is perceived from many aspects of their strike activity—that economics, as the Marxists affirm, is connected with politics. And the miners are interpreting their view of things unequivocally, claiming that without radical political reform and without the removal of command functions from the Communist Party (let us finally speak about this openly!), implementing radical economic reforms in the country today is impossible. Recognition of this fact is, in my view, the main essence of the miners' strikes. That is, the support on which the communists expatiated for 70 years, the support of the working class, is in this case proving ephemeral. Because most likely the working class has recognized that the ruling Communist Party is incapable of implementing economic transformations in the country. And I would like to say this in this connection. In Belorussia the strike was connected with the price rises, and I do not believe this to be an isolated phenomenon. I believe that in the next few weeks, days perhaps, we will experience all the people's sarcasm, so to speak, their pressure and full steam of negative emotions in connection with the jacked-up prices. People have probably not yet fully realized what the increased prices mean. But this action, whose economic and political groundlessness is today clear to all, will undoubtedly further influence the splash of both the strike movement and the negative mood of the people's masses. From my viewpoint, as a member of the legislature, the steps taken by the central government are simply futile. They might make sense in just one instance: were they to be accompanied by swift steps pertaining to realization of the ideas of economic reform and the introduction of market relations when the real stimulation of the entrepreneurial producer would begin. The center's failure to understand this is a tragic detail of our life. In a word, it is perfectly clear that the so-called “price reform” is an absolutely hopeless administrative phenomenon.

[Arkadyev] A depressing statement. But what can members of legislature do in this connection?

[Grinev] The main task of the legislatures of the Ukraine, Russia, and other republics today is to find ways of rapidly compensating for the politically negative consequences of this step of the USSR Government. But not from the viewpoint of support for it but for the purpose (to a certain extent) of preserving their reputation.

[Arkadyev] And was there, in your view, a different measure which would have avoided so sharp a jump in prices—this shock without therapy?

[Grinev] A difficult question. At precisely the moment when the prices were raised, another measure could not have been thought up locally. But the tragedy is that the previous 12-18 months, when a whole package of measures and mechanisms making it possible to avoid the state at which we have arrived today could have been adopted, were spent to absolutely no purpose. I am not even speaking about the program which was formerly proposed by Shatalin-Yavlinskiy or the program which was offered our legislature by Pilipchuk and the Economic Reform Commission or of a number of other programs either. We are today observing the results of the total rejection by our ruling coalition, which is as yet based on the considerable power of the communists, of radical economic transformations. It may be maintained in this respect that we had the opportunities to avoid so serious a state of shock of the economy and social conditions. But today it really would seem perhaps that there were no other measures. But this does not lessen the blame of those who shunned such steps in the past.

[Arkadyev] We have heard from you the thought that implementing radical economic reforms in the country is today impossible without the removal of command functions from the Communist Party. But to whom at the present time, in your view, does the real power belong?

[Grinev] You know, I recently saw on Central Television an interview conducted by Zorin, for whom I do not have all that much respect, with Italian Prime Minister Andreotti, whom I quite respect. During this interview the premier had some rather interesting words to say about power. As he put it, power is essentially the possibility of influencing people, their perception of reality, and their mood. Power means people's trust in the corresponding exponent of this power. In this interpretation of the question it is hard for me to say today that the Communist Party possesses real power—people's frame of mind generally far from corresponds to the omnipotence of the CPSU. But, on the other hand, we are still living in a strange society. Given all the conditions which have taken shape at the present time in respect of the central authorities, and given all the peripeteias of our reality, say, in any normal democratic society the president should have resigned long since. Or the example of the special Russian Congress of People's Deputies. Representatives of the "six," say, who opposed Yeltsin, lacking the support of the electorate and support at the congress and opposing the leader of the legislature, should also, it might have seemed, have tendered their resignations. But no. The vestiges of totalitarianism which make it possible to ignore democratic procedures, the law (as was the case in Lithuania, for example), and the normal thinking of the electorate, I repeat, persist with us. Such unfortunately is our actual reality—we are still living with such procedures. Therefore, when I maintain that real power belongs today to the communist structures, this means that communists are in the leading central positions and that executive authority, in the example of the Ukraine, say, belongs to members of the Communist Party.

[Arkadyev] What, in your view, is the political alignment of forces in our republic?

[Grinev] The Ukraine today, like every other republic for that matter, is quite distinctive from the viewpoint of the political and, yes, the economic situation also perhaps. We have relative tranquillity. Note, for example, the events in such a seemingly "stagnant" Belorussia where there is a strict majority of communists in the legislature. Yet strikes connected with the price rises are erupting in this republic. But such events are not occurring in the Ukraine, and in the capital of the republic, for example, all has been relatively calm. Why? It seems to me that there is a very important and serious aspect here. In the Ukraine various political forces perceived the opportunity, as we have now come to say, for consensus against the background of the events surrounding the Union treaty. Against the background of the fact that in terms of the results of the poll of the republic's inhabitants the people of the Ukraine spoke in favor of the creation of a union of sovereign states. And in our legislature also the voting showed that some of the communists and part of the opposition structures advocate one and the same logic of the conclusion of a Union treaty. And, you know, today this coalition, ephemeral in places perhaps, is nonetheless supported by many political forces. After all, even the extreme radical forces are not advocating, say, the immediate resignation of our legislature, something which incidentally has been heard in Belorussia. In my view, this consensus, even if ephemeral as yet, is today determining the political character of the Ukraine to a considerable extent. There is hope that taking advantage of the effect of such a consensus, we will succeed in achieving the appropriate wording of the Union treaty and certain transformations. Although such legislative parity is perhaps a temporary phenomenon. It does not have such a future in prospect. Nonetheless, I repeat, such a consensus is determining the political character of the Ukraine today.

[Arkadyev] People's frame of mind is also reflected, most likely. There is, for example, no clearly expressed rejection of legislature or the government, there are no public protests. Not yet, in any event. Why is this? Could it be that having caught some changes in the positions of the head of legislature and accepting the policy which Kravchuk has been trying to pursue of late, people have seen "light at the end of the tunnel"?

[Grinev] This is right. Although unfortunately we do not today have objective evaluations of the popularity rating of, say, the legislature and the head thereof and of the government. But I am somehow persuaded that were such a sociological study to be conducted at this time, the rating would be quite high for both Kravchuk and legislature. And not that low, let us say, for the government either. We are persuaded of this to a certain extent by the results of the plebiscite in the Ukraine. That is, legislature and the government are still trusted. Now, when we must—are simply obliged!—to begin cardinal transformations, this is very important. After all, the policy of price increases in the Ukraine has essentially simply driven us into a corner. Unless we take specific decisive steps today in movement toward the market economy, no good will come of this, and by the summer the legislature will have lost all its possible marks of approval....

[Arkadyev] We are now living in times when there is no shortage of evaluations of the state of affairs. Left, right, center, in a word, literally everyone, shelf-by-shelf, is prepared to resolve our realities and scrupulously concoct a preparation of any events in the country and the republic. But unfortunately we do not in the vast majority of such analytical studies encounter specific practical recommendations as to how precisely to emerge from our impasse. In a word, where precisely we live and who is to blame for all our troubles are, it would seem, clear to all. But what is to be done?

[Grinev] A simple question. And exceptionally difficult! After all, as you know, it is the simple questions which are the most complex. What is to be done? I am convinced that, whatever we do, two points must constantly be within our field of vision: sovereignty and the market economy. So today, to answer your question, I would say that it is essential to take specific steps in respect of realization of the market economy! In the Ukraine I see the following steps: next month the enactment of a law on denationalization and privatization, a law on demonopolization, and a law on securities and stock markets. Simply put, the triggering of mechanisms of the market economy within the next month or two. No later! And what is most important is that these laws begin to operate. This is my answer to the question: "What is to be done?" I see no other way. This in the republic. And the creation in parallel of my vision of the Union treaty, which would really reflect the ideas of the Declaration on Sovereignty. As far as the Ukraine's relations with other republics are concerned, as also the relations between republics, I see the country's future in these mechanisms. It is absolutely clear to me, for example, that today we must really harmonize and coordinate positions coming from the republics. This from the viewpoint of both market structures and the Union treaty. I am convinced that it is essential that we forswear the idea which is being propounded to the utmost and served up persistently today: The center, the president, the cabinet are the only hope. I see nothing of the sort.

[Arkadyev] You do not have such a hope?

[Grinev] I do not. These are moribund structures. Yes, there will be a center, but such as is created by the republics in the complex process en route to a market economy and sovereignty. There is no other way.

[Arkadyev] But the president and his team have a somewhat different view. Does this mean struggle, consequently? A tough struggle of today's center for survival. At the meeting with the miners also, incidentally, Gorbachev made it clearly understood: You may strike and call mass meetings; I will not, all the same, resign....

[Grinev] You know, this is a phenomenon which is currently being used to intimidate us. We are being intimidated with political struggle. The logic which is being suggested is: You are going ahead with political struggle and the people are starving. It is time, I believe, to desist from this cliche: You should not go in for political struggle, political confrontation, and debate. Unfortunately, but fortunately also perhaps, we have reached a point today where we have begun to recognize the entire power and usefulness of political struggle. A striking example of this is the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia where a most acute political struggle has developed. There is no escaping this today: The old power structures will not voluntarily give up their omnipotence without political struggle. This by no means signifies that political struggle needs to be taken to the point of civil war, with which we are also constantly being intimidated. We should avoid this at all costs. But without political struggle—struggle for the votes of the electorate, for its acceptance of this doctrine or the other, and recognition that with some logic of political direction or the other lies the future, while another political doctrine leads to impasse—without this we cannot get by today. And when I maintain that logic proceeds from the republics and the market economy via the ouster of the old dogmas to which the center is clinging, this is political struggle. This is a political disavowal of the center and the removal from it of political and economic power. Without this we simply have no future....

[Arkadyev] Thank you. And God help you in your difficult work as a member of legislature of the Ukraine and in the political struggle for its genuine sovereignty.

[Grinev] Thank you for the good wishes. On this path we have no other choice.

Moldova Adopts Anti-Crisis Economic Program

LD0905053591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] Kishinev, 8 May (MOLDOVA-PRESS-TASS)—The anti-crisis program endorsed today by the Government of the Republic of Moldova is intended to halt inflationary processes by increasing production in industry and agriculture.

In particular, by way of concrete measures to increase production of agricultural output, it envisages the creation of a special fund to encourage those who sell above-plan meat, milk, vegetables, and fruits to the state; while from industrial enterprises that produce consumer goods, the government is ready to remove taxes on the volume of output produced above the 1990 level.

Valerik Muravskiy, first deputy prime minister and minister of finance of the republic, spoke out for the use of certain unpopular measures during the implementation of the program.

"One can reduce the budget deficit, which has already exceeded 2 billion rubles," he stressed, "through a 50 percent transformation of free resources of enterprises, organizations, state and collective farms in favor of the budget; through reducing investments in new construction; the sale by auction of "projects that have been under construction for a long time" to commercial companies and joint-stock companies; through ceasing to give out ready cash to cooperatives; and other measures.

Caucasus

South Ossetia Autonomy Decision Under Fire

Georgia Rejects Decision

AU0805110191 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian 0400 GMT 8 May 91

[Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution on (?the Decision of the People's Deputies) of the Former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast of 4 May 1991]

[Text] On 4 May of this year, in Tskhinvali, at an illegally organized session of the town soviet of people's deputies of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, a decision was adopted on the abolition of the so-called Soviet Democratic Republic of South Ossetia and the restoration of the autonomous oblast which, although a part of the Republic of Georgia, is apparently to come under the jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR].

The Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To recognize as illegal the decision of 4 May 1991 of the town soviet of people's deputies of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.

The Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium [words indistinct] provocative fact [word indistinct] to USSR president Gorbachev, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Yeltsin, and USSR Supreme Soviet [words indistinct]

[Signed] Akaki Asatiani, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.
Tbilisi, 7 May 1991.

Letter Denounces Union Intentions

LD0805203591 Moscow TASS in English 1933 GMT 8 May 91

[By correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz May 8 TASS—There was no substantial change in the situation in the South Ossetian autonomous region over the past 24 hours. Single shots were heard in Tskhinvali suburbs in the early hours.

Several armed clashes between Georgian gunmen and local residents were registered in the Ossetian villages of the Tskhinvali, Znauri and Leninogori districts. Twelve Ossetians with gunshot wounds were brought to the regional hospital.

There is a danger of landslides and mud streams after the disastrous April earthquake in Georgia and South Ossetia. The water level in the Liakhva River is still high. As a result of the breakthrough of a dam near the mining village of Kvaisa, several villages and the left-bank part of Tskhinvali were flooded. Service lines were put out of order.

A landslide buried all houses in the village of Khekheti. The number of casualties is not known.

A team of builders, motor vehicles and other machinery, to do away with the earthquake's consequences, arrived in Dzhava from North Ossetia. Residents in the Dzhava district are regularly supplied with food over the Transcaucasian highway.

Humanitarian aid is also pouring in from Germany, France, Turkey and Sweden. However, deliveries to Tskhinvali are always escorted by military patrols: All roads leading to the regional centre are controlled by Georgian gunmen.

Tskhinvali residents and refugees again held a rally. They denounced a decision by the Georgian parliament, under which two districts in South Ossetia—Znauri and Tskhinvali—were annulled.

The Georgian parliament continues to insist on the withdrawal of all-Union interior troops from the South Ossetian region.

Refugees from South Ossetia, Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Rustavi, Borzhomi and other Georgian cities and districts are coming to the North Ossetian republic. Some 30,000 refugees were registered in Vladikavkaz. The republic is experiencing great difficulties with their settlement.

The presidium of the Georgian parliament and republican President Zviad Gamsakhurdia today sent a letter to President Mikhail Gorbachev and chairman of the Soviet parliament Council of Nationalities Rafik Nishanov, the SAKINFORM News Agency reports.

The letter denounces South Ossetia's decision to restore its autonomy.

The letter says that the decision to restore the South Ossetian autonomous region is nothing but a provocation now that constructive talks have resulted in reaching an understanding and a special commission of the parliaments of the USSR, the Russian Federation and Georgia, with the participation of representatives from the Ossetian population of the former South Ossetian autonomous region, is being formed in compliance with a decision of the Soviet parliament Council of Nationalities to settle the armed conflict in the region.

The letter requests Gorbachev and Nishanov to condemn this decision, since it puts into doubt the work of the parliamentary commission and a prospect for settling the conflict peacefully.

A letter was also sent to president of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin, expressing hope that the Russian parliament and its president will reject this provocative act.

The letter stresses that this act is incompatible with equal relations between the two sovereign republics, which are being established now.

Georgia's Gamsakhurdia Cited on Independence Aim

PM0805085191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 91 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed "Opinion for Export" feature citing extract from interview with Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia published in the Italian newspaper LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO; time and place not given

[Text] [LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO] President Gamzakhurdia, why are you waging this independence struggle?

[Gamsakhurdia] Every people wants to live in conditions of freedom and democracy. We were, you see, independent from 1918 through 1921, after which we were forcibly annexed to Russia. We want to restore the past, our autonomy. I know that many people consider this to be a risky and ill-considered step and say that we are economically vulnerable. But do you really think that it could be worse than it is now?

[LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO] What are your relations with Moscow like now?

[Gamsakhurdia] To be frank, our relations are pretty strange and unclear. We know what could happen to us and what measures we should take. On the other hand, we fear that Moscow may intervene militarily and that Soviet troops will create a bloodbath as a result of this. At the same time we would like to hope that some kind of talks can be organized with the center.

[LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO] Do you maintain relations with Gorbachev?

[Gamsakhurdia] I personally have no contacts with him, but there are unofficial contacts between us and the Kremlin.

[LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO] Do you actually fear military intervention?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, such a danger does exist and we must not hide it from ourselves.

[LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO] Excuse me if I again return to a question that is disagreeable to you. Will you be able to exist autonomously from an economic standpoint? I know that Moscow has deprived you of oil, natural gas, and electricity, causing a crisis in the republic.

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, the situation is critical, and the Union Government is trying to use these forms of blackmail just as it did with Lithuania. But if we achieve independence, we will have enough resources to maintain ourselves on our own: We have raw materials, oil, and ancient traditions of winemaking, and we can attract a large number of tourists to the Caucasus. In any case, you will appreciate, we will be no worse off than under the Communists.

[LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO] What is your opinion of perestroyka?

[Gamsakhurdia] It is an erroneous term, it is ambiguous. There has simply been no perestroyka. Gorbachev started liberalizing the system because the West forced it on him; he did so because he had no option.

[LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO] Is it true that you favor the restoration of the monarchy in Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] I have always liked constitutional monarchies such as those in Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and Belgium. I consider this a first-rate option for our time, too. But before proposing the restoration of the emperor to the people we must be free and independent.

Gamsakhurdia on Sociopolitical Situation

91US0489A Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 May 91 p 4

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent O. Chikhladze: "Gamsakhurdia Would Not Compromise"]

[Text] Tbilisi—Preparations for the election of the president of Georgia are proceeding in a very complex sociopolitical environment. Among other things, an election speech made by Z. Gamsakhurdia on republic television last Sunday testifies to this.

As was already reported, the Supreme Soviet elected Zviad Gamsakhurdia president several days after the promulgation of the "Act on the Restoration of the State Independence of Georgia," and at the same time scheduled the election of this supreme official on the basis of a universal, equal, direct, and secret vote for 26 May 1991.

The very first ukase of the president dated 15 April ordained, in particular, that "ministries, departments, and administrative organs shall facilitate in every way possible universal national and civil disobedience proclaimed by the organizations of the 'roundtable.'" The goal of the protest action, stressed the ukase, was "to restore the complete actual independence of Georgia and to liberate it from subordination to the dictates of imperial structures."

The scale of disobedience which, incidentally, is supported by the republic Confederation of Independent Trade Unions was growing. Still new collectives were joining the strikers. Enterprises continuing to operate were shipping some of the products to regions sympathizing with Georgia, and were keeping the rest at their warehouses until better times.

Such was the situation in which the nomination of candidates for the presidency of Georgia came to a close last week. By a decision of the Central Electoral Commission, lists of those supporting particular candidates will be accepted until 2200 hours on 2 May. The supporters of Gamsakhurdia were the first ones to file such a list. Others will be registered if they file similar lists before the deadline.

The election speech by Zviad Gamsakhurdia last week leads to the conclusion that the polarization of sociopolitical forces in the republic is growing. The speech contained responses to the main rebukes of the opposition addressed to the authorities of the republic. Rejecting the accusation that the living conditions of the populace have deteriorated, the speaker stated that genuine economic changes are impossible as long as Georgia remains an integral part of the USSR. In his opinion, such rebukes are voiced by "supporters of the Kremlin attempting to discredit the new authorities." Appeals to show greater flexibility in relations with the center, in essence, induce one to sign the Union treaty. However, as Gamsakhurdia believes, this would mean to betray the principles of the liberation movement.

The president called those who appeal for an immediate transfer of a segment of land to private ownership "enemies of Georgia and traitors to national interests." He believes that the privatization of land should be preceded by the adoption of laws on citizenship and on land. However, before these laws are adopted, the international standing of Georgia needs to be reinforced, domestic stability needs to be attained, and the diplomatic recognition of the republic by at least one state needs to be secured.

The next rebuke hurled at the authorities in the course of preparations for the elections says that strikes along the lines of national disobedience have in essence turned into a "self-blockade." Having called this rebuke a provocation, the president stated that the strikes hurt primarily the economy of the USSR. It was also said that the republic suffers losses as well, but freedom will not be gained without sacrifices. Gamsakhurdia repeated that flexibility and maneuvers in relations with the center will bring about betraying the interests of the nation.

The charge that the Supreme Soviet of Georgia elected on a multiparty basis has turned into a one-party soviet, and that the authorities interfere in the issues of culture, foisting their ideology on the latter, were also rejected completely.

The polarization of political forces is objectively confirmed by the nomination of presidential candidates. There are only nine of them. In addition to Gamsakhurdia, they are Chairman of the Intellectual Association "Free Opinion" Irakliy Shengelaya, Chairman of the Constitutional-Democratic Party of Georgia Georgiy Korganashvili, Chairman of the All-Georgia Union of Farmers Roin Liparteliani, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Independent Party of Georgia Dzhimi Mikeladze, Chairman of the "Democratic Georgia" movement Kartlos Garibashvili, Chairman of the Board of the Union of National Accord and Renewal Valerian Advadze, Chairman of the Board of the People's Front Nodar Natadze, and editor in chief of the journal BALAVARI Tamaz Kvachantiradze.

A statement by a group of voters on nominating the leader of the Corps of Georgian Rescuers Mkhedrioni Dzhaba Ioseliani as a presidential candidate was not accepted by the Central Electoral Commission because he is in pretrial confinement. Officially, he has been charged with offenses punishable under the criminal code. However, Ioseliani's supporters consider him a political prisoner.

In several days, we will learn the names of registered candidates.

Border Situation, NKAO Remain 'Tense'

Arrests Reported

LD0805223691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 8 May 91

[Excerpt] The situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast, remains tense. Subunits of the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and Soviet Army continue their operation to disarm Armenian armed formations, reports the RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY. In the past 24 hours one person has been killed and people have been injured. The villages of Kornidzor, Tekh, Aravus, Kaznafar and (Vaychatur) have been surrounded. In the village of Shurnukh in [name indistinct] rayon, all the men have been arrested. According to (Feliks Manikanyan), permanent representative of the Republic of Armenia in Moscow, the men were taken out of the village to an unknown destination. It is not known what has happened to these people. He also stated that troop concentrations are continuing in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan, where the population is Armenian. It is not yet clear what troops they are. The deportation of Armenians from this rayon is probably being prepared.

We do not have any information about events on the border between the two Transcaucasian republics and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast at the Azerbaijani permanent mission. [passage omitted]

Area Described

LD0805234391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1900 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] The situation in the areas in Armenia on the border with Azerbaijan remain complicated. Our correspondent, Karen Khumaryan, met with Suren Saakyan, deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia. Here is their conversation:

[Begin recording] [Khumaryan] The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic and the leadership of the republic have stated more than once recently that there is not a single armed civilian on the Armenian-Azerbaijan border, but that only militia are serving to defend Armenian settlements.

[Saakyan] Yes. A large-scale military operation is going on now to disarm militia detachments on the border. The situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijan border is tense. Cattle are being rustled, and hostages are being taken continually. In some villages on the border where there is the most acute crime-inducing situation, there are posts of operatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia that aim to stop these violations of the law. The tension remains. We are trying, where possible, to pull militia men back, to take them to rayon centers from the border villages.

[Khumaryan] According to today's reports from the rayon militia departments, a withdrawal of armored vehicles and troop contingents from previously occupied settlements is taking place. Do you think that that is the end of the incident? In response there has been a considerable accumulation of special purpose militia detachments, as well as Internal Troops in the Shaumyanskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan; that is, the area where the population is fully Armenian.

[Saakyan] To date there is no wide-scale withdrawal of armored vehicles and servicemen of these unknown troops. There is just redeployment; for example, a military operation is carried out in one border area, so troops are transferred to a different border area. [end recording]

Troop Movements Cause Alarm

PM0805170491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[S. Mostovshchikov roundup: "Internal Troops Leaving the Armenian-Azerbaijani Border"]

[Text] Troop movements have begun on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and by all appearances they have further exacerbated the situation. According to information received by IZVESTIYA, the maneuvers are associated with the decision to redistribute the roles of the Army and USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. After the holidays, the Internal Troops will be concentrated in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the KGB and its border troops will be responsible for the Nakhichevan sector of the border, and the remaining sector of the border between the republics will be handed over to the Soviet Army.

According to Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin, commander of the USSR MVD Internal Troops, the troop maneuvers "alarmed some people." However, Yuriy Shatalin says, the tactics of military operations in these situations have now changed. Whereas formerly the command used to recommend, strictly speaking, that they take cover and try not to become drawn into conflicts, now there is an order to meet fire with fire. The redeployment of troops is due to be completed after the holidays. It is possible that the new distribution of roles between the departments will have some effect on the situation, but as yet the situation remains not very cheerful.

IZVESTIYA correspondent Sergey Bablumyan reported to the editorial office on the morning of 8 May that a group of Russian deputies returned to Yerevan 7 May after a trip to the zone of hostilities. RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy Anatoliy Shabad refused to leave the village of Voskepar in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon until all firing on the settlement was stopped and guarantees of people's safety were received from the military command.

Refugees from Getashen have begun to arrive in Yerevan from Stepanakert; there are 1,150 of them in all. The first group, of around 300 old men, women, and children, was taken straight from "Erebuni" Airport to boarding houses in the city of Tsakhkadzor.

Rumors are still spreading in the republic to the effect that the Armenian Nuclear Power Station [AES] is in danger: The Internal Troops allegedly intend to blow it up. Here is what AES director Migran Vartanyan told Sergey Bablumyan.

"The unhealthy speculation about the power station is totally unfounded. The AES is under the protection of Internal Troops subunits. As always when a tense situation arises in the republic, additional measures are being adopted to protect the site. That is the way it is, and that's all," Migran Vartanyan stressed.

To supplement these reports, IZVESTIYA obtained a report from the USSR MVD Press Office on the course of fulfillment by the USSR MVD, USSR KGB, and USSR Defense Ministry of the USSR president's 25 July 1990 decree "On Banning the Creation of Armed Formations Not Authorized by USSR Legislation and on the Confiscation of Unlawfully Held Weapons." These departments are carrying out relevant operations in regions close to the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and also in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

Several Armenian armed groupings have already been disarmed and a large quantity of firearms and military equipment has been confiscated; in the last two days, in particular, 66 automatic weapons, 30 pistols, 11 hail guns and antiaircraft guns, two mortars, 10 items of military hardware, and several thousand rounds of ammunition have been confiscated.

In the course of investigations it has been established that a certain proportion of the weapons confiscated from guerrillas had been seized from troop units and internal affairs organs on Armenian territory.

The USSR MVD notes in its report that servicemen and staffers of law enforcement organs do not kill civilians or set fire to villages.

'Fierce Resistance' Noted

LD0805135891 Moscow TASS in English 1334 GMT 8 May 91

["At the Soviet Interior Ministry Press Centre"—TASS headline]

Moscow May 8 TASS—In accordance with the presidential decree of July 25, 1990, banning illegal armed groups and sanctioning the seizure of illegally-kept arms, the Soviet Interior Ministry, the KGB and the Soviet Defence Ministry are taking measures to disarm illegal armed groups and confiscate arms in districts near the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region.

Some Armenian armed groups have been disarmed, and many firearms and military hardware have been seized over the past two days, including 66 submachine guns, 30 handguns, 11 hail [as received] and anti-aircraft guns, two mortars, ten military vehicles and several thousand ammunition rounds.

An investigation revealed that some confiscated arms had been stolen from military and Interior Ministry units in Armenia.

Law enforcement bodies face fierce resistance and are being attacked by militants. Deaths have been reported here.

However, allegations in the mass media that servicemen and policemen are killing citizens and burning down villages are groundless, according to the Soviet Interior Ministry press centre.

Ter-Petrosyan Accuses Gorbachev of Inaction

PM0805150691 Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 May 91 p 4

[Interview with Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan by Jean-Jacques Mevel in Yerevan; date not given]

[Text] Yerevan—Following the violent police operation against two Armenian villages in Azerbaijan, Yerevan is settling its accounts with Moscow: Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the young president, accuses Mikhail Gorbachev of having deliberately turned a blind eye to an anti-Armenian plot orchestrated by the Soviet Interior Ministry. In an interview with LE FIGARO, Levon Ter-Petrosyan said he had tried to alert Mikhail Gorbachev in person on 22 April—in other words one week before the events—to the explosive atmosphere in the villages of Getashen and Martunashen.

Several appeals went unanswered. "It was only on 1 May, after the tragedy, that Gorbachev granted me 10 minutes on the telephone. Until then, I am sure that he was avoiding talking to me. Why? Because once more he was trying to invent an alibi so that he could subsequently say he knew nothing about it. That is what he did after the violent action against Lithuania."

Levon Ter-Petrosyan directly accuses Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo of involvement in the 30 April "pogroms" which, he said, caused the death of 36 people. Although the previous massacres of Armenians in Azerbaijan may have been attributed to angry crowds, "the Getashen and Martunashen pogroms are the work of state institutions carried out according to a previously drawn up plan.... In Moscow responsibility rests with Boris Pugo and General Shatalin, head of the Internal Troops." The Armenian Republic has decided to take proceedings against the two men; it is going to demand the formation of a USSR Supreme Soviet commission of inquiry.

A Friend of Yeltsin

The Armenian president, who readily portrays himself as a friend of Boris Yeltsin, also sees it as proof of the disintegration of the central government: "In Moscow, the institutions are no longer functioning normally. The different parts of the state—the KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the Defense Ministry—are in opposition to each other. That is why I asked Mikhail Gorbachev to take the region under his personal protection.... We need one man who has responsibility."

"It seems to me that the Soviet president has now understood the serious nature of the situation in the Caucasus," Levon Ter-Petrosyan continued. "There is a risk of a chain reaction here." There is also the question of the expulsion of Armenians from the two villages inside Azerbaijan. "KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov assured me that it is no longer on the agenda. I have no guarantee."

The Red Army apparently also bears some responsibility for the deterioration in the atmosphere because it is "secretly" arming Azerbaijanis and Armenians—two communities which are divided by centuries of history. On the other hand, the Armenian president hinted several times that KGB Chief Kryuchkov played a positive role at the height of the crisis.

Armenians Blame Gorbachev For Evacuation Operation

LD0805221991 Paris Domestic Service in French 2030 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] At the call of the churches of the Armenian community in France, some 2 thousand people demonstrated in front of the Soviet Embassy in Paris this afternoon in protest against Soviet intervention in the Armenian villages bordering on Azerbaijan. Another similar demonstration took place in Brussels before the EEC headquarters.

In Armenia, the leaders accuse the Red Army of wanting to deport their citizens. Here is the testimony of the spokesman of the Armenian National Movement, contacted by telephone in Yerevan by Leo Nikolyan:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified spokesman in vernacular with superimposed French translation] The Red Army soldiers issued ultimata to Armenians to lay down their weapons under the threat of shooting at the crowds. They have already done this in several villages. Many Armenians are taken hostages and deported to Azerbaijan by the Soviet troops.

[Nikolyan] Is there also a fight between Armenians and Azeris?

[Spokesman] No, no. It is the Soviet troops that are massacring the Armenians. The Armenians merely defend themselves. The Red Army troops arrived well equipped on board planes and helicopters.

[Nikolyan] What is Gorbachev's stand?

[Spokesman] A few days ago Gorbachev met Armenian President Lev Ter-Petrosyan and assured him there will be no evacuation of the population. He betrayed us. He deported the Armenians from the Getashen region. We Armenians are convinced that this operation is Gorbachev's own decision. [end recording]

Armenia Warned Over Crimes Against Army

PM0905095491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Colonel V. Kaushanskiy report from Yerevan: "Military Council Issues Warning"]

[Text] The Transcaucasus Military District Military Council has sent a message to the leadership of the Republic of Armenia. In particular, it expresses profound concern over the highly unstable sociopolitical situation in the region, which has led to a resumption of criminal acts against servicemen and their families. The first week of May was literally packed with instances of the use of weapons against military men, hostage-taking, and the seizure of official vehicles and equipment.

The message points out that in the city of Dilizhan Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Kolmogorov was physically assaulted; in the same city a mob seized two armored vehicles; and on 4 May Colonel N. Petrov was seized while traveling in an official vehicle to one of the subunits under his command, and was held by guerrillas for more than 24 hours. On the territory of the troop training center, construction cranes and trailers were used in an attempt to seize four T-54 training tanks. The raiders seized Lieutenant Colonel R. Bekgulatov, who tried to prevent the hijacking of the equipment.

These and other incidents cited in the message are causing indignation among servicemen, and could lead to unpredictable consequences.

The Transcaucasus Military District Military Council called on the Armenian leadership to stop the criminal acts by destructive forces. Otherwise, the document stresses, the most resolute measures will be adopted to prevent bandit attacks in defiance of Soviet laws and to protect the honor and dignity of servicemen.

Mutalibov Stresses Determination To Defend Land

NC0805095691 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 6 May 91

[Excerpt] President Ayaz Mutalibov received a delegation from the French Fund for Democracy [Fransa Demokrasya Ugrunda Fund] on 5 May. The delegation, which is headed by [name indistinct], is on a familiarization visit to Baku.

President Mutalibov explained the social and political situation in the country in general and in the Transcaucasus region in particular to the guests and made a detailed analysis of the reasons the Armenian nationalists are waging a bloody war against Azerbaijan. Discussing the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and the rayons bordering Armenia, Mutalibov explained the measures taken to establish peace and settle the territorial dispute in the region. President Mutalibov asserted: For four years now the armed bandit groups from Armenia have been spreading fear among the citizens of Azerbaijan without regard for national affiliation. We have no territorial claim against Armenia, but Armenia has been trying to wrest the NKAO from Azerbiajan by force, despite the fact that the NKAO has always belonged to our republic. We resolutely demand that this neighboring republic refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the sovereign Republic of Azerbaijan. We also demand that Armenia stop sending armed men to our territory, where they intimidate [word indistinct]. Our people are prepared to defend the land of their ancestors, just as any other civilized people would do under similar circumstances. [passage omitted]

Central Asia

Kazakh Legislature Prepares Citizenship Law

LD0705200791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 7 May 91

[From the "Television News Service" program—read by announcer]

[Text] The legislature of Kazakhstan has prepared a draft law on citizenship of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. The draft envisages that only those who have lived on the territory of the republic for at least 10 years, who voluntarily sign an oath of loyality to the republic, and who have a command of the state language may be granted citizenship. Chronic alcoholics, as well as vagrants and prostitutes, do not have the right to citizenship.

Oblast First Secretary in Uzbekistan Replaced

PM0805103791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 91 Second Edition p 6

[UZTAG-TASS report: "Oblast Party Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Karshi, 6 May—An organizational question was examined today at an Kashka-Darya Uzbek Communist Party Oblast Committee plenum. A.R. Atadzhanov was relieved of his duties as obkom first secretary on his transfer to other work.

T.P. Khidirov, who had worked as chairman of the Kashka-Darya Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, was elected to this post by secret ballot.

The plenum was addressed by I.A. Karimov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, and president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.

Kashkadary Oblast Party Committee Holds Plenum

LD0705201391 Tashkent Domestic Service in Uzbek 0200 GMT 7 May 91

[Excerpts] Yesterday a plenum of the Kashkadary Oblast Party Committee was held. It examined an organizational question. Atadzhanov, due to be transferred to another post, was relieved from duty as first secretary of the oblast party committee and bureau member. Khidirov, previously working as chairman of the Kashkadarya Oblast Soviet of Peoples Deputies, was elected first secretary of the Kashkadarya Oblast Party Committee through a secret ballot. [passage omitted]

Karimov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, spoke at the plenum.

Tajikistan Party Registers With Justice Ministry

LD0705200691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1158 GMT 7 May 91

[Text] Dushanbe, 7 May (TADZHIKTA-TASS)—The Communist Party of Tajikistan has become the first public association registered in the republic's Ministry of Justice. In the words of Fayzullo Abdulloyev, the leader of the department, the rules of the Communist Party of Tajikistan correspond completely with the law of the republic on public organizations.

At present, the party of Tajik communists,. headed by Kakhar Makhkamov, president of the republic, is the most real sociopolitical force in Tajikstan. Its membership has remained stable over a number of years, unlike other regions of the country. Communists have a high rating among sections of the population who link their stay in power with the hope for the stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in the republic.

Afghan Delegation Ends Visit to Tajikistan

LD0705210291 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 0700 GMT 7 May 91

[Excerpts] The Afghan delegation from Balkh Province has ended their visit to Tajikistan. They were invited to Tajikistan by the society for cultural relations with compatriots living abroad, called Paivand. The delegation from Balkh held talks with leaders of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the city of Dushanbe, the city party committee, a series of ministries, the clergy, and activists from the Paivand society. [passage omitted]

As a result of the visit, an agreement on cooperation between the Paivand society and business, industrial, and public circles in Balkh Province was signed. In line with the agreement an exchange of specialists and students will take place. Both sides agreed to send one another newspapers, journals, and books; to hold in the cities of Mazari-Sharif and Dushanbe joint scientific conferences and seminars; to jointly celebrate important events in the life of both peoples—festivals associated with well-known representatives of science, culture, and literature. The visitors stated that they are prepared to receive a group of young people at the theology schools. [passage omitted]